Advanced spacecraft fire safety: Proposed projects and program plan by Vedha-Nayagam, M. & Youngblood, Wallace W.
NASA Contractor Report 185147
ADVANCED SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY:
PROPOSED PROJECTS AND PROGRAM PLAN
Wallace W. Youngblood and Dr. M. Vedha-Nayagam
WYLE LABORATORIES
Huntsville, Alabama
(Wyle Report No. 60300-1)
October, 1989
Prepared for
Lewis Research Center
Under Contract NAS3-25367
NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
$_F TY: PF, n
Final _e.port {_yle L._b_.}
AND I-;RQqR._H PLAN
17o p C_,CL 22_
_3/t8
NgO- ].7 b4 ._
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900003329 2020-03-19T23:48:27+00:00Z

NASA Contractor Report 185147
%1 ¸
ADVANCED SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY:
PROPOSED PROJECTS AND PROGRAM PLAN
Wallace W. Youngblood and Dr. M. Vedha-Nayagam
WYLE LABORATORIES
Huntsville, Alabama
(Wyle Report No. 60300-1)
October, 1989
Prepared for
Lewis Research Center
Under Contract NAS3-25367
NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

FOREWORD
This report was prepared by Wyle Laboratories for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), Lewis Research Center, under Contract Number NAS3-25367.
The NASA technical manager for this effort was Mr. Robert Friedman, Microgravity
Science and Technology Branch, NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio.
ii
v"
"V"
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to acknowledge the many contributions to this effort made by Wyle
Laboratories' Consultants, Mr. J. Howard Kimzey (Houston, Texas) and Dr. Harold L.
Kaplan (San Antonio, Texas). The authors wish also to recognize the guidance and
advice provided by the NASA technical manager throughout this effort, Mr. Robert
Friedman, Microgravity Science and Technology Branch, NASA Lewis Research
Center, Cleveland, Ohio.
Finally the authors wish to thank the many organizations and individuals who
responded to the Spacecraft Fire Safety Survey conducted by Wyle. Among these
respondees, special recognition is given to Mr. Matthew B. Cole, Safety Division,
NASA Johnson Space Center (Houston, Texas) and Mr. Charles D. Ray, Environmental
Control and Life Support Branch, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (Huntsville,
Alabama) for their many contributions of advice, information, and technical
recommendations.
,°°
111

TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND PROGRAM PLAN
2.1 Information Sources For Fire-Safety Projects
2.2 PrioritizationOf Fire-Safety Projects
2.3 Overall Program Plan
3.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: FIRE-DETECTION TECHNIQUES AND
HARDWARE
3.1 Background
3.2 Proposed Fire-Detection Related Projects
3.3 Development Of Expert Systems For Fire Detection/Alarm/
Suppression
3.4 Development Of Centralized Fire Detector/Monitors With
Distributed Sensors
3.5 Development Of Techniques For Early Detection Of Incipient
Conditions By Selective Monitoring Of Gases
3.6 Development Of Smoke Detectors Using Microsensor
Technology
3.7 Research On Low-Gravity Fires
3.8 Other Fire Detection Projects
4.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT AND
ATMOSPHERE CLEANUP
4.1 Background
4.2 Proposed Fire Extinguishment And Atmosphere Cleanup-
Related Projects
4.3 Evaluation Of Candidate Fire Extinguishants And
Application Techniques For Use In Spacecraft Hyperbaric
And Hypobaric Atmospheres
4.4 Development Of A High-Capacity Environmental Cleanup
Auxiliary Unit
4.5 Research On Candidate Extinguishants For Use In Low-
Gravity Atmospheres
4.6 Other Fire Extinguishment Projects
iv
Page No.
ii
oo.
Ill
vii
ix
X
xii
1-1
2-1
2-1
2-2
2-6
3-1
3-1
3-4
3-7
3-12
3-18
3-24
3-29
3-36
4-1
4-1
4-3
4-5
4-13
4-22
4-26
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS:
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
RISK AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT
Background
Proposed Risk and Hazard Assessment Projects
Development Of New Fire Risk Analysis Tools For
Advanced, Manned Spacecraft
Research On Numerical Modeling Of Fire Scenarios In
Spacecraft
Other Risk And Hazard Assessment Projects
PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: TOXICOLOGY, HUMAN RESPONSE AND
ATMOSPHERE CONTROL
6.1 Background
6.2 Proposed Efforts
6.3 Evaluation Of Requirements For Continuous Monitoring Of
Contaminants On-Orbit And Materials Screening For Toxicity
6.4 Other Toxicity, Human Response, And Atmosphere Control
Projects
PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: GROUND-BASED TESTING AND
STANDARD TEST METHODS FOR FLAMMABILITY
7.1 Background
7.2 Proposed Ground-Based Testing And Standard Test Methods
For Flammability Projects
7.3 Test Procedures And Pass/Fail Criteria For Electrical
Wire/Cable InsulationFlammability
7.4 Critical Review Of Relevant Test Methods For The Screening
Of Non-Metallic Materials For Flammability
7.5 Other Ground-Based Testing And Standards Development
Projects
SUMMARY OF OTHER FIRE-SAFETY TOPICS AND PROJECTS
8.1 Additional Comments On Post-Fire Cleanup
8.2 Prepartion Of A Spacecraft Fire Safety Handbook
8.3 Spacecraft Crew Training
8.4 Prevention Or Mitigation Of Spontaneous Ignition
8.5 Long-Term, On-Orbit Storage Of Chemically Reactive Liquids
And Gases
8.6 Design And Development Of Fire-Safe Appliances For Crew
Use
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND
OVERSIGHT
CONCLUDING REMARKS
REFERENCES
Pag e No.
5-1
5-1
5-1
5-3
5-10
5-17
6-1
6-1
6-1
6-4
6-12
7-1
7-1
7-2
7-4
7-8
7-17
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-2
8-2
8-3
8-3
9-1
I0-I
11-1
_f
V
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
RESPONDEES TO SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY SURVEY
PRIORITIZATION PROCESS DESCRIPTION
REVIEW OF SPACECRAFT FIRE PROTECTION
vi
2-3
3-1
3-2
3-3
3-4
3.-5
3--6
3.-7
3-8
4-3
4-4
4.-5
LIST OF FIGURES
Flowchart Of Spacecraft Fire-Safety Project Selection
Highest Priority Fire Safety Projects' Work Breakdown
Structure By Work Discipline
Time-Line For Spacecraft Fire Safety Projects (By Calendar Year)
Concept For Fire Detection Sensors In A Spacecraft Rack
Schedule For Fire Detection Projects
Work Breakdown Structure For Development Of Expert Systems
F or Fire Detection/Alarm/Suppression
Simplified Concept Of Fiber-Optic Based Fire-Detection
System For Spacecraft
Work Breakdown Structure For Development Of Centralized
Fire-Detection Monitors With Distributed Sensors
Work Breakdown Structure For Development Of Techniques
For Early Detection Of Incipient Fire Conditions By
Selective Monitoring Of Gases
Commercial Metal Oxide Semiconductor Sensor For Combustion
Gases
Work Breakdown Structure For Development Of Smoke Detectors
Using Microsensor Technology
Work Breakdown Structure For Research On Low-Gravity Fires
Typical Fuel Configurations For Study In Long Duration
Microgravity Tests
Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishers In The U.S. Shuttle Orbiter Cabin
Schedule For Fire Extinguishment And Atmosphere Cleanup
Projects
Varying Degrees Of Combustion In An Oxygen-Nitrogen
Atmosphere
Work Breakdown Structure For Evaluation Of Fire Extin-
guishants And Application Techniques For Use In Spacecraft
Hypobaric & Hyperbaric Atmospheres
Hamilton Standard Smoke-Toxic Gas Removal Unit
Page No.
2-3
2-4
2-7
3-3
3--6
3-9
3-15
3-16
3-21
3-25
3-26
3-31
3-33
4-2
4--4
4-7
4-9
4-15
vii
-- LIST OF FIGURES CContinued)
4-6
4-7
4-8
5-3
6-1
6-2
7-1
7-2
7-3
7-4
7-5
7-6
9-1
U.S. Army CRDEC Reactive Plasma Bed For Decontamination
Of Toxic Gases
Work Breakdown Structure For Development Of High Capacity
Environmental Clean-Up Auxiliary Unit
Work Breakdown Structure For Research On Candidate Extin-
guishants For Use In Low-Gravity Atmospheres
Schedule For Fire Risk And Hazard Assessment Projects
Work Breakdown Structure For Evaluation Of New Fire Risk
Analysis Tools For Advanced, Manned Spacecraft
Work Breakdown Structure For Research On Numerical Modeling
Of Fire Scenarios For Spacecraft
Project Schedule For Spacecraft Atmosphere Control, Human
Response, And Toxicology Projects
Work Breakdown Structure For Evaluation Of Requirements For
Continuous Monitoring Of Contaminants On-Orbit And Material
Screening For Toxicity
Schedule For Ground-Based Testing And Standard Test Methods
For Flammability Projects
Work Breakdown Structure For Test Procedures And Pass/Fail
Criteria F or Electrical Wire/Cable InsulationF lainmability
ESA Oxygen Index Apparatus
NASA Standard Upward Burning Test Apparatus
Cone Calorimeter
Work Breakdown Structure For Critical Review Of Relevant
Test Methods For Screening Non-Metallic Materials For
Flammability
Recommended NASA Organization For Management And Oversight:
Spacecraft Fire Safety
Page No.
4-16
4-17
4-23
5-2
5-6
5-12
6-3
6-8
7-3
7-6
7-8
7-9
7-12
7-13
9-3
°°o
Vlll
2-1
2-2
4-1
6-I
LIST OF TABLES
Research And Technology Development Topics: Spacecraft
F ireSafety
Organization Of Highest-Priority Fire-Safety Project
Descriptions
Typical Contaminant Sources Anticipated For Space Station
Freedom
Space Station Safety Philosophy Precedence (How Much Safety?)
Requirements For A Numerical Code Used In Microgravity Fire
Modeling
Candidate Strategies For Spacecraft Materials Selection Based
On Combustion Toxicity
Page No.
2-9
2-6
4-19
5-4
5-15
6-7
ix
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS
(See Note 1)
w
u
AR
ARC
ARS
ATA
AV
BR
CDR
CY
ECLSS
ESA
EVA
FAA
FDS
FMEA
FMECA
g
GC/MS
GSF C
GT
HAL
HMF
HEPA
Hx
IFO
IMS
IR
JEM
JPL
JSC
KSC
LaRC
LDV
LeRC
LIF
MSFC
NASA
NASDA
NBS
NFPA
NIST
NRL
NSTS
PCB
PDR
PMMS
RBP
SC
Applied Research
Ames Research Center
Atmosphere Revitalization System
Atmospheres Absolute
Avionics
Basic Research
Critical Design Review
Calendar Year
Environmental Control/Life Support System
European Space Agency
Extra-Vehicular Activity
Federal Aviation Administration
Fire Detection/Suppression
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects CriticalityAnalysis
Gravitational Acceleration
Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer
Goddard Space Flight Center
Ground (-Based) Testing
Hyperbaric Airlock
Health Maintenance Facility
High Efficiency Particulate Aerosol (Filter)
Heat Exchanger
Infrared Fiber Optics
Ion Mobility Spectrometer
Infrared
Japanese Experiment Module
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(Lyndon B.) Johnson Space Center
(John F.) Kennedy Space Center
Langley Research Center
Laser Doppler Velocimeter
Lewis Research Center
Laser Induced Fluorescence
(George C.) Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Development Agency (Japan)
National Bureau of Standards (Currently, NIST)
National Fire Protection Agency
National Institute for Standards and Technology (Formerly,
NBS)
(U.S. Navy) Naval Research Laboratory
National Space Transportation System
Printed Circuit Board
Preliminary Design Review
Process Materials Management System
Reactive Bed Plasma
Source Code
X
SMAC
SRM & QA
SRU
SS
SSP
STS
TC
TD
UV
VESDA
WBS
WSTF
_-g
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS (Continued)
(See Note I)
Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration
Safety, Reliability,Maintainability,and Quality Assurance
Smoke Removal Unit
Space Station (Freedom)
Space Station Program
Space Transportation System
Thermocouple
Technology Development
Ultra Violet
Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus
Work Breakdown Structure
(NASA/JSC) White Sands Test Facility
Microgravity
NOTE i: All other symbols are defined in text or have
engineering and scientificusage.
corn mort
_.,¢#
xi
ADVANCED SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY:
PROPOSED PROJECTS AND PROGRAM PLAN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A detailed review was performed to identify new or currently unresolved spacecraft
fire-safety issues and the efforts deemed necessary to be initiated or expanded for
their resolution. The major thrust of the review was devoted to advanced manned
spacecraft, such as Space Station Freedom, where the spacecraftls size, complexity,
mission, and on-orbit duration may pose new and/or more exacerbating fire safety-
related threats. An important source of information and identification of fire safety-
related issues and concerns was from a formal survey conducted by the authors. The
survey resulted in approximately 155 total recommendations accumulated from 36
individual respondees or organizations representing fire-safety workers from industry,
academia, NASA and other government agencies. These 155 recommendations have
been combined and correlated with the independent reviews performed by the authors
and synthesized into some 58 clearly defined technical issues and recommendations.
A recommended program plan is presented for those spacecraft fire safety-issues or
concerns deemed to have the highest priority for initiation and/or resolution over the
next five years. To accomplish this, the authors combined a large portion of the 58
tabulated issues into approximately 30 research and engineering projects. These
projects were prioritized with respect to their perceived urgency (for, e.g., Space
Station Freedom design and issue resolution), their long-term importance to the safety
of all advanced, manned spacecraft, status of enabling technology, cost and effort, and
other factors. Some 14 of the highest priority of these projects are described in detail
herein, along with their proposed schedules and work breakdown structures (WBSs).
These projects are grouped within the following thematic areas:
0
0
0
0
0
Advanced Fire Detection Techniques and Hardware
Fire Extinguishment and Atmosphere Cleanup
Risk and Hazard Assessment
Toxicology, Human Response and Atmosphere Control
Ground-Based Testing and Standard Test Methods
Clearly, the projects identified and described herein are at various stages of
development. Some of the projects are already underway, some are recommended for
immediate initiation for resolution within the next two to five years, and others are
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admittedly of a much longer-term nature due to their dependence on emerging
technologies and/or their need for substantial testing in a low-gravity environment.
The highest-priorityprojects are as follows:
Near-Term Projects: (Present through Calendar Year (CY) 1992)
O
O
O
0
0
0
0
Evaluation of New Fire Risk Analysis Tools
Test Procedures for Electrical Wire Insulation Flammability
Evaluation of Contaminants and Continuous Monitoring for
Toxicity
Development of Centralized Fire Detectors/Monitors
Research on Numerical Modeling of Spacecraft Fire Scenarios
Review and Revision of Current Spacecraft Material Flamma-
bility Tests
Evaluation of Ventilation Flow Models for Spacecraft
Intermediate-Term Projects: (CY 1990 through 1993/1994)
0
0
0
0
0
Development of Expert Systems for Fire Detection/Suppression
Evaluation of Fire Extinguishants for Hyperbaric Atmospheres
Development of High-Capacity Environmental Cleanup Unit
Development of Techniques for Early Detection of Incipient
Fire Conditions
Development of Smoke Detectors Using Microsensor Techniques
Long-Term Projects: (through 1995 and beyond)
O
O
Research on Candidate Fire Extinguishants for Low Gravity
Research on Low-Gravity Fire Characteristics
In addition, brief discussions of another 12 lower-priority projects and nine unranked
suggestions present further information on important issuesin spacecraft firesafety.
Finally, recommendations are presented relevant to the overall program management
and oversight deemed necessary to ensure successful and efficient initiation and
completion, or resolution, of the proposed projects. It is recommended that responsi-
bility for the technical management of the projects should be retained by the
appropriate spacecraft project officer and NASA field center engineering directorates
and laboratories. However, the safety-related issue coordination and oversight
activities should be formalized through direct involvement of NASA's Safety, Relia-
bility, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM & QA) offices at all levels.
Specifically, these recommendations may be summarized as follows:
1) Oversight responsibility for spacecraft fire safety should be main-
tained by NASA Headquarters, preferably by Code Q (SRM & QA
office).
°°°
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2)
3)
4)
Each NASA field center involved in some aspect of manned space-
craft should establisha "Spacecraft Fire Safety Committee."
At least one representative from each field center's SRM & QA
Office should be a member of that center's Spacecraft Fire-Safety
Committee.
The exchange of information and concerns relevant to fire-safety
related issues between each field center's Spacecraft Fire-Safety
Committee should be the responsibilityof the Committee's chairman.
A narrative review of fire-protection guidelines and experience for the historic and
current NASA manned-space missions is included as an appendix to the report,
contributed by J. Howard Kimzey, a consultant.
xiv

1.0 INTRODUCTION
The possibilityof a fire event in a spacecraft isreal; ithas happened in the past and it
ishighly probable to happen in the future. In the recent Space Station Freedom Toxic
and Reactive Materials Handling Workshop (Huntsville, Alabama, November 1988),
Skylab Astronaut Dr. BillPogue stressed the need to have reliable,false-alarm free
firedetectors and the means to quickly and precisely locate the firesource in manned
spacecraft. The following notes, written by the Soviet Cosmonaut V. Lebedev during
his stay aboard the Salyut 7 Space Station, vividlyillustratesthe threat of fire:
"In the case of fire(and itis very possible up here) we have to turn off all
the electrical equipment, including the ventilation system, put on our
protective suits with respirators, and use fire extinguishers."
(September 7, 1982)
Eighteen days later:
"_e felt (sic)the smell of burning lacquer or insulation. We turned off all
the fans and closed allthe hatches to the supply ship. Ifsmoke continues it
won't enter the resupply ship. We took fire extinguishers and began to fly
across the station, sniffing for smoke ....Something probably got inside of
the fan, and itoverheated." (September 25, 1982)
Luckily for the Soviet Cosmonauts, the firesource was spotted quickly and the damage
contained. However, this may not be possible all the time. Large, permanently
orbiting, complex space structures, such as the Space Station Freedom, and other
advanced spacecraft with long-duration missions pose new fire-safety problems that
were not anticipated untilthistime. NASA's effort to commercialize space and derive
maximum utilizationfrom the space-borne facilitiesbrings a renewed need to have a
coordinated and balanced program in spacecraft firesafety.
Current spacecraft fire-safety procedures rely primarily on materials screening so
that the amount of flammable material that is present inside a spacecraft is a
minimum. Since there have been no major fire-safety related occurrences in the
Space Shuttle and the Spacelab, fire-hardened spacecraft with limited fire fighting
capability have proven to be adequate. However, in view of advanced spacecraft
designs, the judgement that the present technology and knowledge isadequate may be
extremely short sighted. Also, even the relatively minor instances of wire insulation
smoldering and/or electricalshorting that have been reported after STS-6 and STS-28
flightsserve as reminders of the potential for a fireevent.
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The objective of this study was to understand the shortcomings of the present
fire-safety technology, identify projects that will lead to improved fire safety in
future spacecraft, and prepare a program plan that will provide NASA with
recommendations for a coordinated, balanced development program in fire safety.
Section 2.0 describes the methodology to identify,classify,and prioritizethe topics
and criticalissues in spacecraft fire safety, to provide a coordinated set of projects
for research and applications in this field. In Sections 3.0 to 7.0, descriptions and
schedules for the 14 highest-priorityprojects are presented, grouped in the categories
of firedetection, extinguishment, risk assessment, toxicology, and testing. Section 8.0
contains a detailed program management and oversight plan. It is illustrated by
organization responsibilitiesfor NASA Headquarters and field centers. This offers a
clear example of the plan, but in no way does itconstitute an endorsement or criticism
of NASA policies in safety management. Section 9.0 provides some concluding
remarks relevant to the study.
Appendix A presents a list of the respondees to Wyle's formal survey of fire-safety
experts. The cooperation of these individuals is greatly appreciated. Appendix B
describes the details of the prioritization procedure used by Wyle to rank
recommended fire-safety projects. Finally, Appendix C presents a historical and
criticalreview of spacecraft fire protection from the perspective of a retired NASA
firesafety and materials specialist,Mr. J. Howard Kimzey.
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2.0 PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND PROGRAM PLAN
This section describes the process through which topics that lead to improved fire
safety of advanced spacecraft were identified,and it provides an overview of the
priorityprojects constituting the program plan.
2.1 Information Sourees For Fire-Safety Projects
Spacecraft firesafety isinherently a multi-disciplinary effort involving diverse areas,
such as microgravity combustion science, fire detection/suppression technology,
toxicology and human response, risk and hazard analysis, and detailed planning and
management. A comprehensive assessment of the current status of spacecraft fire
safety must include input from allof these groups. The Wyle team, consisting of Wyle
personnel and two consultants (J.H. Kimzey and Dr. H. Kaplan), collected the relevant
information by means of literature reviews, interviews and discussions, and a formal
survey of selected experts in fire-safetyand low-gravity combustion research.
An exhaustive review of the published literature in the area of spacecraft fire safety
was conducted. Wyle's internal data base was augmented using computerized
literature searches conducted at Redstone Scientific and Information Center (RSIC)
and the NASA-sponsored NERAC Inc. (Tolland, Conn.). Attendance at several fire-
safety related workshops/conferences and review of published proceedings provided
further information regarding current activities that may impact spacecraft fire
safety. For example, the International Microgravity Combustion Workshop held at the
NASA Lewis Research Center January 25-26, 1989, and the Space Station Freedom
Toxic and Reactive Materials IIandling Workshop sponsored by the NASA/Marshall
Spaceflight Center November 29 - December I, 1988, provided information on current
problems and research activitiesin the fire-safetyarea.
During the course of this study, Wyle team members were in routine contact with a
number of researchers working in the area of spacecraft fire safety. In particular,
regular contact with fire safety personnel at Boeing Aerospace Company, NASA
Johnson Space Center (JSC), Marshall Spaceflight Center (MSFC), Lewis Research
Center (LeRC), and JSC's White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) kept the Wyle team
abreast with Space Station Freedom fire-safety plans. Telephone interviews and
written communications with these and other researchers provided valuable insights,
information, and additional contacts to expand Wyle's comprehension of the fire-safety
issues.
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As a part of the projects identification effort, a formal survey wasconductedamonga
selected group of fire-safety experts. The respondeesare acknowledgedand identified
in Appendix A. Written responsesto the survey were collected and documented. When
needed, follow-up discussionswere conducted in person or over the telephone with the
respondee. To enhance the effort, Wyle team members visited NASA/JSC, MSFC,
JSC's WSTF,Factory Mutual ResearchCorporation, Southwest ResearchInstitute, and
the National Institute for StandardsandTechnology.
The outcome of this effort was a list of issues that covered the overall study
objective, namely improving the fire safety of advanced spacecraft. As one would
expect, the listcovers a variety of projects ranging from radiant ignition of condensed
fuels to crew training in fire-fighting,with each respondee emphasizing the critical
need in his/her area of expertise. A complete listof the suggestions, identified as 58
topics, broadly classified under 11 categories of interest is given in Table 2-1. The
source code (SC) numbers given in Table 2-1 correspond to the respondees (Appendix
A) who have suggested the particular issue. Table 2-1 isat the end of Section 2.0.
2.2 Prioritization Of Fire-Safety Projects
While all the suggestions in Table 2-1 have merit, they differ in relative importance
with respect to their relevance to spacecraft needs, feasibility,and cost, among other
factors. To develop a coordinated plan from the suggestions, prioritizedprojects must
be defined (Figure 2-1). The 58 topics shown in Table 2-1 were firstgrouped together
according to their work discipline. The four major work disciplines used for the
purpose of the prioritizationprocess are 1) Basic Research and Microgravity Testing
(BR), 2) Applied Research and Engineering (AR), 3) Technology Development (TD), and
4) Ground-Based Testing (GT). This grouping brings diverse projects under organized
headings and makes prioritization feasible within each group. The details of the
prioritizationscheme used in this study are given in Appendix B. In the process of
work discipline prioritization,41 of the original topics were selected; and then, with
some combining of topics, a work breakdown structure comprising 30 prioritized
projects was devised (Figure 2-2).
The time constraint imposed by Space Station Freedom's development schedule, and
the cost/benefit consideration are two obvious factors that influence the prioritization
scheme. For example, the microsensor technology, when available,will have a major
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impact on fire detection techniques. However, the maturation period for this
technology is stillseveral years away. Therefore, based on the Freedom's time
schedule, thisproject must be given a lower prioritythan other projects such as expert
systems development. Similar comments apply to the idea of developing less
flammable, new spacecraft materials.
There are other factors that play a subtle role in the prioritizationprocess. These
depend on the baseline philosophy for the spacecraft design and operation and the
overall fire-safetystrategy. Depending on the fire-safetystrategy, emphasis must be
placed on prevention, control, or recovery. A general fire-safety strategy for
advanced spacecraft was previously proposed (Reference 1),and it was adopted for the
present study as well (see Figure B-l, Appendix B). This strategy involves a balanced
approach in which prevention, detection/suppression, and recovery aspects are all
treated equally important. It is worthwhile to note here that, historically,NASA has
placed the most emphasis on prevention. With the advent of the Space Station
Freedom and other advanced, manned spacecraft, a balanced fire-safetystrategy has
become a necessity.
Thus, a further selection of projects yielded 14 projects worthy of more detailed
definition,in terms of background and objectives, work effort, and schedule. The
description of priority spacecraft fire-safetyprojects constitutes the major portion of
this report. For descriptive purposes, the priority projects are regrouped into five
fire-safetythematic areas, covered in separate sections of thisreport, as follows:
Section 3.0
Section 4.0
Section 5.0
Section 6.0
Section 7.0
Fire Detection
Fire Extinguishment and Atmosphere Cleanup
Risk and Hazard Assessment
Toxicology and Human Response
Ground-Based Testing and Flammability Test Methods.
Table 2-2 liststhe 14 highest-priorityprojects, with reference to the report thematic
area and the identifyingnumber for the work breakdown structure (WBS) of Figure 2-2.
In addition to the fulldescriptions of the highest-priorityprojects, this report includes
a brief discussion of another 12 lower-priority projects and further comments on eight
or nine unranked topics selected from Table 2-1.
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TABLE 2-2. ORGANIZATION OF HIGHEST-PRIORITY
FIRE-SAFETY PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS
REPORT
SUBSECTION
3.3
FIGURE 2-2 WORK
DISCIPLINE NUMBER
TD-1
3.4 TD-2
3.5 TD-4
3.6 TD-5
3.7 BR-3
4.3 AR-3
4.4 TD-3
4.5 BR-1
5.3 AR-1
5.4 BR-2
5.5 AR.,4
6.3 AR-2
7.3 GT-1
7.4 GT-2
PROJECT TITLE
Development of Expert System for Fire Detection/
Suppression
Development of Centralized Fire Detectors/Monitors
With Distributed Sensors
Development of Techniques for Early Detection of
Incipient Fire Conditions
Development of Smoke Detectors Using Microsensor
Techniques
Research on Low-Gravity Fires
Evaluation of Fire Extinguishants for Hyperbaric
Atmospheres
Development of High-Capacity Environmental Cleanup
Unit
Research on Candidate Fire Extinguishants for Low
Gravity
Evaluation of New Fire Risk Analysis Tools
Research on Numerical Modeling of Spacecraft F'tre
Scenarios
Evaluation of Ventilation Flow Models for Spacecraft
Evaluation of Contaminants and Continuous Monitoring
for Toxicity
Test Procedures for Electrical Wire Insulation Flamma-
bility
Review and Revision of Current Spacecraft Material
Flammability Tests
2.3 Overall Program Plan
An advanced spacecraft fire-safety program, in principle, must be a continually
evolving process where the 'state-of-art'technology is constantly assimilated as it
becomes available and research goals are upgraded as new understanding of micro-
gravity fire behavior is gained. Still,an overall, structured program schedule is
necessary for effective planning and management of these efforts. The Space Station
Freedom's project schedule provides a convenient time-line reference frame (Figure
2-3) for an advanced spacecraft fire-safety program plan. The limiting dates, for
reference, as of the writing of this report, are the Freedom Preliminary Design
Review (PDR) in April 1990 and the Critical Design Review (CDR) in the spring of
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1992. Thus, a listof the projects would group those whose schedule may conform to
the near-term timeline (through 1992), namely:
AR-1 Evaluation of New Fire Risk Analysis Tools
GT-1 Test Procedures for Electrical Wire InsulationFlammability
AR-2 Evaluation of Contaminants and Continuous Monitoring for Toxi-
city
TD-2 Development of Centralized Fire Detectors/Monitors With Dis-
tributed Sensors
BR-2 Research on Numerical Modeling of Spacecraft Fire Scenarios
GT-2 Review and Revision of Current Spacecraft Material Flammability
Tests
AR-4 Evaluation of Ventilation Flow Models for Spacecraft.
The intermediate-term (1990 through 1993-1994) projects are:
TD-I
AR-3
TD-3
TD-4
TD-5
Development of Expert Systems for Fire Detection/Suppression
Evaluation of Fire Extinguishants for Hyperbaric Atmospheres
Development of High-Capacity Environmental Cleanup Unit
Development of Techniques for Early Detection of Incipient Fire
Conditions
Development of Smoke Detectors Using Microsensor Techniques.
The long-term (through 1995 and beyond) projects are:
BR-1 Research on Candidate Fire Extinguishants for Low Gravity
BR-3 Research on Low-Gravity Fire Characteristics.
Clearly, some of these projects have already been started and are currently in
progress. For example, some numerical flow modeling work has already been initiated
by NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), and the Japanese National Space
Development Agency (NASDA). The White Sands Test Facility has expanded its
flammability testing in hypo- and hyperbaric environments; and at NASA/LeRC,
preliminary work is underway to evaluate flame signatures and other fire-related
parameters during low-gravity solid fuel combustion in drop-tower experiments.
It is recommended that the other near-term projects identified above be started
immediately. The intermediate-term projects that need results from the near-term
projects must be initiated at the appropriate time. The long-term projects are
essentiallybasic science and research projects. The results of these projects improve
our fundamental understanding of materials combustion in microgravity and feed
information into other fire-safetyprojects.
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TABLE 2-1. RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TOPICS:
SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY
(SC isSource Code, see Appendix A)
1.0 Atmosphere Control: Monitoring, and Post-Fire Cleanup
1.1 Develop a High Capacity Environmental Cleanup Auxiliary Unit (SC: 8.0,
17.0, 18.0, 25.0, 29.0, 32.0, 43.0)
1.2 Develop a Combined Vacuum Cleaner/Fire Suppressant Device (SC: 29.0)
1.3 Evaluate Methods for Mitigating the Effects of Post-Fire Corrosion (SC: 9.0)
1.4 Evaluate the Merits of Inerting Atmospheres for Use in Powered Equipment
Racks, Cable Runs, etc. (SC: 9.0,43.0)
1.5 Evaluate the Merits of Breathable, "Fire-Safe" Atmospheres in Advanced
Spacecraft (SC: 2.0,33.0)
1.6 Select Those Gases Which Should Be Continuously Monitored for Spacecraft
Atmosphere Impurities, Toxic Compounds and Irritants (SC: 2.0,17.0, 43.0)
1.7 Outline Detailed Procedures for Optimum Post-Fire Cleanup on Orbit (SC:
17.0, 18.0, 20.0, and 44.0)
1.8 Evaluate the Merits of Providing a "Safe Haven" for Spacecraft Crew (SC:
2.0,43.0)
2.0 Low-Gravity Ignition,Flame Spread, and Flame Characteristics
2.1 Perform Low-Gravity Tests to Evaluate the Ignition,Flame Spread, Flame
Characteristics. etc., of Selected Materials (SC: 2.0, 3.0, 18.0, 21.0, 23.0,
35.0, 39.0, 43.05
2.2 Perform Low-Gravity Investigations Relevant to the Pyrolysis and
Combustion Products of Selected Materials (SC: 7.0 14.0, 23.0, 28.0, 43.0)
2.3 Determine the Hot Surface Ignition Temperatures of Selected
Flammable/Combustible Fluids in Low Gravity (SC: 5.0, 9.0)
2.4 Perform Tests to Determine the Effects of Low Gravity on the Flash Points
and Fire Points of Selected Flammable Fluids (SC: 19.0, 39.0)
3.0 Expert Systems (Hardware/Software)
3.1 Develop Advanced Expert Systems (Artificial Intelligence) for Handling
Spacecraft Emergencies (Such as a Fire Event) (SC: 7.0, 14.0, 21.0)
3.2 Develop Expert Systems for Fire Detection/Alarm/Suppression Systems (SC:
2.0, 14.0, 21.0, 42.0, 43.0)
4.0 Fire Extinguishants and Suppression Techniques
4.1 Evaluate Effectiveness of Candidate Fire Extinguishants (Including Portable
Units) in Various Low-Gravity Fire Scenarios (SC: 3.0, 7.0, 17.0, 18.0, 22.0,
27.0, 28.0, 32.0)
4.2 Develop an Appropriate Replacement for the Commonly Used Halon Fire
Extinguishants (SC: 5.0,14.0, 32.0, 41.0)
4.3 Evaluate the Need for the Use of Special Fire Extinguishants and/or Fire
Suppression Techniques in Spacecraft Hyperbaric and Hypobaric Atmospheres
(SC: 7.0, 17.0)
4.4 Consider the Specific Use of Water Sprays (Mists) as Candidate Fire
Extinguishants (SC: 9.0)
4.5 Develop a Nonflammable Blanket to Smother Crew Accessible Fires (SC: 9.0)
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TABLE 2-1. RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TOPICS (Continued)
5.0 Fire Detectors and Fire Detection Systems
5.1 Evaluate Use of a Centralized Smoke Detection Monitor that Would Receive
Multiple Air Samplings from Remote Points (SC: 7.0, 29.0, 43.0)
5.2 Incorporate the Technique of "Cross-Zoning" to Enhance Fire Detection While
Reducing False Alarms (SC: 9.0,17.0)
5.3 Investigate Early Detection of an Overheated Component by Monitoring the
Increased Outgassing of Selected Gases (or Use of Micro-Encapsulated Gas
"Tags") (SC: 2.0, II.0, 21.0, 37.0, 43.0)
5.4 Accelerate the Development of Micro-Sensor (Including Solid State) Fire
Detectors (SC: 14.0, 21.0, 37.0)
5.5 Evaluate the Effectiveness of Temperature Sensors for Use as Fire Detectors
in Low-Gravity Fires (SC: 23.0)
5.6 Continue the Development of Optical Detection (Including IR Fiber Optics) of
Flames and Overheat Conditions (SC: 17.0, 29.0, 32.0, 42.0, 43.0)
6.0 Fire Risk/Hazard Assessment
6.1 Review Crew Activity and Use of Materials on Past Space Flight Missions to
Assess Potential Fire Hazards (SC: 7.0, 11.0, 17.0)
6.2 Prepare a Detailed Spacecraft Fire Safety/Fire Event Handbook (SC: 5.0)
6.3 Develop a Detailed Fire Risk Assessment Methodology for Advanced
Spacecraft (SC: 1.0)
6.4 Assess the Fire and Explosion Risk Associated With Spacecraft Impact by
Meteoroids and Space Debris (SC: 17.0, 32.0)
7.0 Human Effects and Toxicity
7.1 Perform Toxicity Analyses of the Offgassed Products from Overheated
Components (SC: 7.0,11.0)
7.2 Establish a Policy Position Relevant to the Toxicological Hazards Associated
with the Pyrolysis Products of Spacecraft Materials (SC: 8.0,41.0, 42.0, 43.0)
7.3 Expand Research Relevant to the Effects on Human Physiology Due to Long-
Term Exposure to Non-Standard Atmospheres (SC: 20.0,41.0)
8.0 Materials and Material Configurations
8.1 Review the Criterion for the Selection and Utilization of "Fire-Safe" Fluids
(SC: 5.0,9.0, 32.0, 44.0)
8.2 Investigate Crew Use of Materials, Especially NonmetaUics (SC: 7.0)
8.3 Expand Efforts for the Development of New or Modified Spacecraft Materials
(SC: 15.0, 21.0, 32.0, 41.0, 42.0)
8.4 Investigate the Effects of Long-Term Aging on the Degradation (Including
Flammability) of Spacecraft Materials (SC: 41.0)
8.5 Develop Engineering Models to Aid in the Evaluation of the Effects of End-Use
Configurations on Material Flammability (SC: 15.0, 32,0, 41.0, 43.0)
8.6 Update and Distribute an Approved Materials List for Those Materials Which
Meet the NASA Test Requirements for Flammability (SC: 17.0)
8.7 Prepare Data Base Relevant To The Long-Term Compatibility of
Storage/Handling Materials With Chemically Reactive Gases, Liquids, and
Solids(SC: 17.0, 32.0, 44.0)
w
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TABLE 2-1. RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TOPICS (Concluded)
9.0 Modeling of Fire Scenarios
10.0
11.0
9.1 Prepare Analytical and Numerical Models to Aid in the Study of Microgravity
Fire Safety Concerns (SC: 9.0,14.0, and 43.0)
9.2 Develop Numerical Flow Models of Spacecraft Ventilation Systems In Order to
Estimate Local Convection (SC: 14.0, 23.0, 29.0,42.0, and 43.0)
Other Fire-Safety Related Issues
10,1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
Investigate Methods for Mitigating the Potential Fire Hazards Associated With
Dust and Other Debris That May Accumulate on Filters,Heat Exchangers, Etc.
(SC: 7.0)
Establish Stringent Safety Protocols for the Storage, Use, and Disposal of
Chemically Reactive Materials (SC: 9.0,17.0)
Establish an Industry-Government "Fire-Safety Working Group" (SC: 4.0)
Establish an Intensive Fire-Safety Training Program for Spacecraft Crews (SC:
41.0)
Develop Guidelines for the Design of "Fire-Safe" Appliances --Such as a
Clothes Dryer -- for Use on Spacecraft (SC: 17.0)
Evaluate the Potential for Overheating of Electrical Components as a Result
of Aging and/or Drift in Calibration (SC: 17.0)
Evaluate Methods for Mitigating the Potential Hazard of Spontaneous Ignition
of Stored Waste Material (SC: 17.0)
Evaluate the Potential Fire Hazards Associated With the Storage of Supplies
for Long-Duration Mission Spacecraft (SC: 17.0)
Testing and Test Standards (Ground-Based)
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.5
11.6
11.7
11.8
11.9
Perform Expanded Ignitabilityand Flammability Tests on Materials for Use in
Hyperbaric Atmospheres (SC: 15.0, 19.0, 42.0)
Perform Tests to Evaluate Candidate Extinguishants for Use in Hyperbaric and
Hypobaric Atmospheres (SC: 7.0)
Establish a Test Procedure and "Pass/Fair' Criterion Relative to Wire
Insulation"Arc Tracking" (SC: 19.0, 32.0)
Develop New or Revised Screening Tests for Materials to Be Used in High-
Pressure Oxygen Systems (SC: 19.0, 32.0)
Perform Accelerated Aging Testing of Electrical Insulation for Use in Long-
Duration Mission Spacecraft (SC: 17.0)
Perform Detailed Testing to Determine the Relative Reactivity of Air Versus
Selected Oxygen-lnert Gas Mixtures at Increasing Levels of Pressure (SC:
17.0, 32.0)
Perform a Critical Review of Current NASA (and ESA) Test Methods for the
Screening of Flammable Materials: Revise Current Test Methods as New Data
is Received (SC: 32.0)
Perform Tests To Assess the Effects of Various Diluents on the Suppression of
Ignition and Combustion of Aerospace Materials Used in Oxygen Systems (SC:
32.0)
Perform Expanded Tests to Ascertain the Effects of Hypervelocity Impact of
Particles on Various System Configurations (SC: 17.0, 32.0)
2-ii
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3.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: FIRE-DETECTION TECHNIQUES AND HARD-
WARE
Sections 3.0 to 7.0 provide individual project summaries and proposed program plans
for the highest priority fire-safety projects. Each project summary includes a
proposed work breakdown structure (WBS) composed of specific tasks and subtasks.
The background material included for each project is based upon available reference
material and recent consultations with cognizant fire-safetyexperts.
3.1 Background
Most conventional fire detection/fire alarm systems depend upon responses from one
or more of the following types of detectors: I) ionization and optical detectors
(physical properties of smoke aerosols), 2) thermal detectors (temperature level or
rate-of-rise in temperature), and 3) radiation detectors (electromagnetic radiation
emitted by a fire or overheat condition). The appropriate selection of any fire
detector depends largely on its end-use application, availability,reliability,and cost.
The various types of fire detectors that have been developed and used over the years
in ground-based applications have been described in numerous reports and in the open
literature (see References 2-4). A paper describing a generalized response theory for
firedetectors was published by J.S.Newman (Reference 5).
In the special case of fire detector selection for manned spacecraft, cost has not been
the driving factor as much as concerns regarding reliability,response time, sensitivity,
size, and weight. However, even the aerospace community has been forced to select
and rely upon well-developed detectors from ground-based technology. Friedman and
Sacksteder (Reference 1) provided a brief summary of the fire detectors used to date
in NASA's manned spacecraft program. They itemized several fire detector concepts,
including some that have been rejected early in the NASA space program (e.g.,a mass-
spectrometer smoke gas detector). The present use of ionization smoke detectors in
the STS Space Shuttle and Spacelab (see Appendix C) is a marginally adequate
approach, but itdoes not apply current knowledge of low-gravity firecharacteristics.
It isn't clear why other fire detection techniques or appropriate combinations of
detectors have not been developed and adapted for spacecraft use. One reason given
is that the full-time presence of crew in the STS Space Shuttle provides a human level
of fire detection. Although at this writing the design requirements of the Space
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Station Freedom (SS Freedom) are not complete, Mr. Harlan Burke of Boeing
Aerospace Corporation (Source Code No. 3.0, Appendix A) has stated that the
following types of fire detection sensors are under consideration for use in each
powered equipment rack (Figure 3-1):
, The primary fire detector may be an ionization or optical smoke
detector. One smoke detector of this type would be located in each
powered equipment rack's avionics air return duct.
1 A thermal (temperature rate-of-rise)sensor may also be located in
each powered equipment rack'savionics air return duct.
In addition, there was discussion regarding the location of "smoke sensors" in each
avionics air return duct manifold (external to the powered equipment racks). Note
that there are smoke sensors currently located in the avionics air return ducts of the
STS Space Shuttle and Spacelab. Mr. Burke also indicated that some type of flame
detector (UV or IR) may be adopted for the open regions of the SS Freedom modules.
Several Wyle sources contributed information reflecting the concerns of the fire-
safety community as a whole. These concerns are summarized below:
q_w
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.
.
m
1
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What are the characteristics of fires in microgravity in terms of
o
o
o
o
Combustion rates
Flame propagation (spread) rates
Potential for flash-over
Emission spectrum, etc.?
In low gravity, how much forced convection is required to render a
smoke detector effective?
Given the uncertainties regarding air flow patterns in the SSF
modules, what are the limitations inherent to the use of temperature
sensors for detecting combustion (and overheat)?
Are there fuels and firescenarios that may maintain such a low level
of photon emission during combustion that they would not provide
sufficiently early detection by a flame sensor to salvage the cabin
atmosphere?
How does the time frame for ignition,flame spread, and combustion
of spacecraft materials differ in microgravity from that in normal
gravity?
What about smoldering combustion under low gravity conditions? Is
this a possibilityand what are the implications as regards detection
of smoldering?
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AVAIRFLOW
VALVE
AV = AVIONICS
FDS = FIRE DETECTION AND
SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
FIGURE 3-1. CONCEPT FOR FIRE DETECTION SENSORS IN A
SPACECRAFT RACK
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Clearly, fire detection systems for use on advanced, manned spacecraft such as SS
Freedom willbe a significantportion of the spacecraft's safety system. In the case of
SS Freedom, the increased size and complexity of the spacecraft, the increased
experimentation activity, the much longer duration of the missions, and the lengthy
periods of time when the spacecraft systems will be active in the absence of crew
members all contribute to the importance of firedetection (and suppression systems).
Such fire detection systems for advanced spacecraft must not only be highly reliable,
but they must also be highly responsive. Equating increased sensitivity with an
increased tendency for false alarms is not a valid assumption if the detector sensor
and its monitoring system is well-understood and is appropriately designed and
configured for its end-use application. This, then, demands the enhanced use of expert
system technology and the appropriate selection of multiple detectors of various
sensor types.
W
3.2 Prolx_ed Fire-Detection Related Projects
Several topics have been identifiedduring the course of this effort that are directly
and specifically related to fire detectors and fire-detection related systems. These
projects have been tabulated in Table 2-1 under the heading "Fire Detectors and Fire
Detector Systems." In addition, several other topics have been identified that are
either indirectly related to fire detection or that will ultimately be necessary to
provide the desired low-gravity data base on ignition, flame spread, and flame
characteristics that may affect decisions relative to fire detection sensor types,
number, location, etc.
The final selection of projects based on the prioritizationof topics has provided five
highest-priorityprojects to be included in this thematic area of fire detection, listed
below in the order of descending priorityand identifiedby the disciplinenumber shown
in Figure 2-2:
Priority
Discipline No.
TD-I
TD-2
Project Title
Development of Expert Systems for Fire Detection/
Alarm/Suppression Systems
Development of Centralized Fire Detector Monitors with
Distributed Sensors
3-4
Priority
Discipline No.
TD-4
TD-5
BR-3
Proiect Title
Development of Techniques for Early Detection of
IncipientFire Conditions by Monitoring Outgassing
Development of Smoke Gas (Fire) Detectors Using Micro
Sensor Technology
Research on Low-Gravity Ignition,Flame Spread, Flame
Characteristics, etc. for Selected Materials
Figure 3-2 illustratesa proposed schedule for the highest-priority fire detector
projects. The proposed schedule is admittedly optimistic, but could be met with
proper emphasis.
The schedule includes additional lower-priority projects (BR-5, BR-7, and BR-8),
starting after calendar year (CY) 1992. To date, only limited low-gravity combustion
and flame spread data have been obtained (see Reference 6). Additional data will be
obtained in the interim from drop tower tests,aircraft flights,etc., but the extensive
test data desired will not be available until large numbers of tests are performed on
the STS Space Shuttle/Spacelab and SS Freedom.
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3.3 Development Of Expert Systems For Fire Detection/Alarm/Suppression
3.3.1 Background: The need for highly responsive and reliable fire detection (and
suppression) systems is stressed throughout this report. A large number of the
respondees to the spacecraft fire-safety survey, conducted as a part of this effort,
have endorsed the need for an "expert system" approach to the fire detection
suppression (FDS) subsystem. For example, R. Smith of the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) acknowledged that the expert system knowledge base
should be developed in a phased approach, since the development of advanced manned
spacecraft -- such as Space Station Freedom -- isonly now underway. Also, since the
effects of microgravity on the various types of combustion is not well understood,
Smith and Kashiwagi (Reference 7) suggested that the knowledge base should include a
basic fire-signature data base for size distribution and constituency of particles
produced in both the flaming and non-flaming cases. This firesignature data base will
then be upgraded as low-gravity data becomes available.
The development of "expert" and "distributed intelligence" fire detection and suppres-
sion systems is taking place at a rapid pace for earth-based applications (see
References 8-13). The use of microprocessor-based systems permits higher levels of
fire detector signal evaluation and processing. In general, control tends to be moved
away from the detector sensor to a central "panel" or control system. According to
R. Von Tomkewitsch (Reference 13), the fundamental functions of a fire-protection
system that needs a certain level of intelligenceare as follows:
o
2.
3.
Processing of signalsfrom automatic firedetectors.
Annunciation of an alarm condition.
Automatic initiationof defense measures (i.e.,fire extinguishment,
closing of vents, switching on escape route indicators,etc.).
Depending on the level of complexity desired and limited by the knowledge base
available,an expert system should have at least the following attributes:
. Identification of individual detectors by type and precise physical
location.
2. Continuous and rapid functional checks of allconnected detectors.
t Ability to store and utilizeappropriate algorithms (e.g.,calibration,
firesignature data, etc.).
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15.
.
Automatic notificationof faileddetectors.
Uniform response sensitivityunaffected by "drift" from the nominal
operating points of the detectors.
Greater protection against false alarms.
Finally, a very important aspect of automated, or semi-automated, expert fire
detection and suppression systems is that of fail-safe reliabilityand/or system
redundancy. This includes considerations of both the system hardware and software
(e.g.,see Reference 11).
3.3.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of work
breakdown structure (WBS) tasks directed toward the development of fire detection
and suppression (FDS) "expert" systems for advanced, manned spacecraft. A review of
the literature to date suggests that ground-based applications of microprocessor-based
firedetection/alarm systems have outpaced those for aircraft and spacecraft. Thus,
the starting point for this effort should be the performance of a criticalreview of the
commercially available ground-based systems and those utilized on commercial and
military aircraft. The organization of the project WBS is illustratedin Figure 3-3.
Task 1.0: Review Current State-of-the-Art Fire Detection/Alarm Expert Systems
Subtask 1.1: Evaluate Commercially Available_ Ground-Based Systems. There are a
number of complex, multiple detector fire detection/alarm systems available on the
commercial market. These should be reviewed to evaluate their attributes and
applicabilityto advanced spacecraft.
Subtask 1.2: Review Current Status Of Aircraft And Spacecraft Fire Detection And
Suppression Control S][stems. Fire alarm and control systems used on commercial and
military aircraft may have littlerelevance to advanced spacecraft. An exception may
be the recent (Reference 14) Federal Aviation Study on advanced fire alarm systems.
The systems used on the STS Space Shuttle and Spacelab are not highly complex and
are not fully automated (i.e.,crew action is required). Current design efforts for SS
Freedom's FDS subsystem should be made a part of thisreview.
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I TASK 1REVIEW STATE OFTHE ART
EVALUATE
COMMERCIAL FIRE
SYSTEMS
DESIRED
OPERATIONAL
ATTRIBUTES
PREPARE
BREADBOARD
SYSTEMS
TASK 2
ESTABLISH
REQUIREMENTS
APPROPRIATE
ALGORITHMS
SELECT AND EVALUATE
TASK 3
CANDIDATE SYSTEMS
GENERATE
ALGORITHMS
TASK 4
RECOMMEND
MODIFICATIONS AND
IMPROVEMENTS
REVIEW
AIRCRAFT/SPACECRAFT
SYSTEMS
I
SOFTWARE
REQUIREMENTS
GROUND-BASED
TEST
EVALUATIONS
FIGURE 3-3. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF
EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR FIRE DETECTION/ALARM/SUPPRESSION
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Task 2.0: Establish A Requirements List For Advanced Spacecraft Expert Systems
Subtask 2.1: Tabulate Desired Operational Attributes. The level of complexity of an
advanced spacecraft's FDS subsystem will strongly impact on the subsystem's opera-
tional attributes. Some of the most commonly desired features and attributes were
outlined above in the background section. The use of multiple types of detectors in
any specific region of the spacecraft willincrease the level of fire detection but only
to the extent that the appropriate algorithms are available to the expert system.
Subtask 2.2: Identify The Fire Detection Algorithms To Be Incorporated. As a
minimum, the expert system knowledge base shallrequire the following algorithms:
I.
2.
3.
4.
Type and location of alldetector sensors.
Calibration set points and/or curves.
Response versus known firesignature.
Long-term detector sensor drift.
In addition, there may be a need for a number of operational protocols concerning
communication, alarm annunciation, and system control (i.e.,vents, lighted markers,
etc.)
Subtask 2.3: Review And Identify Software Requirements. The F DS subsystem's
expert system software requirements will follow the level of complexity and desired
features outlined in Subtask 2.1 and 2.2. The software reliabilityand fail-safe
requirements must be given proper attention,
Task 3.0: Select And Evaluate Candidate Expert Systems For Advanced Spaeeeraft
Subtask 3.1: Prepare Operational Breadboards of Candidate Expert Systems. The
intent of this subtask is to assemble ground-based breadboard FDS subsystems and
appropriately configured expert systems for test and evaluation. The use of existing
commercially available hardware and software is recommended. Minor modification
and up-grades to the hardware may be appropriate.
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Subtask 3.2: Generate And Incorporate Desired Algorithms Into Brea_)oards. The
software for an expert system to be used with spacecraft FDS subsystems may be
significantlydifferent from that used in ground-based expert systems. Thus, based on
the requirements established in Task 2.3, there may be significant changes in the
software and algorithms incorporated into existing expert systems.
Subtask 3.3: Perform Ground-Based Tests And Evaluations Of Candidate Breadboards.
The intent of these tests is to exercise the candidate FDS subsystem expert systems
for evaluation. Therefore, artificiallygenerated firesignatures may be used unless it
is the test and evaluation of the fire detector sensors that is specificallydesired. A
limitation of these tests is that, by necessity, the bulk of them must be performed
under normal, sea-level gravity conditions. Thus, the low-gravity response of the fire
detector sensors cannot be readily simulated untila more extensive knowledge base of
low-gravity firesignatures has been established.
The tests and evaluations of the candidate expert systems shall be measured against
the desired features and attributes outlined in Task 2.0.
Task 4.0: Recommend Modifications And Improvements To The Expert System
Designs
The purpose of this task is to summarize and organize the modifications and
improvements deemed necessary for the candidate expert systems tested in Task 3.0.
Assuming that there is no commercially available expert system that meets all of the
desired attributes for spacecraft application, the breadboards should be modified and
retested.
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3.4 Development Of Centralized Fire Detector/Monitors With Distributed Sensors
3.4.1 Baekgrotmd: The use of a small number of centralized fire detector monitors
in a spacecraft is attractive in the potential savings in weight, power, and usable
space. Each centralized monitor would accommodate multiple sensors arranged in the
most appropriate ways for reliability,redundancy, etc. The discussion herein for this
project is,therefore, devoted to the development of centralized monitors that utilize
some type of optical-based radiation sensors (including fiber optics)and/or the sensing
of smoke particlesand aerosols through pumped or aspirating tubes.
Several respondees to the Wyle spacecraft fire-safetysurvey recommended that NASA
should give consideration to the use of some types of radiation sensors for advanced
spacecraft. Some of the more specific of these recommendations included the use of
combined ultraviolet/infrared(UV/IR) radiation sensors, the use of near-field infrared
imaging and signal processing, and the use of infrared-transmitting fiber optics. UV
and IR detectors are commonly specified for use where very rapid response (milli-
seconds) is necessary, i.e.,in hypo-and hyperbaric chambers, munitions and other
explosives handling areas, inside of certain military vehicles, etc. The NASA Skylab
spacecraft (1973-74) utilized some 22 UV radiation flame detectors. The development
and test evaluation of these Skylab flame detectors have been described by
R.M.F. Linford (References 15 and 16). The advantages and disadvantages of the use
of UV and IR radiation detectors are reasonably well understood, and their application
to highly controlled environments reduces some of the causes of false alarms.
Techniques for minimizing certain types of false alarms through special signal
processing measures have been discussed by H. Luck and K.R. Hase (Reference 17).
Most applications of UV and IR flame and overheat detectors have, to date, required
that the radiation sensing element and any associated optics be located at the site
being monitored. This requirement often places the delicate sensing elements in
adverse environments. The use of fiber-optic technology promises to aid in allowing
the detector sensing element and associated electronics to be located remotely from
the site of interest. For example, the U.S. Air Force funded studies over ten years ago
relative to the use of UV fiber optic sensors for aircraft engine fires (e.g.,Reference
18) and more recently (1982) to advanced UV aircraft fire detection systems
(Reference 19). In 1988, the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) published an
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investigation into the applicability of infrared (IR) fiber-optic sensors for use as
distributed firedetectors on Space Station Freedom (Reference 20). Ultimately, low-
gravity testing of UV and IR radiation detectors will be required to evaluate their
response to various fire scenarios when compared to similar fire scenarios under
normal gravity.
Another method for creating a centralized fire-detection system is that whereby the
smoke particles (i.e.,any smoke gases and aerosols) are transported rapidly from the
fire source to the fire detector by pumping the smoke through tubes. The use of
pumped tubes for the transport of combustion products to centralized detectors has
been used for several years in underground mines, road- and subway tunnels, etc.
(References 21 and 22). A comparable system was developed in Australia for early
detection of fires in computer facilities(Reference 23). This system has been given
the generic name VESDA (Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus) and is now
marketed in the United States by Fenwal Incorporated, Ashland, Mass. An advantage
of centralized fire-detection systems is that the centrally located smoke detector
sensor, usually of the light scattering type, can be made more sensitive than
conventional smoke detectors. This is because the centralized detector is not as
restricted in size and power and can, therefore, use a higher intensity light source, a
larger scattering chamber, and a highly responsive photo receiver.
There are obvious disadvantages to the use of pumped tubes. Their size, although
small, is non-trivial,and there is a response time associated with the length of each
tube and the forced-convection flow rate. Also, there is a pump and scanning valve
system required to multiplex the multiple tubes.
Wyle did not find any reference in the literature that indicates that any studies have
been performed regarding the use of the pumped-tube (i.e.,VESDA type) centralized
fire-detection system for spacecraft. However, its use could be attractive for
portions of a large, manned spacecraft such as monitoring un-powered racks and
storage bins, especially those that are not supplied with circulating air. The central
detector unit could be based on the standard detection principlesused in ionization and
light scattering smoke detectors, or the unit could be enhanced by the addition of
some relatively new technologies such as that used by the condensation nuclei fire
detector (CNFD, Reference 24).
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3.4.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of WBS tasks
directed toward the technology development and application of promising fire-
detection system concepts that may have specific application to advanced, manned
spacecraft. The emphasis is placed on centralized fire detection systems, especially
those that include fiber-optic technology (radiation detectors) as shown in Figure 3-4
and pumped tubes (smoke particle/aerosol detectors). The organization of the project
WBS isillustratedin Figure 3-5.
Task 1.0: Establish Knowledge Base From The Past AppHeations Of Centralized
Fire DeteeUon Systems: Radiation And Smoke Monitors
Subtask 1.1: Review Documented Application Of Radiation Detectors (UV t IR I And
UV]IR) For Fires And Explosions. This subtask willconsist of a detailed review of the
past application of these fire detectors. The literatureindicates that there has been a
significantamount of experience with UV and IR detectors for ground-based applica-
tions, in military tanks and munitions plants, and for aircraft,in engine nacelles and
fuel compartments, but only limited experience in space applications(e.g.,Skylab).
Subtask 1.2: Review Documented ApplieaUon Of Central/zed Fire Detection Systems
Based On PumDed-Tube Smoke Sensors. This subtask will consist of a review of the
past applications of centralized fire detection systems that use pumped or aspirating
tubes to sense smoke particles and aerosols. As described in the background material
for this project, these types of smoke detectors have been used in a variety of earth-
based applications (mines, underground roadways and subways, computer facilities,
etc.). Their use in other applications should be reviewed for details regarding type of
smoke detector, response time, power requirements, etc.
Task 2.0: Assess The Applicability Of Centralized Fire Detection Systems For Use
On Advanced Spacecraft
Subtask 2.1: Analyze The Advantqes And Limitations Associated With The Use Of
Radiation-Type Fire Detectors. As described in the background material for this
project, the advantages associated with UV and/or IR detectors are understood to
include rapid response (milliseconds),high sensitivityto certain types of explosions,
and ability to monitor large, open areas. The limitations are also reasonably well
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understood and include the following: 1) The optical radiation sensors are line-of-sight
devices and may require special enhancement for a wider viewing area; 2) False alarms
due to stray light have been reported; and 3) Response to deep-seated and/or
smoldering combustion may be inadequate. Additional advantages and limitations
must be assessed to meet the requirements of advanced spacecraft designs.
Subtask 2.2: Ap_dyze The Advantages And Limitations Associated With The Use Of
Pumped Tube Smoke Sensors. For spacecraft applications, where the absence of
buoyancy induced convection will limit movement of smoke to the air circulation
system, the use of pumped or aspirating tubes to sense smoke particles and aerosols
appears to hold promise. Thus, in addition to sensing smoke in quiescent regions of a
spacecraft, such systems may be lighter due to the reduced number of detectors, the
detector sensitivitycan be very high, and a large number of sensing tubes may be
supported by each detector. Some system limitations include the following: 1) There
is limited spacecraft and aircraft application experience; 2) The detector response
time willdepend largely on the sensing tube lengths and pumping speed; and 3) A pump
and scanning valve system may be required.
Task 3.0: Select And Test Promising Centralized Fire Detection Systems That Use
Multiple, Distributed Sensors
This task implies that the review and analysis of fiber optic-based radiation CUV and
IR) sensors and pumped tube smoke sensors indicate some applicability to advanced,
manned spacecraft. Although much development work may be required for spacecraft
application, this task is intended to provide the preliminary selection, design
definitions,and possible breadboard testing to establish promising sytems for further
development.
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3.5 Development Of Techniques For Early Detection Of Ineipient Fire Conditions
By Selective Monitoring Of Gases
3.5.1 Baek_und: Materials, especially nonmetallics, tend to release significant
amounts of gases as they are heated. This release of gases ("outgassing")depends on
the material, its temperature, and the material's environmental history. It is well
understood that firesproduce gases (i.e.,smoke gases) in quantities that are absent in
normal air and that the composition of smoke gases depends on the levels of
combustion (e.g., smoldering, flaming, etc.) and the fuels and oxidizers involved.
Similarly, incipient fire conditions such as very low levels of smoldering or the early
stages of pyrolysis, can also result in the release of gases and smoke aerosols.
Although such outgassing occurring at temperatures well below the material's ignition
temperature does not constitute an unambiguous incipient fire signature, the detection
of large amounts of outgassing coul____din icate abnormal or unwanted overheating and
the potential threat of a fire.
J
It must be noted that a firein a spacecraft environment may be significantlydifferent
than at normal gravity. For some firescenarios and fuel geometries, the blanketing
effect of the products of combustion will tend to inhibitoxygen entry into the flame
zone causing fuel-rich smoke, lower burn rates, and alterations in flame size and
shape. The chemical makeup of the combustion products may include more carbon
monoxide, aldehydes, ketones, and organic acids than in normal gravity.
Given our current understanding of outgassing and smoke gas composition, the use of
these phenomena as fire signatures appears encouraging. Dr. Robert Hager, a
consultant, suggested the establishment of a database of those gases most common to
the outgassing of aerospace materials (especially nonmetallics) at temperatures from
ambient to approximately 250oc (482oF). Ifa particular gas, or group of gases, can be
identified as an unambiguous signature of overheating, then an important early
warning alarm may be available. The major problem with thissuggestion is that false
alarms could be excessive unless some gaseous species other than water vapor, carbon
dioxide, and hydrogen is selected.
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The use of smoke gases as fire signatures has been investigated for many years. In
1969, M.V. Drickman (Reference 25) recommended the development of a fire
detection system for the Apollo command module -- and other advanced spacecraft --
based on a combination of a mass spectrometer and overheat detectors. Problems
associated with use of mass spectrometers included size and weight, selection of
appropriate species to monitor, false signals from background gases, general instru-
ment reliability,etc.
In 1983, G. Pfister (Reference 26) published a review of research activities on the
detection of smoke gases by solid-state sensors. He concluded that solid-state gas
detection could provide a viable alternative or additional means for the detection of
smoldering or pyrolytic fires at an early stage. The type of solid-state gas sensors
that were stated to hold the most promise as smoke gas detectors were the solid-state
electrolyte, the metal oxide semiconductor, and the silicon semiconductor device
element. Progress in the development of these devices for use as oxygen, hydrogen,
and carbon monoxide sensors was discussed. Although some of these devices are
commercially available (e.g.,CO and 0 2 detectors), they have not been developed for
common use as firedetectors.
The use of a very sensitive ion mobility spectrometer (IMS) has been suggested for
development as a smoke gas detector by E. Thomas of Brunswick Defense Company.
The IMS can operate at atmospheric pressure and has been used to detect a number of
explosive vapors at levels as low as parts-per-trillionin time periods of the order of
seconds (e.g.,Reference 27).
The use of material additives or temperature sensitive coatings to act as "tags" was
suggested by Wyle respondees. Additives that can be incorporated into textiles,
foams, and plastics for the purpose of causing volatile products and distinctive odors
when heated can be used as human sensory alarms. This study was reported by
J. R. Holker and G. R. Lomax in 1986 (Reference 28). The B. F. Goodrich Company
(Reference 29) developed a novel wall covering material designed to emit a colorless
and odorless vapor that activates the alarm mechanism of ionization smoke detectors.
Tests reported in the literature(Reference 29) showed that the treated wall covering
activated an alarm within six minutes upon heating to 130oc (266OF).
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3.5.1 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of WBS tasks
performed with the overall objective of developing techniques for early detection of
incipient fire conditions and the generation of additional levels of fire signatures.
Thus, the proposed effort is divided into three major tasks: 1) development of a data
base of aerospace material outgassing species and smoke gases, 2) development of
temperature sensitive material coatings (or micro-encapsulated gas "tags") and 3)
development of highly sensitive gas detectors. The organization of the project WBS is
illustratedin Figure 3-6.
a
Task 1.0: Develop A Data Base Of Typieal Outgassing Data And Production Of
Smoke Gases For Aerospace Materials
Subtask 1.1: Review Available Information To Establish Data Base Of Low Tempera-
ture Out_in_. Initially,this subtask would consist of a review of available
outgassing data versus temperature for selected aerospace nonmetallic materials. As
a material is heated, the initialgases emitted will,of course, be those that are loosely
adsorbed, i.e.,water vapor and carbon dioxide. As the temperature is increased,
additional species will be released, including oxygen, hydrogen, and possibly some of
the more volatile hydrocarbons. If the results of thisreview indicate that there may
be some unambiguous gaseous species common to the general class of aerospace
materials, then the effort should be pursued to fully confirm this incipient fire
signature. One of the immediate sources of data may be the outgassing data taken by
NASA during the screening of materials in accordance with the requirements of NHB
8060.IB (Reference 30), although present outgassing tests are performed at ambient
conditions only.
Subtask 1.2: Perform A Systematic Review Of The Smoke Gases Produced Durin_
Different Stages Of Incipient Fire Conditions. The next part of Task 1.0 is to review
information on the composition and quantity of smoke gases produced during different
stages of incipient fire conditions. Wyle's consultant for toxicology, Dr. H.L. Kaplan,
has also suggested that a high priority should be given to the continuous monitoring of
the following asphyxiant gases and conditions, i.e.,CO, HCN, CO2, and 02 depletion.
Dr. Kaplan placed emphasis on CO and HCN since these gases are capable of producing
rapid incapacitation. Regarding the monitoring of irritantgases -- some of which are
also highly toxic --, Dr. Kaplan suggested that the following gases be monitored on a
less rapid basis;HC1, HBr, HF, NOx, acrolein, isocyanates, phosphorus compounds, and
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fluorinated organics. It should be noted that the irritantgases (except NO 2) are likely
to provide warning to the spacecraft crew (when crew is present) at lower than
hazardous concentrations because they irritatethe eyes and the respiratory tract.
The output of this subtask is intended to be a limited data base which will summarize
the "typical" outgassing species from aerospace nonmetallic materials for tempera-
tures up to approximately 250oc (482OF). Also, this data base shall include a
tabulation of "typical" smoke gases resulting from the different stages of incipientfire
conditions.
Task 2.0: Develop Temperature Sensitive Coatings Or Micro-encapsulated Gas
"rags"
This proposed task constitutes an effort to determine the viability of the use of
temperature sensitive coatings that would enhance early detection of incipient fire
conditions without creating other hazards to the spacecraft or crew. Although
research and development have been performed relative to the application of this
technique to materials for use in homes and offices,it isnecessary to ensure that such
coatings or material additives are non-toxic and do not adversely affect the base
materials' physical and mechanical properties. The use of additives that depend on the
production of odors upon pyrolysis may be inappropriate for spacecraft, which may be
unmanned for extended periods of time. The proprietary active ingredient reported by
the B. F. Goodrich Company for poly (vinylchloride) coated wall covering (Reference
29) was stated to emit a colorless and odorless vapor that would activate ionization
smoke detectors when the wall covering was heated to approximately 150oc (302OF).
Task 3.0: Expand The Development And Application Of Tuned Smoke/Gas Detectors
The types of smoke gas detectors of interest to this task are those that can be tuned
to identify the presence and quantity of specific gas species. These instruments
include, but are not limited to, the gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS)
and the ion mobility spectrometer (IMS). The use of the GC/MS and similar
instruments are already in the planning stages for the purpose of monitoring the
habitable atmosphere in Space Station Freedom (Reference 31). These plans include
rapid sampling of major constituents (i.e.,H2, 02, N2, CO, CO2, H20 , and CH 4) and
the periodic (e.g., 30 minute cycle time) monitoring of a large class of trace
contaminants.
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The current status of these gas detectors was reviewed recently by R. A. Peters, et al.
(Reference 32) and G. Marsh (Reference 33). Although these types of instruments are
generally impractical to be used as distributed smoke gas detectors, they can provide
an additional level of firesignature to warn operators of problems.
The objectives of this task are to quantify the use of incipient-firedetection systems
and to investigate the possibilityof designing a centralized fire-detection system using
these types of gas detectors as the sensor subsystem. In order to accomplish these
objectives, the study may establish standard laboratory test setups to evaluate
techniques and provide comparative assessments and tests of detector response, design
requirements, potential low-gravity influences,and so on.
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3.6 Development Of Smoke Detectors Using Mierosensor Technology
3.6.1 Backl_round: Assuming that microsensor gas detectors can be developed to
adequate levels of sensitivity and reliability,their use on advanced spacecraft is
attractive by virtue of their small size and the additional fire signatures provided.
Fundamentally, microsensor fire detectors depend on the research and development of
solid-stategas sensors, a fieldof some activity in the past 15 years (References 34 and
35).
According to G. Pfister (Reference 26), the most promising solid-state
principles for use in detecting low concentrations of gases include the following:
sensor
I. The Electrochemical Cell (based on sensing the change in cell
potential across a solid state electrochemical membrane, i.e., a
Nernst cell)
2. The Metal Oxide Semiconductor Gas Sensor (based on sensing the
change of the electrical conductivity of metal oxide semiconductors
due to surface oxidation)
3. Barrier Type Gas Sensors (based on the change in the electrical
characteristics of MOS, MIS, and Schottky barrier devices)
4. Microcalorimeter Gas Sensors (based upon a measurement of the heat
of combustion liberated when a gas isoxidized).
Solid-state gas sensors have the general limitations of 1) high working temperature and
power consumption of sensors, 2) gas response sensitive to the relative humidity, 3)
limited specificity to selected gases, and 4) sensor contamination and drift in time
periods of one year or less. Pfister has suggested that many of these limitations can
be overcome and that specific solid-state sensors can detect selected gases with
sufficient sensitivityto be used as smoke gas detectors. Of course, some of these
types of sensors have already been developed commercially for specific applications.
One of these is the Taguchi gas sensor manufactured by Figaro Engineering in Japan.
The Figaro metal oxide semiconductor gas sensor (see Figure 3-7) is used extensively
for explosive vapor monitors, combustion hazard alarms, and breath alcohol meters.
Also, probably the most widely used solid state gas sensor is the electrochemical cell
used to monitor oxygen.
m
m
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The general class of gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS) gas sensors are
not included here since they can hardly be considered "microsensors." However, in a
recent paper by G.E. Spangler et al. (Reference 36), a miniature ion mobility
spectrometer (IMS) cell is described, which is being developed for field application
monitoring of toxic organic vapors in the ambient atmosphere with levels of detection
in the range of parts per billion(ppb) or better.
3.6.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of _rBS tasks
which will require intensive efforts in several technical discipline areas. These
discipline areas include chemical microsensor and microinstrumentation development
and the involvement of such technologies as the following: I) integrated optics and
surface acoustic wave (SAW) sensors, 2) etched microcapillary tubes, 3) lithographic
and thin-film techniques, and 4) many other microfabrication techniques.
NASA cannot be expected to underwrite all of the research and development costs
associated with microsensor smoke gas detectors. However, the need for multiple,
low-weight, smoke gas detectors for very early fire detection on large, advanced
manned spacecraft demands that NASA monitor and adapt the most appropriate
emerging technologies. The organization of the project WBS is illustratedin Figure
3-8.
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Task 1.0: Seleet Appropriate Mierosensor Gas Deteetors For Further Development
This task shall consist of a criticalreview of the current status of microsensor gas
detector development and an assessment of the applicability of such detectors to
advanced manned spacecraft. The following subtasks shall be required to fulfillthese
objectives.
Subtask 1.1: Review Current Status Of Mierosensor Gas Detector Development. This
review should include, but not be limited to, those solid-stategas detectors that are
either in the commercial development stage or are emerging as highly promising.
Desired characteristics should be established that include the following: 1) specific
gas(es) monitored, (2) sensor sensitivity,3) physical and operational parameters,
4) reliabilityand maintainability, etc. Also, estimates should be made regarding the
development time required for flightqualification. The candidate sensors may include
the following types:
1) Electrochemical (Nerst) Cells
2) Barrier Type Devices
3) Metal Oxide Semiconductors
4) Microcalorimeters
5) Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) Sensors.
Subtask 1.2: Assess Applicability Of Mierosensor Fire Detectors For Use On
Advaneed_ Manned Spacecraft. A systems engineering trade study willbe necessary
to identify the advantages and disadvantages of microsensor smoke gas detectors when
compared to currently used, conventional smoke detectors. Also, their applicabilityas
redundant or backup detectors and their ability to provide very early fire signatures
must be considered. This review should also consider the achievement of desirable
attributes for spacecraft design, including minimum size, mass, and power
requirements, and maximum sensitivityand reliability.
Task 2.0: Support Development And Evaluation Of Selected Mierosensoe Gas
Deteetors
Subtask 2.1: Perform Beneh Scale Tests And Evaluation Of Selected Mierosensor Gas
Detectors. This subtask is based on the assumption that candidate microsensor gas
detectors have been developed to a state of commercial readiness, but are not
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necessarily ready for inclusion in a spacecraft firedetection subsystem (FDS). In this
subtask, appropriate test requirements and procedures must be devised in order to test
and evaluate the candidate detectors based on spacecraft system requirements.
Bench-scale tests are to be conducted for comparison of the performance of the
microsensors to that of conventional sensors.
Subtask 2.2: Continue Refinement and Evaluation of Smoke Gases as Early Burning
Process Fire Signatures. The purpose of thissubtask isto perform a criticalreview of
the reliabilityof smoke gases as signatures for early burning processes. It is essential
that an understanding of the nature and quantity of smoke gases is achieved. In this
regard, the project on smoke-gas identificationdescribed in Section 3.5 is a necessary
precursor or complement to the efforts of thissubtask.
Task 3.0: Assess Results of Development Program for Application of Mierosensor
Smoke Deteetors to Advanced Spacecraft
The purpose of this task is to review the results of the foregoing development effort to
assess the applicability of microsensor smoke detectors to advanced, manned space-
craft. Clearly, there is applicability of these sensors as habitable atmosphere gas
monitors and as process monitors, but the requirements for smoke detection --
especially reliabilityand sensitivity -- need to be established at this point in the
overall effort.
J
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3.7 Research On Low-Gravity Fires
3.7.1 Background: Basic research in combustion science impacts almost every aspect
of the spacecraft fire-safety problem: prevention, detection/suppression, and
recovery. Despite the progress made in the past few decades, the combustion
characteristics of fuels in reduced gravity are not completely understood. In the
January 25-26, 1989, International Microgravity Combustion Workshop at the NASA-
Lewis Research Center (report in preparation), recent advances and future needs in
microgravity combustion were discussed by a number of reseachers. It has been
suggested by several authors that there are essentially two main reasons to pursue
low-gravity combustion research: 1) better understanding of normal-gravity combus-
tion processes by eliminating the buoyancy effects, and 2) spacecraft fire safety.
However, on-going low-gravity research efforts in the USA, Europe, and Japan have
largely focussed on the science aspects of the field rather than on the applied, fire-
safety aspects. While it is clear that a fundamental understanding of the low-gravity
combustion phenomena will enhance the spacecraft fire safety in the long run, short
term benefits could be improved by focussing some of the research efforts toward
immediate fire-safety problems, such as low-gravity burning rates, fire detection, and
fire suppression.
Fire, in itself,is a very complex phenomenon involving interactions among fluid
dynamics, chemical reactions, radiation,and aerosol physics. So, it is understandable
that researchers have focussed on a single phenomenon, such as flame spread over a
thin solidfuel, and developed theoretical models and simple experimental tests. Also,
most of these low-gravity combustion experiments, except those performed aboard
Skylab, are performed in ground-based drop towers, or in aircraft flying parabolic
trajectories to produce the low-gravity field. These ground-based facilitieslimit the
scope of the experiments in two ways: first,the time available for experiments is
limited and, at present, only very thin solid fuels can be used as test materials; and
second, sophisticated diagnostic tools cannot be utilized.
From the above introduction, it is clear that for the low-gravity research program to
have maximum impact on spacecraft fire safety in the next five year period, it must
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aim to:
.
.
.
Provide a long duration microgravity environment so that practical
material configurations can be tested and the required diagnostic tools
can be employed to extract pertinent information from these experi-
m ents.
Focus more on the fire-safety aspects of combustion science such as
burning rates, pyrolysis products, ignition, spread, extinction, and
flame radiation characteristics.
Obtain data for various fuel geometries including films and sheet
materials, foams, bulk materials, as well as particulates (e.g.,dusts).
3.7.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of WBS tasks
in the field of theoretical and experimental low-gravity combustion of non-metallic
solid materials. It must be emphasized that thisbasic research effort isnecessarily an
iterativeprocess between theoretical modeling and experimentation, and both of these
aspects must progress simultaneously. The organization of the project WBS is
illustratedin Figure 3-9.
Task 1.0 Review Solid-Fuel Combustion Literature
This task consists of reviewing all aspects of low-gravity, solid-fuel combustion
literature with a view toward identifying the knowledge gap that exists in the fire-
safety area. Limitations of currently available theoretical models and experimental
data are gathered as a part of thistask.
Task 2.0: Define Low-Gravity Tests
Subtask 2.1: Identify Fuel Materials/Configurations To Be Tested In Low Gravity. A
material is usually selected as a test fuel based on itsburning characteristics and test
reproducibility. Drop tower tests (Reference 37)and KC135 flightexperiments have
produced limited data on flame spread and extinction for thermally thin solid fuels of
the two-dimensional and cylindrical configurations. However, realistic applications
involve more complex configurations, such as open cellfoam, thermally thick surfaces,
laminated fuels with thermal properties varying along a given direction, and 3-D
effects. Other fuels to be tested will include particulates and even gaseous and liquid
fuels. The NASA document NSTS 22648 on flammability configuration analysis
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(Reference 38) provides examples of other configurations that are encountered in
spacecraft hardware constructions. The intended outcome of this subtask is a set of
fuel configurations that have direct bearing on practical applications and test
effectivity. Some typical fuel configurations that should be tested in low gravity are
shown in Figure 3-10.
Subt_k 2.2:
as follows:
o
o
o
o
o
Select Environments. The experimental conditions to be determined are
O2/Diluent Concentrations
Pressure
Flow Velocity (0 to approximately 20 cm/s)
Radiation H eating
Others
The oxygen concentration and pressure levels are chosen for the experiment to reflect
the operating environment of the spacecraft, and they are well established or known.
The diluent concentration, however, needs to be selected with some care because
recent results (Reference 39) have shown that the diluent properties can affect the
flame characteristics. Similarly, flow velocity can have a strong influence on
flammability limitsand flame-spread rate (Reference 37) and experiments should vary
from the quiescent condition to the typical ventilation-generated flow velocities.
Radiation heating is used to preheat the fuel sample prior to ignition, as desired.
Other boundary and initialconditions are also selected during thissubtask, depending
upon the experimental apparatus and modeling requirements.
Subtask 2.3: Select Test Parameters. This subtask is to identify the quantities that
are to be measured experimentally. The quantities include ignition energy, flame
spread rate, extinction conditions, flame radiation characteristics,and mass burning
rates. With the availabilityof long-duration mierogravity facilitiesand sophisticated
diagnostic tools,measurements of transient effects, velocity and temperature fields,
and burnt-gas particulate characteristics must also be planned.
Task 3.0: Develop Low-Gravity Experimental Apparatus
Development of an experimental apparatus for use in a space-based facility is an
evolutionary process. However, the scope of the experimental effort envisioned in this
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project allows one to use some of the experimental hardware that is already under
development by NASA, perhaps with some minor modifications. The hardware include
apparatus in final design, under development, or in active use, such as: the solid
surface combustion chamber, the multipurpose drop tower chambers, and the modular
combustion facility(Reference 40). It is recommended that as far as possible,one of
the existing,already tested, hardware be used for thisproposed experimental project.
The diagnostic tools that would be anticipated for the proposed experimental project
are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Temperature Measurement - Thermocouples
Velocity Measurement - P articleTrack, LDV
High Speed Movie Camera
Radiation Detectors
Specie and Particulate Measurement Units
Subtask 3.1: Perform Ground-Based Testing Of The Experimental Apparatus. All
aspects of the experimental setup chosen during Task 3.0 is ground tested during this
subtask. Any modifications to the experimental apparatus, data acquisition, or
diagnostic tools are made when necessary. To some extent, the resultsobtained during
thistesting phase could be used to validate the subsequent theoretical models.
Subtask 3.2: Perform Low-(]rarity Tests. The ground-tested apparatus isreadied for
flight aboard the Space Shuttle or Spacelab. This includes integration and other
necessary modifications to the data acquisition and automation aspects of the
experiment. Stringent safety measures are met during this task period. Finally, the
experiments are conducted based on the planned test matrix.
Task 4.0: Develop The Theoretical Model
The objective of this analysis is to provide a theoretical basis to interpret the
experimental data obtained in reduced gravity. Analytical and numerical models for
ignition,flame spread, and extinction are to be developed. Models are to be validated
through low-gravity test data available from the literatureand ground-based tests, as
applicable,from Task 3.0.
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Task 5.0: Interpret And Compare Data To Model Predictions
During this task, the experimental results obtained from low-gravity tests are
analyzed and interpreted based on the theoretical models developed in Task 4.0.
Model limitations are identified and methods of improvement are outlined. These
results are organized and presented in such a form so that they can be incorporated
into fire modeling, material screening tests, and other low-gravity fire fighting
efforts.
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3.8 Other Fire Detection Projects
Several other concepts and suggestions directly related to fire-detection hardware and
techniques for advanced spacecraft are worth noting even though they have not been
incorporated into the high-priorityprojects.
Cross-zoning (Topic 5.2, Table 2-1) is a common technique in ground-based fire
detection systems wherein the response of firedetectors in regions (zones) adjacent to
the alarm detector(s) are interrogated for their level of response. If a fire event has
initiatedin a specific zone, the response of detectors in adjacent zones or in zones in
the downstream path of the ventilationsystem may aid in determining the validityof
an alarm and the severity of the fire event. The applicability of the cross-zoning
technique to spacecraft fire-detection systems will depend upon the type, location,
and number of fire-detector sensors and the expert system designed to monitor and
respond to the detectors. For example, a decision on the degree of response (warning
or danger) may be based on whether sensor indications are confined to a single
powered-equipment rack or are found in adjacent racks in the common ventilating
system.
Another major concern relative to fire-detection systems for advanced spacecraft is
that relative to the optimal location of fire-detection sensors in the absence of
gravity-induced convection (Topic 5.5). Fire-detection devices that depend upon the
transport of combustion products (smoke gases and particulates) and for heat to the
detector sensors are likelyto not respond readily to a fire condition unless there isan
appropriate amount of forced convection. Obviously, the fire-detector sensors must
be located in the forced convection flow path and must be downstream of the fire
condition. The ventilation modeling of spacecraft volumes and its influence on the
transfer of heat, smoke, and combustion products for fire detection and control isan
important concern, and it is the basis of a high-priority project described in Section
5.0.
Finally, it must be recognized that ionization and photoelectric fire detectors are the
state-of-the-art for aircraft and spacecraft, and they willcontinue to be used (inSTS
Shuttle and Spacelab) for the foreseeable future. While no high-priority project
addresses the development of these detectors, their improvement for the unique
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application in space is clearly desirable. The major limitations of these devices are
that they are more responsive to certain ranges of particulate and smoke aerosol sizes
(requiring better knowledge of likelyspace fire and precursor signatures) and they are
far from optimum in terms of minimum size and mass and maximum reliability.
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4.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT AND ATMOSPHERE
CLEANUP
4.1 Baekground
The perceived need and provision for fire-fighting equipment to be used on-board
manned spacecraft has changed significantly as spacecraft have grown larger and as
the spaceflight missions have increased in duration. The NASA Mercury and Gemini
spacecraft were not provided with any dedicated fire extinguishers, except for the
crew's hand-held food rehydration (water) guns. Currently, the STS Space Shuttle and
Spacelab spacecraft are fitted with crew-activated portable and fixed fire extin-
guishers that contain pressurized bromotrifluoromethane (Halon 1301). Location of
the Halon 1301 extinguishers in the STS Shuttle Orbiter cabin is shown in Figure 4-1.
A brief history of NASA's use of fire extinguishants on all manned spacecraft is
provided in Reference 41 and in Appendix C. The choice of specific extinguishing
agents and the appropriate application techniques for advanced spacecraft is of
continuing concern. A general discussion of the advantages and limitations of a
number of candidate extinguishants was prepared by Dr. J. de Ris (Reference 42).
The commonly used fire extinguishing agent Halon 1301 is well-recognized as an
effective and efficient fire fighting material, especially in the case of superficialfires
in ground systems. However, some of the adverse features of the Halon 1301
extinguishants -- and many other bromo- and chlorofluorocarbons -- may prevent their
extensive use on future spacecraft. For spacecraft usage, these adverse features are
largely associated with their toxicity and their corrosiveness when decomposed in a
fire: i) The decomposition products as a result of interaction with a fire may be
unacceptably toxic and corrosive (References 41 and 42); and 2) These extinguishants
may not be compatible with various elements of a spacecraft's environmental control
system. Certain halons and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) have recently been linked to
possible future depletion of the Earth's stratospheric ozone layer (Reference 43).
The choice of a new fire extinguishant for use on an advanced spacecraft, such as SS
Freedom, is constrained by the requirements for low toxicity (in both the neat an___dd
decomposed states),high effectiveness per pound, low corrosivity,compatibility with
the spacecraft environmental control and life support system (ECLSS), etc. Also,
special considerations and uncertainties are added when there is a need for the
extinguishants to be used in a hyperbaric airlock (HAL) facility or in an oxygen-
enriched atmosphere.
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Special demands for "rapid" atmosphere cleanup are required if a fire event -- or a
major spill-- occurs in the confines of an orbiting spacecraft. Obviously, the demands
for crew involvement during the cleanup or the need to provide safe exit and refuge
for the crew will depend upon the severity of the event. The capacity of most
spacecraft atmosphere revitalizationsystems (ARS) is limited, and a significant fire
event (or spill)would most likely require mission termination. This is not an
acceptable scenario for an advanced, long-duration mission spacecraft.
4.2 Proposed Fire Extinguishment And Atmosphere Cleanup-Related Projects
All of the concerns expressed above regarding fire extinguishment and atmosphere
cleanup on board manned spacecraft were identified repeatedly during the course of
thiseffort. Specifically related topics are tabulated in Table 2-1 under the headings
"Fire Extinguishants and Suppression Techniques" and "Post-Fire Cleanup." These
suggested topics include tests and evaluations of extinguishants for use in hypo-and
hyperbaric atmospheres, development of a replacement extinguishant for Halon 1301,
development of a high capacity environmental cleanup (auxiliary)unit, and several
others.
The final selection of highest-priority projects has provided three projects to be
included in the thematic area of fire suppression, listed below in the order of
descending priority and identifiedby the disciplinenumber shown in Figure 2-2.
Priority
Discipline No. Project Title
AR-3 Evaluation of Fire Extinguishants And Techniques For
Use In Hypobaric And Hyperbaric Atmospheres
TD-3 Development of High-Capacity Environmental Cleanup
Auxiliary Unit
BR-1 Research On Candidate Extinguishants For Low-Gravity
Fire Scenarios
Figure 4-2 illustratesa proposed schedule for the highest-priorityfire-extinguishment
projects. Included on the schedule is the project to develop expert systems already
described in Section 3.3, since the expert system will encompass fire-suppression
subsystems. The schedule also includes the lower-priority advanced project on post-
firecorrosion and the technologT development project on fireblankets.
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4.3 Evaluation Of Candidate Fire Extinguishants And Application Techniques For
Use In Spacecraft Hyperbaric And Hypobaric Atmospheres
4.3.1 Baekgrotmd: The use of specially designed, artificialatmospheres has been a
major part of manned space flight since its inception. Initially,concern about
potential cabin leaks in flightresulted in the requirement for the crew to wear full
pressure suits for their protection. The total pressure within the suits had to be low
enough to permit mobility of the suitjointsand gloves. The requirement of a normal
oxygen quantity, or partial pressure, in the atmosphere dictated a high concentration
of oxygen (i.e.,a hypobaric environment). For these reasons, early manned spacecraft
were designed to use a pure oxygen atmosphere at 0.34 ATA (atmospheres absolute, or
34 kPa).
NASA's designs for early manned spacecraft -- Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo --followed
this low pressure, pure oxygen philosophy. For the Skylab spacecraft, the need to be
pressure-suited at a low pressure applied only to crew transfers in the Apollo
spacecraft (0.34 ATA and pure oxygen) and the occasional extra-vehicular activity
(EVA). The balance of the crew time in Skylab was in a shirt-sleeve environment
which consisted of 65 percent oxygen/35 percent nitrogen at 0.35 ATA (35 kPa).
Manned spacecraft have not been equipped with "hyperbaric" chambers to date.
However, the need for these facilitiesfor application to advanced, long-duration space
missions such as Space Station Freedom (SS Freedom), lunar bases, missions to Mars,
etc. is now recognized. Recommendations prepared by the SS Freedom Hyperbaric
Medicine Ad Hoc Committee (NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC), January 9-10, 1989,
Dr. Joe Boyce, Chairman) support the need for a Hyperbaric Airlock (HAL) and the
incorporation of a hyperbaric Health Maintenance Facility (HMF) within HAL. The Ad
Hoc Committee endorsed the need for the HAL/HMF facilityto alleviate risk due to
decompression sickness during EVA and to respond to any illnessesrequiring hyperbaric
treatment on SS Freedom.
Due to this need for a HAL/HMF and due to the very long duration missions planned
for SS Freedom, much thought has been given to the selection of the breathable
atmosphere for both the STS Space Shuttle and SS Freedom. The current concensus
relative to the shirt-sleeve environment outside of the HAL is that the breathable
atmosphere should be as nearly like that at normal sea level as possible. The
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spacecraft fire-safety community would prefer a much reduced percentage of oxygen
in both the shirt-sleeve environment and in the HAL. The fire-safety materials
community is concerned with the on-going difficultyof providing non-flammable (i.e.,
rapidly self-extinguishing) materials, especially those used in quantity: paper,
clothing, electrical wire insulation,thermal insulation,etc., and the very high riskto
lifeif an accidental fire were to start in the confines of crew spaces. The dichotomy
between human breathing effectiveness, which is primarily determined by the partial
pressure of oxygen, and the flammability characteristics of materials which are
essentially a function of oxygen concentration is illustratedby Figure 4-3. Recent
tests performed by the NASA Johnson Space Center's White Sands Test Facility at high
pressures (References 44 and 45) on various commonly used materials such as paper,
cotton cloth, etc.,confirm thistrend.
Even today in 1989, there stilldoes not exist a fullconcensus as to what the nominal
hyperbaric environment should be for SS Freedom. The Space Station Projects (SSP)
Requirements Document (JSC 31000, Revision C) (Reference 47) specifies that the
hyperbaric environment shallhave an oxygen concentration no greater than 16 percent
at 4 to 6 atmospheres (400 to 600 kPa). However, the SS Freedom Hyperbaric
Medicine Ad Hoc Committee (see above) has recommended a hyperbaric environment
of 2.8 ATA (280 kPa) with an oxygen concentration of no less than 20 percent and no
more than 23 percent at allpressures.
Clearly, adoption of the above recommendations by the SS Freedom Hyperbaric
Medicine Ad Hoc Committee (January 1989) may severely limit the type and quantity
of non-metallic materials used in the HAL/HMF if the requirements of NHB 8060.1B
(Reference 30) are adhered to rigorously. In any case, a significant amount of
additional flammability testing isindicated.
Fire detection and extinguishment in artificial atmospheres, especially oxygen-
enriched atmospheres, can be problematic. In ground-based hyperbaric and hypobaric
facilities,the NFPA Technical Committee on Hyperbaric and Hypobaric (Health Care)
Facilities(Reference 48) has established recommendations for the use of deluge type,
wet pipe sprinkler systems in Class A hyperbaric chambers (i.e.,those designed for
human use, multiple occupancy). For the extinguishment of fires in hypobaric
facilities,the NFPA recommends that only water or water-containing thickening or
wetting agents are to be used.
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NASA has performed a limited series of fire extinguishment tests in hyperbaric and
hypobaric atmospheres. The tests often cited (Reference 49) were performed at the
NASA Johnson Space Center and included highly oxygen-enriched hypobaric
atmospheres and moderately oxygen-enriched hyperbaric atmospheres. Suppression of
combustion by the direct application of gaseous extinguishants (e.g.,Halon 1301) to
open fires in open-cell polyurethane foam was relatively ineffective at oxygen
concentrations above 30 percent and unsuccessful when the oxygen content was
greater than 77 percent at total pressures of 0.34 and 1.0 ATA (34 and 101 kPa). The
hypobaric test extinguishants included other gases (helium, nitrogen, argon, and carbon
dioxide), solids (sodium bicarbonate and potassium bicarbonate), and liquids (foam,
ethylene glycol solution and a water-based gel).
4.3.2 Proposed Efforts: Based on the background discussion provided above, it is
apparent that there willbe strong requirements for additional testing of hypobaric and
hyperbaric environments for application to advanced space missions -- beyond those
efforts currently underway at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and
NASA JSC's White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). The proposed project is described on
the basis of work breakdown structure (WBS) tasks directed to the concerns regarding
extinguishment in these atmospheres, but the effort must clearly be coordinated with
materials screening, materials selection and design, fire detection and alarm
annuciation, post-fire cleanup, and human factors. The organization of the project
WBS isillustratedin Figure 4-4.
Task 1.0: Update Current Knowledge Base Relevant To Space Applications Of
Hypo- And Hyperbarie Environments
Subtask 1.1: Establish Current Knowledge Base And Pereeived Requirements For
Hypobarie Environments And Extinguishants. The current knowledge regarding the use
of, and firehazards associated with, ground-based hypobaric facilitiesmay be obtained
largely from the open literature and published reports. Slightly to moderately oxygen-
enriched hypobaric atmospheres are currently experienced in STS Space Shuttle pre-
EVA conditioning, post-EVA desuiting (in airlocks),and in the EVA spacesuit itself.
The current recommendations relative to firesafety in hypobaric environments may be
obtained from a number of sources, including the materials screening test data
published in MSFC 527/JSC 09604 (Reference 50), the various studies and tests upon
which the NFPA standards are based, limited NASA tests,and others.
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Oxygen-enriched spacesuits willcontinue to be used in the foreseeable future with the
current 4.3 psia (30 kPa) limitation,and oxygen masks or hoods willbe required for use
in space-based Health Medical Facilities(HMF). An advanced 8 psia (55 kPa) hard suit
under design willpermit reduced oxygen concentration, however. Also, pre- and post-
EVA procedures and protocols are likely to include oxygen-enriched environment
scenarios. Other hypobaric requirements should be established.
Subtask 1.2 Establish Current Knowledge Base And Pereeived Requirements For
Hyperbaric Environments And Extinguishants. Although there is a significantamount
of information from Navy, NFPA, and other literature relevant to fire safety in
hyperbaric environments, this effort will concentrate on test data and studies at or
slightly below the normal-atmosphere mole fraction of oxygen. It is likely that a
substantial amount of flammability-screening tests and extinguishant evaluation and
selection tests willbe performed under these hyperbaric atmospheres.
Future uses of hyperbaric atmospheres in space will certainly include those associated
with health medical facilities(e.g.,for treatment of air embolism and decompression
sickness (DCS) suffered by crew members). Also, as man learns to better adapt to
artificialatmospheres, the use of hyperbaric environments consisting of very low
percentages of oxygen (less than 10-12 percent) may appear promising to fire
protection engineers but are unlikely to be well received by physiologists. Thus,
another purpose of this subtask is to tabulate some of these requirements, especially
those that would most likelyimpact materials use and firesafety.
Task 2.0: Develop A Ground-Based Test Program For The Evaluation Of Candidate
Extinguishants For Use In Hypo- And Hyperbaric Environments
Subtask 2.1: Establish A List Of Candidate Materials (Fuels) And Worst-Case Hypo-
And Hyperbarie Atmospheres That May Be Eneountered. Test materials will include
not only thick and thin aerospace construction materials but also waivered flammable
materials likely to be encountered, such as cotton cloth or paper. The test
atmospheres will cover the expected range of oxygen concentrations and hypo- to
hyperbaric total pressures.
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Subtask 2.2: Select The Highest Ranked Candidate Extinguishants And Application
Methods For Test And Evaluation. The list of candidate extinguishants can be
imaginative, to include water, water-based foams, gas-based foams, and conventional
gaseous extinguishants. For space applications, it is also important to investigate
application techniques, to include sprays, mists, deluge and flooding, and portable
hand-held units.
Task 3.0: Perform Ground-Based, Fire Extinguishment Tests In Hypo- And
Hyperbaric Environments
Subtask 3.1: Establish Relative Effectiveness Of Fire Extinguishment Systems.
Relative effectiveness is,in general, a measure of the mass of extinguishant necessary
to suppress the tested fire scenario. Other factors to be weighed in the comparison
may be cost, volume, containment and pressurization,etc.
Subtask 3.2: Monitor Tests For Production Of Toxic Contaminants. Some
extinguishants, particularly the halogenated agents, generate toxic and corrosive
byproducts. Of some importance, also, is the disposal of nontoxic contaminants from
the extinguishant; for example, excess water collection,foam disposal,or gas venting.
Subtask 3.3: Evaluate Test Results In Terms Of Perceived Crew Activities. The
proposed efforts tabulated under Tasks 2.0 and 3.0 are largely an extension and
expansion of work currently underway at NASA (MSFC and JSC/WSTF). Among the
new aspects of this effort is the need to clearly define acceptable (and unacceptable)
extinguishants and to evaluate crew activitiesand procedures. For example, certain
gaseous extinguishants may be acceptable for use in the lower oxygen concentration
(e.g.,less than 20 percent) hyperbaric environments, but not in the general hypobaric
environments. Also, since hyperbaric chamber environments have not been used on
manned spacecraft to date, the capability of the crew members involved to respond to
and safely handle a fire event is a critical issue. One or more of the hyperbaric
facility occupants on board an actual spacecraft may, in fact, be patients who are
already incapacitated to some level prior to a fireevent.
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Task 4.0: Make Recommendations For The Selection Of Extinguishants And Appli-
cation Techniques To Be Used In Hypo- And Hyperbaric Environments
These recommendations shall proceed from results emanating from the preceding
tasks, Tasks 1.0 through 3.0. The recommendations shall cover not only the
appropriate extinguishants and application techniques but also an assessment of
missing data and verification tests to be performed in low gravity. Again, the close
relationship of this project to the basic research project on low-gravity combustion,
described in Section 3.7, isstressed.
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u4.4 Development Of A High-Capaeity Environmental Cleanup Auxiliary Unit
4.4.1 Background: One of the highest safety-related priorities for any manned
spacecraft is to provide the crew with a clean, comfortable, and relatively
contaminant-free breathable atmosphere. The overall system used to perform this
function isreferred to as the ECLSS (Environmental Control and Life Support System).
An overview of the Space Station Freedom's ECLSS is presented in Reference 31. The
Atmosphere Revitalization Subsystem (ARS) of the ECLSS ischarged with the function
of maintaining the spacecraft's breathable atmosphere and removing contaminants so
that they do not exceed the SMAC (Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations)
values for the intended mission (Reference 30). However, the ECLSS units used in
current NASA spacecraft such as the STS Space Shuttle and Spacelab are no____tdesigned
to accommodate any significantfireevents or major spills-- such as a microbial spill.
Small quantities of typical combustion products (e.g.,HF, HCI, CO, HCN, and COCI 2)
would be removed by the STS Space Shuttle LiOII canisters, charcoal beds and/or
catalytic oxidizers, but other toxic combustion products that may be present may be
much more difficultto remove.
Among the highest ranked and most often repeated concerns by fire-safety experts
contacted in the Wyle survey were those relevant to post-fire recovery of the
breathable atmosphere and restoration of "normal" on-orbit operations. However, the
Space Station Freedom may have very limited amounts of LiOIl if current plans are
continued to provide removal of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) by trapping on
molecular sieves. Thus, sufficient LiOH may not be available to remove acidic
combustion products unless some research is done to show that it is effective in
removing them. The need for a portable, high-capacity device to clean up smoke and
microbial spillswas identified by Charles D. Ray of NASA/MSFC and Dr. Hiroaki
Sasaki of The Fire Research Institute of Japan, who suggested that such a vacuum
cleanup device might also include an internal extinguishant to quench any burning
materials, including liquids.
It is Wyle's understanding that NASA does not currently have a fully developed
auxiliaryunit that could be used for rapid decontamination and cleanup of a spacecraft
module's atmosphere after a fire event or a microbial spill. However, there are a
number of organizations that have been involved in the design and development of
systems and devices whose purpose it isto remove and/or neutralize toxic gases.
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In 1984, the Hamilton Standard Division of United Technologies Corporation (UTC)
developed and demonstrated a smoke removal unit (SRU) for shipboard use in closed
compartments (Reference 51). This Hamilton Standard SRU was developed
specifically to clear and maintain the atmosphere of a sealed compartment following
various ship firescenarios, by utilizinga series of filtersand chemical beds to remove
smoke particulates and toxic gases to a level that permits a safe and comfortable work
environment (Figure 4-5). Visual observations indicated rapid clean-up of dense smoke
within 10 minutes.
In a separate effort, the Plasma Group at the U.S. Army Chemical Research,
Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland) is
developing an invention referred to as the Reactive Bed Plasma (RBP) reactor
(References 52 and 53). The RBP (Figure 4-6) is based on the technology of a plasma
(or ionized gas) and catalytic packing materials. The main function of the catalytic
packing material isto provide an increased amount of time for contaminant molecules
in a flowing air stream to reside in the active plasma region. The high energy
electrons generated by the plasma produce decomposed species of the toxic materials.
The CRDEC is currently analyzing the scale-up of the RBP device and the addition of
a ceramic High Efficiency Particulate Aerosol (HEPA) filterfor potential application
to Space Station Freedom.
Efforts similar to those described above are underway at other organizations and these
efforts should be investigated for applicabilityto advanced spacecraft. For example,
toxic substance decontamination efforts are underway at the National Institute for
Standards and Technolgy's Center for Chemical Technology, Boulder, Colorado.
4.4.2 Proposed Efforts: The need for a high-capacity, auxiliary atmosphere cleanup
unit for fire events in advanced manned spacecraft is generally acknowledged,
assuming that sufficient excess capacity is not available in the spacecraft's environ-
mental control and lifesupport system (ECLSS). The proposed project is described on
the basis of the following WBS tasks whose organization isillustratedin Figure 4-7.
Task 1.0: Review Current Status of Breathable Atmosphere Cleanup Units
$ubt4t_ I.I:
Space Shuttle
Review Status of NASA ECLSS Atmosphere Revitalization Units. STS
and Spacelab ECLSS units rely basically upon LiOH canisters and
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charcoal absorbent beds to cleanse the spacecraft atmosphere. The capacity of these
systems generally do not permit accommodation of any significant fire event or
hazardous spill. Design efforts for the Space Station Freedom ECLSS acknowledge the
need for a more sophisticated, higher capacity system. However, there are a number
of combustion-produced (smoke) gases and other toxic (and irritant)gases that may
poison and/or exceed the capacity of nominal ECLSS units. A short listof some of the
contaminants anticipated on Space Station Freedom ispresented in Table 4-1. It is the
purpose of thissubtask to identify those contaminant gases that would quickly exceed
the capacity of the current ECLSS units in the event of a fireor hazardous spill.
Subtask 1.2: Identify And Review Capabilities Of Candidate Auxiliary Cleanup Units.
The purpose of this subtask is to review and tabulate the capabilities and
advantages/disadvantages of candidate auxiliary units for breathable atmosphere
cleanup. Candidate cleanup units may include those described above in the background
discussion (e.g.,Hamilton Standard's SRU and the RPB under development by the U.S.
Army CRDEC) and others. In addition to their ability to provide acceptable
decontamination of challenge gases, their operational characteristics are to be
tabulated (i.e.,operating temperature, power, EMI shielding requirements, size, ease
of regeneration, post-treatment requirements, etc.).
Task 2.0: Establish Strawman Specifications For Spacecraft Applicable Auxiliary
Units
Subtnsk 2.1: Prepare Priority List Of Combustion Produced (Smoke) Gases And Other
Contaminants To Be Accommodated. Since the purpose of the auxiliary cleanup unit
is to clean up the spacecraft breathable atmosphere rapidly and safely after a fire
event or hazardous spill,itmay be stated that the unit should be able to accommodate
acid and other gases from fire events, extinguishments, and spills, as well as
significantquantities of particulate material and aerosols. This task shall be devoted
to the quantification of the contaminants to be accommodated and to the
establishment of the allowable time -- for a given event -- until the SMAC values
(Reference 30) are approached and/or until the spacecraft ECLSS can accommodate
the load.
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TABLE _1. TYPICAL CONTAMINANT SOURCES ANTICIPATED
FOR SPACE STATION FREEDOM
(Reference 31)
• MAN
SOURCE CONTAMINANT
• SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEMS, NON-ISOLATED
EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT AND PAYLOADS
• EMERGENCY SITUATIONS:
FIRE, SPILLS, EQUIPMENT FAILURES
• NON-ISOLATED ANIMAL AND PLANT
- METABOLIC PRODUCTS:
CO2, NH 3, CO, H2 S, H2,
CH4, ORGANIC ACIDS, MERCAPTANS
- BACTERIOLOGICAL CONTAMINANTS
WIDE VARIETY OF ALCOHOLS,
ALDEHYDES, AROMATICS, ESTERS,
ETHERS, CHLOROCARBONS,
FLUOROCARBONS, HALOCARBONS,
HYDROCARBONS, KETONES, ACIDS, etc.
CO, CO2, HYDROCARBONS, AROMATICS,
ACID GASES, OXIDES OF N 2 , SO 2 , NH 3 ,
SMOKE, ALCOHOLS, FORMALDEHYDE, etc.
- METABOLIC, BACTERIOLOGICAL
EXPERIMENTS
• FOOD PREPARATION (NOTE 1)
• GARBAGE (NOTE 1)
- AEROSOLS, DRY SOLIDS, ACROLEIN, etc.
- H 2, CH4, BACTERIOLOGICAL
CONTAMINANTS (CADAVERINE AND
PUTRESCINE)
NOTE 1: These contaminant sources were added by J.H. Kimzey, Consultant.
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Subtask 2.2: Outline Desired Range Of Operational Characteristics. The purpose of
this task is to establish a practical range (or ranges) of auxiliary unit characteristics
for spacecraft application. These characteristics include the removal or filtration
limits of contaminants (time and maximum discharge), and, in addition, specify limits
on power usage, size and weight, high-voltage and El_CIshielding,etc.
Task 3.0: Design Breadboard Test And Demonstration Unit(s)
The overall purpose of this task is to prepare a design (or designs) of an engineering
breadboard unit based upon the reviews and assessments performed during Task 1.0
and, where possible,to meet the strawman specifications outlined in Task 2.0. Where
the advantages or disadvantages of competing technologies are unclear, the design of
more than one breadboard unit may be warranted.
Subtask 3.1: Select Configuration(s) For Design. It is the purpose of thissubtask to
perform trade studies and component assessments in sufficient detail to permit
choosing a limited subset of designs that willapproach the strawman specifications of
Task 2.0. A variety of alternative configurations may be established from existing
units,modifications, and innovative concepts.
Subtask 3.2: Investigate Inclusion Of An Internal Fire Extinguisher In Auxiliary
Cleanup Unit. The incorporation of a fireextinguishing device internal to an auxiliary
cleanup unit may have merit if burning materials (solidso__rrliquids)are vacuumed into
the unit for rapid fire response. The investigation must also include the means of
storage, quantity required, delivery, and application technology of selected
extinguishing agents.
Task 4.0: Construct And Test Breadboard Demonstration Unit
Subtask 4.1: Challenge Breadboard Unit With Simulated And/Or Actual Fire
Scenarios. The purpose of thissubtask is to evaluate the operational capability of the
breadboard auxiliary atmosphere cleanup unit(s). Since the main purpose of the high
capacity auxiliary unit is to provide rapid cleanup of the spacecraft module
atmosphere after a fire event, the breadboard unit may be initiallychallenged by a
series of real or simulated fire scenarios. This series of tests could be formulated
similar to those performed by Hamilton Standard during the evaluation of their Smoke
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Removal Unit (SRU) (Reference 51). The SRU was challenged with particulates,
aerosols, and toxic gases simulating combustion products from Class A and Class B
fires. Since the auxiliarycleanup unit may also be required to accommodate toxicants
and irritantsother than those resulting from "typical" spacecraft fire scenarios, the
breadboard units may be challenged with these gases as well.
Subtask 4.1: Review Test Results And Recommend Appropriate
Modifieations/U_ades To The Breadboard Unit. The purpose of this subtask is to
perform criticalevaluations of the ability of the unit(s)to meet, or approach, the
strawman specificationsdeveloped in Task 2.0. Also, itwillbe important to assess the
capacity of the unit(s) in terms of the amounts of contaminants that can be
accommodated prior to regeneration and/or reconstitution. It is quite likely that
preliminary reviews will require additional challenge testing in order to assess the
value of recommended modifications or upgrades.
Task 5.0 Prepare Recommendations For The Development Of A Prototype
Auxiliary Cleanup Unit
After a sufficient and appropriate amount of challenge tests and modifications are
made to the breadboard auxiliary cleanup unit, a prototype unit (or units) should be
designed and developed. The development schedule for the prototype units may be
appropriately shortened ifprior test efforts are judged successful.
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4.5 Research On Candidate Extinguishants For Use In Low-Gravity Atmospheres
4.5.1 Background: The effective and efficient suppression of unwanted fires in
spacecraft is clearly a high-priority issue and has been stressed in the preceding
sections. The requirements for acceptable fire extinguishants to be used in manned
spacecraft can be more demanding than in ground-based facilities.Since a manned
spacecraft is a closed environmental system, a fireextinguishing agent should possess
the following attributes: 1) low toxicity in both the neat and decomposed states, 2)
high effectiveness in fire suppression on a unit-mass basis, 3) low corrosivity of the
post-fire products, 4) compatibility with the spacecraft's ECLSS, and 5) no major
problems in post-fire cleanup.
Some of the desired attributes of candidate extinguishants listed above can be
evaluated in ground-based testing and many of these evaluations and recommendations
have been published (References 42, 49, 54 and 55). An attribute that cannot be fully
evaluated in ground-based facilitiesis the effect that the low-gravity environment
may have on an extinguishant's efficiency. These issues of concern in fire/extin-
guishant interaction in microgravity have been discussed by W. Youngblood and K.
Seiser (Reference 56). One of the respondees to the Wyle survey, Dr. James Reuther,
has addressed some of the anticipated problems with regard to spacecraft fire
suppressions (Reference 57). Dr. Reuther included the following concerns:
I) combustion in low gravity can actually be intensifiedby the convection induced via
delivery of a suppressant, and 2) fire suppressants whose effectiveness depend on
chemical activity may not be as effective in the presence of the cooler burning, low-
gravity flames.
4.5.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of WBS tasks
directed at performing extinguishant/fire interaction experiments in low gravity. The
organization of the project WBS isillustratedin Figure 4-8.
Task 1.0: Establish A Recommended Group Of Extinguishants For Testing
Subtask 1.1: Review Available Data For Effectiveness Of Candidate Extinguishants.
The purpose of thissubtask is to collect and review the available literature and test
data on extinguishants. This will assistin establishing which extinguishants should be
evaluated further.
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Subtask 1.2: Review The Appropriate Methods And Procedures For Testing And
Evaluating Extinguishants. This subtask shallconsist of a trade study for the review of
industry standards and accepted procedures for methods of evaluating fire
extinguishant materials and means of application. For example, is a specific
extinguishant inappropriate for smoldering combustion, yet fully adequate for NFPA
Class A and Class B fires? Does it appear that normal-gravity testing is sufficient --
no low-gravity testing isrequired?
Subtask 1.3: Perform Limited Ground-Based Testing On Candidate Extinguishants. If
necessary, ground-based tests will aid in creating a data base of extinguishant/fire
interaction results for later comparisons with low-gravity tests. The type and quantity
of test data desired should be determined from the reviews performed in Subtasks 1.1
and 1.2. The data should include the following as a minimum:
1) Concentration of extinguishant necessary to suppress combustion.
2) Effect of material type on extinguishant effectiveness.
3) Toxicity and other characteristics of extinguishant.
4) Soot, toxic and corrosive products of extinguishment process.
5) Compatibility with design features of spacecraft ECLSS.
Task 2.0: Initiate Design Of Low-Gravity Tests And Test Apparatus For
Extinguishant Evaluation
Subtask 2.1: Establish Desired Test Parameters. Some general comments provided by
J.H. Kimzey, a Wyle consultant, that apply to extinguishant tests in any spacecraft
environment are appropriate here, as well as to the hyperbaric testing described in
Section 4.3.
. Careful consideration should be given to the selection of materials to
be used as candidate test fuels. Include samples of the following
materials:
0
0
0
0
Highly flammable (e.g.,paper, cotton cloth)
Low melting point (e.g.,sheet nylon, nylon cordage)
Thin materials (e.g.,mylar films,various coatings)
Other materials (e.g., thick solids, foamed materials,
metals(?)).
liquids,
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2. Select materials that tend toward self-extinguishment in normal
gravity and evaluate these materials in low gravity.
3. Select a test chamber whose size will provide realisticresults for the
material and material configuration selected.
4. Consider tests using different material spacings to investigate low-
gravity ignitionfrom material to material.
. Investigate realistic disturbances to the atmosphere in low gravity
caused by the spacecraft ventilationsystem, crew movement, and flow
induced by application of the extinguishing agent.
Subtask 2.2: Perform Limited Tests in Sub-Orbital Low-Gravity Facilities. These
fire/extinguishantinteraction tests are intended to be precursor tests to any such tests
on STS Shuttle or Spacelab. Although the short duration of the drop tower tests are
unlikely to produce the desired data for full extinguishant evaluation, some
information may be gained relevant to the suppression of ignition by inerting. The
longer duration aircraft flights (following Keplerian parabolic trajectories) and the
much longer sounding rocket flightspromise much useful fire/extinguishant data. It
must be noted that, for such tests to be of value, the test chamber must be scaled
appropriately for the test combustion process.
Task 3.0: Prepare Designs For Fire Extinguishment Apparatus To Be Evaluated On
Spacelab And/Or Space Station
This task would require the development of flightqualified hardware to be flown on
manned spacecraft missions. This task should only be contemplated if the issues and
concerns regarding low-gravity fire/extinguishant interaction and extinguishant
effectiveness remains unresolved.
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4.8 Other Fh-e Extinguishment Projects
Several other concepts and projects directly related to fireextinguishment are worth
noting even though they have not been incorporated into the highest-priorityprojects.
Figure 4-2 includes schedules for two lower-priority projects: post-fire corrosion and
non-flammable blankets for smothering crew-accessible fires. A brief review of post-
fire corrosion effects in ground-based fire scenarios isdescribed by W.W. Youngblood
(Reference 58), and long-range research has been initiated at the Factory Mutual
Research Corporation relevant to post-firecorrosion and mitigation methods.
The development of "nonflammable" blankets to be used by the spacecraft crew to
smother accessible fires was also suggested by Factory Mutual Research Corporation.
Blankets of this type are commercially available.
Topic 4.2 (Table 2-1) calls for the development of an appropriate replacement for the
commonly used Halon fireextinguishants. This topic was not developed into a priority
project since this corresponds to studies already underway at several private-sector
organizations with oversight from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
U.S. Department of Defense (Reference 43). Obviously, candidate replacement agents
are major concerns of the three priority projects already described in thissection.
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5.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: RISK AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT
5.1 Background
A thorough understanding of the risksand hazards associated with any spacecraft must
be of the highest priority. The advent of advanced, manned spacecraft such as Space
Station Freedom poses new risks and hazards that must be identified and
accommodated in the most efficient and safest manner. The responses to the survey
conducted by Wyle as a part of this study suggest that the riskand hazard assessment
of threats from fires and explosion-induced fires requires additional and detailed
attention. It should be noted that the recommended projects described herein for fire
risk and hazard identificationand assessment are intended to supplement and expand
existing NASA guidelines and requirements. For example, the "Threat Strategy
Technique" prepared for Space Station Freedom by Rockwell International (lleferences
59 and 60) and the nuclear power industry'sProbabilistic Risk or Safety Assessment
(PRA or PSA) methodology (Reference 61) represent organized means for addressing a
variety of threats to a spacecraft, including those threats involving fires.
5.2 Proposed Risk And Hazard Assessment Projects
The final selection of highest-priority projects has provided three projects to be
included in the thematic area of risk and hazard analysis,listedbelow in the order of
descending priorityand identifiedby the disciplinenumber shown in Figure 2-2.
Priority
Discipline No.
AR-1
Project Title
Evaluation of New Fire-Analysis Tools for Advanced
Manned Spacecraft
BR-2 Research on Numerical Modeling of Spacecraft Fire
Scenarios
AR-4 Evaluation of Ventilation Flow Models for Spacecraft
Figure 5-1 illustratesa proposed schedule for the highest-priority risk and hazard
assessment projects. The schedule also includes the lower-priority basic research
projects on engineering models for evaluation of end-use material flammability. Note
that for the two numerical modeling projects (BR-2 and AR-4), a single schedule is
shown. These are more or lessparallelprojects;and, in fact, only one detailed project
description isgiven in thissection.
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5.3 Development Of New Fire Risk Analysis Tools For Advaneed, Manned
Spacecraft
5.3.1 Baekground: A detailed, methodical system safety analysis tool has been
identified as a prime requirement for use at all stages of spacecraft design to
preclude, control and otherwise mitigate threats, including those threats due to fires
and explosions on-board spacecraft. Such a system safety analysis tool (or tools)
suitable for application to Space Station Freedom and other advanced spacecraft will
most likelyrequire development from the best features of existing fire risk analysis
tools and methodologies. This review and assessment must start at concept design and
continue throughout the lifeof the spacecraft. It isbecause of thisneed to recognize
the importance of spacecraft fire and fire-related threats and the associated risk
analyses that thisproject has been assigned a high priority.
A listof the typical risk assessment tools and techniques that represented the state-
of-the-art in the 1970's was prepared and assessed by Peercy and Raasch (Reference
59). These risk assessment tools included the following: I) Fault tree analysis, 2)
Checklists, 3) Sneak circuit analysis,4) Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA or
FMECA), 5) Vehicle hazard analysis,and 6) Mission phase hazard analysis. Although
each of these analysis tools have specific strengths, Peercy and Raasch stated that
they are normally applied to spacecraft after requirements definition,i.e.,not nearly
early enough in the design cycle. Thus, they identified the need for new threat
assessment and threat mitigation techniques as a requirement for alldesign stages of a
spacecraft.
A system safety analysis tool referred to as the "Threat Strategy Technique" was
prepared for the NASA Space Station by Rockwell International (Reference 60) well
before the Phase B Work Package 1 design efforts. In an early presentation of this
overall effort,Witcofski (Reference 62) outlined the study'ssubobjectives:
1) Develop a crew-safety philosophy and criteria,
2) Assess potential threats to crew safety, potential Space Station
design and operational concepts, and the range of potential in-space
activity scenarios, and
3) Assess the potential for various crew-safety strategies to meet
desired criteria.
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As part of the Rockwell International Threat Strategy Technique development effort,
a "baseline" safety philosophy for the Space Station was prepared by Peercy and
Raasch(Reference 60) and is illustrated in Table 5-I.
TABLE 5-1. SPACE STATION SAFETY PHILOSOPHY PRECEDENCE (HOW MUCH SAFETY?)
CURRENT OPTIONS COMMENTS
Cause no damage whatsoever to Space Station and no
injury to crew.
• Cause no damage to Space Station beyond routine
maintenance capability.
. Cause no damage to Space Station or injury to crew thatwill result in a complete suspension of operations.
• Space Station repairable and operational within a
specified period of time.
• Crew survival at expense of the Space Station.
Desirable: cost trade
Cost Trade
Baseline Philosophy I
May require escape/rescue.
Implies evacuation and rescue as a minimum.
The Rockwell effort identified 23 separate categories of threats to the Space Station
and ranked the threats of fireand explosion/implosion among the highest. The overall
approach used in the Rockwell effort to deal with the identified threats included the
following sequence of hazard mitigation efforts:
1. Design To Preclude.
2. Design To Control.
3. Provide Protective Devices And Design Operational Work-Arounds.
4. Design An Appropriate Crew Retreat To A "Safe Haven" Or Module
(Assuming Incomplete Mitigation Of The Threat).
Based on probabilistic risk assessments developed by the nuclear power industry
(Reference 61), another methodology for the definition of risk due to fire in manned
spacecraft can be stated as follows:
.
o
Define the criticallocations in the spacecraft where fire could result
in substantialdamage, or lead to loss of life,
Model the propagation of a fire event as well as its detection and
suppression, and
3. Assess the system response for the identifiedcriticalfirescenarios.
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Some of the limitations in this methodology include the difficulty in modeling fire
scenarios due to incomplete knowledge of the effects of low gravity on ignition,
combustion, flame propagation, etc.
J. H. Kimzey and others have identified secondary causative factors of ignition of
materials within a spacecraft pressurized module as a result of an impact by space
debris and those due to materials incompatibility, especially those failures caused by
storage container release of reactive materials.
As used herein, a threat is defined as any situation that endangers either the crew or
the spacecraft. A potential hazard is a threat that has been determined to have a
combination of probability, frequency, and/or severity for a given scenario and that
must be dealt with. Throughout this report, the phrases "risk assessment" and "hazard
assessment" will be used interchangeably. These phrases generally imply that the
probabilityand frequency of the threat may be determined, along with the severity of
the event for a given scenario.
5.3.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of work
breakdown structure (WBS) tasks directed to develop and refine a technique for
identifying threats to spacecraft due to firesand fire-induced explosions. Further, the
effort is intended to outline methods for developing acceptable solutions to the fire
threats such that they may be rendered benign. The organization of the project WBS is
illustratedin Figure 5-2.
Task 1.0: Establish Data Base Of Fire/Explosion Threats Of Potential Hazard To
Manned Spacecraft
The purpose of this task is to establisha data and knowledge base of "lessons learned"
from past spaceflight missions, existingrisk analyses and "threat-strategy" techniques,
and knowledge of low-gravity effects on fire and firesafety.
Subtask 1.1: Review Documented Fire/Explosion Events and Alarms From Past
Missions. There is a need to gather fire and explosion-related information from past
space flight missions and to organize this information to be readily accessed by
designers, safety personnel, crew training specialists,etc. The long-duration missions
of both the United States (especiallyApollo, Skylab and Spacelab) and the Soviet Union
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(Salyut through Mir) will be of highest use. Evidences of overheated motors, clogged
filters,inappropriate use of materials, etc. have all been documented or alluded to in
mission reviews.
Subtask 1.2: Review Existing Fire Risk Assessments Relative To Advanced
Spacecraft. The purpose of this subtask is to identify and review available risk
assessments and studies relative to advanced, manned spacecraft such as those
developed for Space Station Freedom, covering those of fire, fire-induced explosions
and related threats.
Subtask 1.3 Review Knowledge Base Of Microgravity Effects On Fires. Although the
knowledge base relative to the effects of low gravity on ignition, combustion, and
extinction of fires is limited, the intent of this subtask is to collect available
information for efficient application. Over the long term, new information will be
made available from several sources, including the results of the basic research
project described in Section 3.7.
Task2.0 Define Potential Hazards From Fire And Explosion Threats Foe Speeific
Spacecraft
The purpose of this task is to apply the knowledge base developed in Task 1.0 to a
specific spacecraft. As discussed above, the review and definition of specific threats
to a spacecraft should be performed very early in the design cycle and then updated as
the design proceeds.
Subtask 2.1: Review Spacecraft Design Documents At Each Review Step. NASA's
safety requirements for payloads, payload integration, carrier spacecraft and all
associated hardware and operating procedures are very stringent. This subtask is
intended to supplement existing safety requirements from an overall review
perspective, i.e., to apply the knowledge developed during Task 1.0 to identify
potential threats for fire and explosions. The review should examine material usage,
location, quantity, and compatibility, and it should also identify locations of highest
threat, for example, hazardous experiments, waste storage, fluid handling, power
concentrations, etc.
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Subtask 2.2 Assess Risks Associated With Potential Threats For The Specific
Spaceeraft Under Review. The intent of this subtask is to assess the risk associated
with the threats identified in Subtask 2.1. This would entail an estimate and review of
probabilities of exposures and consequences of the threatened event. Such an
assessment would include a study of the proximity or isolationof identifiedfuels and
likelyignitionsources, probability of spillage,human errors, and probability of outside
events, such as meteoroid or space debris impact.
Task 3.0- Identify And Recommend Strategies For Fire Risk Minimization By
Mitigation Or Elimination Of Threats
This task is devoted to the preparation of strategies for eliminating or rendering
benign any fireor explosion threats identified for the specific designs reviewed in Task
2.0. The overall results of this task will be a set of strategies that apply to specific
fireand explosion threats, but may also apply to similar threats associated with other
designs.
Subtask 3.1: Review Design For Ac_erenee To Established NASA Safety Require-
merits. Existing NASA safety requirements are intended to "preclude" and "control"
threats by adherence to stringent design considerations. The appropriate selection and
limitation on the use of materials is inherent to these safety requirements. Wherever
possible, one leg of the fire triangle should be eliminated and in the case of reactive
fluids,both ignition sources and fuels should be eliminated for a fail-safe design.
However, in the case of advanced, manned spacecraft this cannot always be done.
This is especially true of some experiment racks where fuels and oxidizers are present
and where containment and isolation from ignition sources becomes the only way to
preclude the threat of fireor explosion.
Subtask 3.2: Review Operational Requirements For The Minimization Of Threats.
This task is to be devoted to the development of operational strategies designed to
"preclude" and/or "control" threats of fireand explosions. An obvious example of such
a strategy is that of timelining experiments such that power usage is well distributed
in both time and location on the spacecraft. Another example is that where the
discharge of waste materials to the process materials management subsystem (PMMS)
is timelined to keep incompatible reactive materials from mixing or accumulating.
Handling and storing general refuse (foodstuff, wipes, etc.) is also a common, but
important spacecraft activity.
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Subtask 3.3: Review Of The Provision Of Safety Devices And Contingency Equipment
And Procedures. This subtask is included in recognition of the importance of the
safety devices and contingency measures required in the event that a fire hazard due
to a specific threat or group of threats isnot mitigated. Thus, early design reviews of
the locations and types of fire detection and suppression systems, early warning and
communication systems, provisions for egress of crew to safe havens (e.g.,adjacent
modules), and post-fire cleanup are all important aspects of the riskanalysis.
Task 4.0: Assess The Impact Of Threat Mitigation Strategies On Fire And Explosion
Risks
After selected threat mitigation strategies have been defined and recommended, they
must be critically reviewed for anticipated effect and appropriateness. Threat
mitigation and the accompanying risk assessment is an iterative process to insure that
the solution to one threat will not create a worse solution for other threats. The cost
and schedule impacts must also be addressed for allthreat mitigation strategies.
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5.4 Research On Numerical Modeling Of Fire Scenarios In Spaeeeraft
5.4.1 Background: In the event of a fire inside a spacecraft, the smoke and fire
spread are essentiallycontrolled by the ventilation flow. Established fire-detection
and suppression procedures developed for the buoyancy-dominated, normal-gravity
conditions are not applicable in the microgravity environment. Detailed flow and fire
modeling are necessary to determine the optimum locations for the firedetection and
extinguishment systems and to develop fire control procedures. The information
obtained from spacecraft fire models is also important during the design phase of the
spacecraft to formulate appropriate rescue, escape, and recovery procedures. The
need to create comprehensive mathematical models to enhance fire safety of a
spacecraft during its design phase as well as operational stage has been identified as
one of high priorityby several experts surveyed by Wyle.
Fire modeling involves the solution of the field equations for temperature, velocity,
and species concentrations with basic combustion models providing the flame dynamics
as the driving boundary conditions. Fire spread, growth and smoke-gas transportation
in enclosures have been modeled with some success under normal-gravity conditions
using numerical solution techniques of the governing conservation equations. Both
zone models and field models have been used to analyze the smoke spread, flashover
and other fire related phenomenon in a variety of enclosed geometries such as
buildings,aircraft cabins, and ships. In zone modeling, the burning enclosure is divided
into several distinct regions characterized by a dominant firebehavior and these zones
are coupled together using interface conservation conditions to simulate the entire
fire scenario. Typical zones employed in a zone model are the flaming combustion
zone, the thermal plume zone, the hot-gas layer accumulation, and the ventilation
flow region.
In the field-modeling approach, the entire region of interest is treated as one unit and
the governing Navier-Stokes equations and energy and species conservation equations
are solved along with the appropriate initialand boundary conditions. While field
modeling provides accurate flow-field results and avoids the empiricism involved in
the zone modeling, itdemands large amounts of computer-memory storage and time to
resolve small scale flow structures in space and time which may be of importance in
certain firescenarios associated with large enclosures.
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%The modular construction and well defined geometry of most spacecraft, such as the
Space Station Freedom, eliminates some of tilestatisticalaspects of a normal-gravity
building fire code and lends itselfto realisticfield calculations. Individual units such
as equipment racks, open cabin areas, air-locks, etc. can be analyzed separately,
treating the inlet and exit conditions as parameters, and an overall model for the
entire spacecraft can be developed by combining these separate results.
Both the European (ESA) and Japanese (NASDA) space agencies have started
preliminary numerical modeling studies for the Columbus Lab and the JEM
(References 63 and 64). The Japanese effort includes numerical flow fieldcalculations
as well as functional model tests to validate the codes. However, at present, their
objective is essentially to determine the ventilation flow parameters and is not
directly related to the fire-safety problem. The proposed effort by ESA is directly
aimed at fire modeling with a view toward finding optimal locations to place the fire
detectors. Numerical modeling has also been sponsored by NASA to study the
dispersal of contaminants in the cabin area of the Space Station Freedom (Reference
65).
5.4.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of WBS tasks
directed at developing and formulating a numerical model of fire spread in the low-
gravity environment of Freedom modules. The organization of the project WBS is
illustratedin Figure 5-3.
Task 1.0: Select A Suitable Mathematical Model For The Flow Processes
In microgravity, as in the normal gravity conditions, the fluid flow fieldis determined
by the conservation equations for mass, momentum, and energy and these equations
are well known. However, certain special considerations need to be taken into account
in formulating a fire model. Materials burning under microgravity isknown to produce
more soot, and radiation heat transfer plays a major role in fire growth and smoke
spread. A suitable radiation exchange model has to be adopted to simulate the highly
non-gray combustion products. Hotters "mixed gray masses" model has been used in
the past for building fires (see Reference 66). Another important factor that is of
interest from the fire-detection point of view is the smoke transportation and
coagulation process. In the past, the Smoluchowski equation, which governs the
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particle size distribution,has been solved using a Lagrangian reference frame and
particle tracking procedures along with the hydrodynamic equations to predict smoke
properties (Reference 67). A similar approach could be used to analyze the fire-
generated aerosol transportation inside spacecraft compartments. A suitable
turbulence model also needs to be incorporated into the flow conservation equations.
Task 2.0: Develop Models For Basie Combustion Processes And Configuration
Effects
Basic combustion models for ignition,flame spread, burning rate, and extinction are
necessary components for a physically realisticfire modeling effort. No matter how
accurately the field equations are solved, without physically realistic materials
combustion models, the overall performance of the simulation will be unsatisfactory.
The current state of knowledge on microgravity solid fuels combustion is stillin its
infancy (see Section 3.7). The limited information that is available in the literature is
focused toward understanding the basic physical phenomena and is not directly
applicable to numerical simulation models.
Basic combustion science experiments on solid fuels and theoretical analysis consider
simple geometrical configurations and boundary conditions. However, the flammable
materials that are used in a spacecraft form a part of the complex configurations.
Guidelines to evaluate potentially flammable configurations are presented in the
NASA/JSC document NSTS 22648 (Reference 38) which is based on NASA's past
experience in firesafety and extensive test results conducted according to NHB 8060.1
(Reference 30). The need to place this empirical knowledge on a strong scientific
basis has been recognized by a number of fire safety experts. The primary methods
recommended in NSTS 22648 are 1) to limit the flammable materials by replacement
with nonflammable materials and 2) to restrict the flame propagation paths, either by
covering flammable materials with a nonflammable material or by separation of
flammable materials by fire breaks, which are gaps, openings, nonflammable
materials, or heat sinks.
At the present time, it may be necessary to consider a semi-empirical approach. This
approach would be based on available experimental and theoretical results to extract
information relevant to fire models from fundamental combustion science
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investigations,where empirical and/or analytical models for microgravity combustion
of solid fuels are developed that provide fire-relatedparameters such as burning rate,
smoke production rate, energy release rate, etc. These models must be able to
account for the energy interactions that are encountered in an actual end-use
geometrical configuration of a spacecraft interior.
Task 3.0: Develop Numerical Codes
The numerical code selected must be able to solve three-dimensional, transient
problems for arbitrarilyshaped bodies (racks, electronic cabins, open cabin area, etc.).
Body fitted co-ordinate systems may need to be implemented to model complex
interior shapes of a spacecraft. A listof requirements for a microgravity fire-model
code is given in Table 5-2. There are a number of powerful codes that are
commercially available that seem to meet most of the requirements, namely the
PHOENICS, FLUENT, FLUENT/BFC, FIDAP, etc. There are also several Navier-
Stokes solvers developed by NASA (e.g.,ARC3D, INS3D) which may be modified to
suit the present problem. A review of the literaturepertaining to combustor modeling
and aerosol dispersion may be valuable in selecting relevant transport equation solver
and smoke particle tracking procedures respectively.
This task involves the selection of numerical schemes that are capable of solving the
field equations, radiation transfer and particle transport equations accurately in the
region of interest. The results of the previous tasks will be combined to produce a
unified numerical program. The fieldequations are coupled with the proper boundary
and initialconditions and a program flow logic isdeveloped.
Task 4.0: Code Validation And Model Predictions
Any numerical code developed to simulate a spacecraft firescenario must be validated
first. Experimental validation of microgravity fire scenario simulation is very
difficult,if not impossible, on earth. Full scale tests similar to building fires and
aircraft cabin firesare not possible for spacecraft fires in ground-based facilitiesdue
to the ever present buoyancy forces. However, it is possible to model the smoke
spread and the flow patterns caused by ventilation inside a spacecraft using
isothermal, liquidsystems in normal gravity. A scale model of the spacecraft can be
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TABLE 5-2. REQUIREMENTS FOR A NUMERICAL CODE USED IN
MICROGRAVITY FIRE MODELING
• FLOW TYPE
• FLUID TYPE
• ANALYSIS TYPE
• FLUID PHASE COMPONENT
• REACTION OF FLUID
• CIRCULATION TYrE
• BOUNDARY
• EQUATIONS SOLVED
INCOMPRESSIBLE
SUBSONIC
VISCOUS
NEWTONIAN
LAMINAR/TURBULENT
STEADY
TRANSIENT
SINGLE
DISPERSED SECOND PHASE OF PARTICLES
REACTING
RECIRCULATION
FIXED
COMPLEX INTERIOR GEOMETRIES
3D
CONSERVATION OF MASS
CONSERVATION OF MOMENTUM
CONSERVATION OF ENERGY
CONSERVATION OF CHEMICAL SPECIES
RADIATION
PARTICLE TRANSPORT/COAGULATION
5-15
fabricated using transparent materials and the flow circulation inside could be
visualized using, for example, water as the flow medium and a neutrally buoyant dye
as the smoke generated by a fire source. It may be possible to use some other fluid
with neutrally buoyant particles in an isothermal system to model the hydrodynamic
effects under microgravity.
The validated fire code could then be used to predict a number of factors influencing
the firesafety of the spacecraft. Some of these parameters are:
1. Flow and temperature field.
2. Particle size growth and distribution.
3. Transient firedevelopment times.
The simulation code can also provide input to the risk and hazard analysis by
simulating various fire events at different locations and times inside a spacecraft.
Results from simulated fire events can also be incorporated into the knowledge-base
of an expert system used in the spacecraft fire control. Since full-scaletests under
microgravity are not possible,even crude simulation results are of great value to the
designer and may help in designing future test methods.
Task 5.0 Simulate Fire Scenarios
This task identifiescriticalfirescenarios and simulates them on a computer to assess
the potential risk levels and provide the designer with alternatives. Optimum
locations to installfire detectors and suppressants are also identified. One must be
aware that such use of the computer simulations must be used with caution and good
judgement.
The modeling program outlined above isquite ambitious and it may not be possible to
include all the physical details into a single computer code which can be run in a
reasonable length of time. Part of the challenge, then, is to make the necessary
approximations without losingthe predictive capabilitiesof the overall program.
It must be noted that the program outlined above considers flammable solid materials
as the potential sources of fire hazards. However, flammable and reactive liquidsand
gases when spilledor leaked into an area could act as sources of firespread. On-going
research on the combustion characteristics of these fuels must be continued.
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5.5 Other Risk And Hazard Assessment Projects
The third-ranked project in this thematic area on the evaluation of ventilation flow
models isnot discussed further. It isparallel to the project on numerical modeling of
fire scenarios just described and would have a similar WBS. One of the most useful
results of a ventilation-flow model would be a forced convection map that would guide
the optimal locations of fire detectors for sensing through means of both temperature
and smoke-particle distribution.
A lower-priority topic of interest deals with the threats associated with spacecraft
impact by orbitaldebris and meteoroids (Topic 6.4,Table 2-1). The potential damages
that may be caused by such impacts and the methods of mitigating those damages are
being studied extensively by NASA and its contractors. Of concern to fire safety, the
radiant energy release from hypervelocity impacts (Project GT-5), along with molten
debris from the impact, has been shown to easily ignite flammable materials (thiswas
reported by WSTF personnel). The proposed oxygen transfer system for Freedom has
utilitytrays that contain flexible oxygen lines as well as coolant and electrical lines.
The study would evaluate the penetration and flame propagation initiated by
hypervelocity particle impact on the utilitytray. Possible experiments could use CO 2
lasers to measure criticalenergy for ignitionof standard materials.
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6.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: TOXICOLOGY, HUMAN RESPONSE AND ATMO-
SPHERE CONTROL
6.1 Background
The maintenance of a safe, clean and comfortable atmosphere for crew habitation in
any spacecraft is of the highest priority. Originally, in the Mercury and Gemini
spacecraft, the breathable atmosphere was I00 percent oxygen at 34.5 kPa (5 psia).
This evolved finallyto the shirt-sleeve,sea level air environment (21 percent oxygen
at 1 atmosphere total pressure) for the STS Space Shuttle Orbiter and Spacelab. The
equipment devoted to maintaining the spacecraft atmosphere is referred to as the
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS). The abilityof the ECLSS to
maintain the spacecraft environment free from toxicants and irritantsis somewhat
limited, and the system isgenerally not designed for off-nominal occurrences such as a
fire or toxic spill(see Section 4.4). Even in the state-of-the-art ECLSS units used in
the Shuttle Orbiter and in the planned units for Space Station Freedom, toxic
contaminants and irritantscan exceed acceptable human tolerance levels if an off-
nominal event occurs and is undetected in sufficient time to use auxiliary cleanup
devices.
Monitoring a spacecraft atmosphere continuously for selected gases, including toxic
contaminants and irritants,will be essential for the much longer-duration mission
spacecraft such as Freedom. The universalityof the need for real-time contamination
monitoring was emphasized by Astronaut Dr. Bonnie J. Dunbar in her presentation at
the Space Station Freedom Toxic and Reactive Materials Handling Workshop
(Reference 68).
6.2 Proposed Efforts
The final selection of highest-priority projects has provided a single project to be
included in the thematic area of toxicology, human response, and atmosphere control
listedbelow and identifiedby the disciplinenumber shown in Figure 2-2.
Priority
DisciplineNo.
AR-2
Project Title
Evaluation Of Contaminants and Continuous Monitoring
On-Orbit And Material Screening For Toxicity
6-I
However, a number of lesser-priority projects were identified during the course of this
effort, which addressesconcerns regarding threats to spaceraft crew from fire-
produced toxicants and irritants, the provision of off-nominal "fire-safe" atmospheres,
and the long-term physiological response of crew members to these off-nominal
environments. Figure 6-1 illustrates a schedule for the priority project and two other
projects in these human factors.
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6.3 Evaluation Of Requirements For Continuous Monitoring Of Contaminants On-
Orbit And Materials Screening For Toxicity
6.3.1 Background: With the advent of NASA's Space Station Freedom, there is a
renewed concern regarding the potential hazard from toxicants and irritants in the
spacecraft habitable atmosphere. Of course, a major source of toxic gases would be
from a spacecraft fire event, or to a lesser extent from a severely overheated
component.
During the Wyle survey conducted as a part of this effort, several topics were
suggested that involve toxicants and irritantsin various contexts. These suggested
topics may be identifiedas follows (from Table 2-1):
Topic 1.6
Topic 7.1
Topic 7.2
Identify Those
Continuously For
Irritants
Gases Which Should Be Monitored
Spacecraft Atmosphere Toxicity And
Perform Toxicity Analyses Of The Offgassed Products From
Overheated Components
Establish A Policy Position Relevent To The Toxicological
Hazards Associated With The Pyrolysis Products Of
Spacecraft Materials
These topics have been combined into the single highest-priority project
described in thissection.
Continuous and rapid monitoring of toxic contaminants has not been routinely
performed on past NASA-manned spacecraft. Further, the detailed screening of
materials for the production of toxicants and irritantsresulting from any stage
of combustion has been essentially abandoned. Although seven-day Spacecraft
Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC) values have been established for a
limited number of the major combustion products (e.g.,CO, HCN, SO2, and the
nitrogen oxides (Reference 30)), these values are not applicable to the much
longer missions planned for the future. Work is currently underway to define 90-
day SMAC values.
An overview and assessment of the proposed research and technology projects
relevant to spacecraft smoke gas toxicity (and irritants)was prepared by a Wyle
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Consultant, Dr. H.L. Kaplan. Some of the comments from that overview are
highly relevant to this proposedeffort and are summarized in the remainder of
this section.
According to Dr. Kaplan, materials screening and selection and the development
of toxic hazard/risk assessmentmodelsbasedon the results of toxicity bioassay
tests have not beenproductive becauseof constraints and limitations suchas the
following:
.
.
.
.
.
.
The combustion products and the quantities thereof generated by any
material are variable and depend on several factors, i.e.,temperature,
rate of heating, 02 availability, material configuration, etc. In
addition, the results obtained under normal gravity conditions do not
represent those of low gravity.
With few exceptions, the LC50 (toxicityindex -- see Note I) values of
most materials fallwithin a narrow range despite marked differences
in the combustion products generated and their potential toxicity to
humans. One notable exception ispolytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE).
In general, the LC50 index of lethality values does not measure the
potential of the smoke gas to impair performance, impair or delay
escape, or incapacitate humans.
The relevance of the animal models, used in toxicitytest methods, has
not been fully established, particularly in the case of irritantgases,
because it is not known whether any of the laboratory test methods
replicates the combustion of materials in actual firesand the resultant
generation of toxicants.
In one series of tests (Reference 70), the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (formerly NBS) N-gas model failed to
predict the lethality of approximately 30 percent of the materials
tested.
New York State is nearing completion of its mandatory three-year
program requiring the submission of LC50 values for certain building
and finishing materials. To our knowledge, the hundreds of LC50
values filed will not be used for approval/disapproval of materials
since there isno means to apply them.
Note 1: The term LC50 may be defined as "...the concentration of combustion
products needed to cause 50 percent of the test animals to die from these
concentration measurements after a specified exposure time."
(Reference 69)
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The combustion of materials and the generation of toxicants may be considerably
different in low gravity than in normal gravity. Consequently, the data base
accumulated during years of testing in normal gravity is questionable when used to
assessthe potential toxicity of spacecraft materials. Resolution of this concern
implies the need for a research and test program that includes testing in low gravity.
The fundamental question, therefore, is what strategy should NASA assume with
regard to the potential for toxicity-related incapacitation and/or death of spacecraft
crews that may result from fires during a mission? Monitoring of toxicants and
irritants is planned for SpaceStation Freedom, but to what extent and how timely the
monitoring should be has not been fully established. Regarding the combustion
toxicity of spacecraft materials, should all candidate materials be screened for their
potential to produce lethal or incapacitating quantities of toxicants and irritants? If
such screening is performed, on what basis and against what criteria should the
screening be performed? Alternatively, should such screening be abandonedand full
reliance be placed on the screening provided by flammability tests and enhancedfire
detection/suppression techniques? It shouldbe noted that the techniques used to make
a material less flammable generally introduces increased toxicity. Thus, selecting a
material which is less likely to propagate a fire (the criterion generally used
throughout the manned spacecraft program) has reduced the total gas load from an
accidental fire while admitting a small amount of more toxic gases. The Spacecraft
Columbia teleprinter incident of 12 August 1989(STS-28)illustrates this. If electrical
insulation had been selected for minimum toxic gases, it probably would have been
polyethylene, cotton or paper, and parafin, and the fire would have spreadproducing a
total gas load which would be far more damaging -- or total results that were
catastrophic.
These arguments have been assessedby Kaplan to determine the priority and overall
cost of three strategies for spacecraft material selection basedon combustion toxicity
(Table 6-1). The most practical approach appears to be largely in experience-based
material selection (Strategy 3, Table 6-1), with limited bioassay testing (Strategy I)
and analytical toxicity assessment(Strategy 2). This philosophy underlies the project
described in this section.
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TABLE 6-1. CANDIDATE STRATEGIES FOR SPACECRAFT MATERIALS SELECTION
BASED ON COMBUSTION TOXICITY
APPROACH
1. Extensive combustion toxicity testing, including
bioassay tests (e.g., NIST N-gas method as a
minimum). (Selected low gravity confirmation
required.)
.
.
Extensive analytical toxicity assessment based on
evaluation of smoke gases produced by a material
and toxic hazard assessment from available human
toxicological dam. (Low gravity comparison of smoke
gas production required.)
Avoidance of potentially hazardous (i.e., toxicant
producing) materials based on their chemical content
and industry experience. (Limited tests as in
Approaches 1. and 2. may be required.)
PRIORITY COST
Low
Medium
Highest
Over $100 Million
(10+ year period)
Over $25 Million
(5+ year period)
$2-5 Million
(5+ year period)
6.3.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of work
breakdown structure (WBS) tasks directed toward the applied research and engineering
associated with the monitoring of combustion (smoke) gases for crew safety (and
possibly fire detection) and the need for and merits of candidate methods for the
screening and selection of materials based on combustion toxicity. The need for
continuous monitoring for crew safety and warning may be judged to be well-
established. The need for material screening is not well-established for the technical
and cost reasons discussed above. The organization of the project WBS is illustratedin
Figure 6-2.
Task 1.0:
Establish A Priority List Of Combustion (Smoke) Gas Toxicants And
Irritants To Be Monitored Continuously On-Orbit
Subtask 1.1: Review Past Experience In Spacecraft Atmosphere Monitoring,-. On-
orbit monitoring of the spacecraft breathable atmosphere has been generally limited
to measurements of the partial pressure of oxygen and carbon dioxide (e.g.,in Skylab,
STS Space Shuttle and Spacelab). Any other detailed assessment of the spacecraft
breathable atmosphere was accomplished by taking "grab-samples" and returning them
to earth for analysis. This past experience should be reviewed.
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REVIEW
PAST
EXPERIENCE
TASK 1
ESTABLISH PRIORITY LIST
OF COMBUSTION PRODUCT
TOXICANTS/IRRITANTS FOR
MONITORING
ESTABLISH
WARNING
LEVELS
REVIEW EXISTING
EXPERIENCE
RESULTS
TASK 2
EVALUATE MERITS OF
MATERIAL SCREENING
REVIEW
EXISTING
METHODS
!
!
TASK 3
PREPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS
ASSESS
REQUIREMENTS
FOR LIMITED
TESTING
ON-ORBIT
MONITORING
MATERIAL
SELECTION
FIGURE 6-2. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE FOR EVALUATION OF
REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF
CONTAMINANTS ON-ORBIT AND MATERIAL
SCREENING FOR TOXICITY
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Subtask 1.2: Establish Warning Levels For The Major Smoke Gas Toxicants And
Irritants. Current plans for the Space Station Freedom include the continuous
monitoring of the atmosphere in the habitable areas for several major constituents and
a wide range of trace contaminants (Reference 31). What is currently missing is a
quantitative identification of the most toxic combustion products (i.e.,the "bad
actors") and a means for rapidly identifyingthese compounds in the event of a fire and
for determining when the atmosphere is again safe for normal breathing. Rapid
monitoring of only such gases as carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO 2) and
oxygen (02) may be inadequate in the presence of other smoke gases such as HCI, HBr,
HCN, HF, NOx, acrolein, and isocyanates. Also, there may be value in monitoring
phosphorous compounds and fluorinated organics. The firstpurpose of thissubtask is
to determine which of these asphyxiant and irritantgases should be monitored rapidly,
i.e.,in time periods of seconds to a few minutes. The Federal Guidelines of IDLH
(Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health) concentrations may be appropriate
(Reference 71).
The second purpose of this subtask is the selection and assessment of simple and
compact -- preferably portable -- analytical sensors for monitoring major toxicants to
determine, e.g.,when it issafe for crew members to remove their respirators. These
sensors could be the standard Draeger tubes or some combination of battery-powered
smoke gas detectors under development (Reference 32).
The third purpose of this subtask is to develop recommendations for new Spacecraft
Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC) values needed for application to long-
duration manned spaceflight missions to ensure that continuous, prolonged exposure to
combustion products and fire/extinguishant breakdown products do not result in
incapacitation of crew members. Seven-day SMAC values have been developed and
are listed in NHB 8060.IB (Reference 30) for some major combustion products,
including CO, HCN, nitrogen oxides, and SO 2. However, these values are not
applicable to the much longer missions planned for advanced, manned spacecraft.
Subtask 1.3: Review Existing Experimental Results To Establish Those Gases That
Should Be monitored For Use In Smoke Gas Fire Detection Systems. The
interpretation of experimental results is an important subtask in the project. The
scope of thissubtask, however, fallswithin the project discussed in Section 3.5 on the
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development of techniques for early
monitoring outgassing, smoke gases,etc.
two projects must be assumed.
detection of incipient fire conditions by
Precursor or concurrent activities in these
Task 2.0: Evaluate The Need For Adopting An Approaeh For Screening Materials
For Combustion Product Toxicity
Subtask 2.1: Review Existing Methods For The Evaluation Of The Toxicity Of Smoke
Gases. All three material-selection strategies listed in Table 6-1 are based on
methods to assess conbustion-product toxicity of candidate materials. In addition,but
not discussed here, is the growing number of mathematical models being developed for
the prediction of toxic hazards (e.g.,the Fractional Effective Dose Model (Reference
72)). These models depend upon the availability of appropriate toxicological and
flammability data. Adoption of any of these methods will require careful
consideration by toxicologists who are sensitive to the limitations and merits of the
individual methods.
The costs in time and money associated with any detailed, thorough methodology for
the screening of materials for combustion toxicology can be substantial. Even the
costs of the NIST (formerly NBS) "N-gas" model methodology (Reference 69) are not
insignificantif a large number of materials are to be screened. The rough order of
magnitude costs listedin Table 6-1 would need to be re-defined.
Subtask 2.2: Assess The Requirements For A Limited Test Program. This subtask
depends largely upon the results of the assessment performed in Subtask 2.1. For
example, the evaluation of Strategy No. 3 of Table 6-1 may involve use of limited
bioassay tests (e.g.,the N-gas method) to verify that a material isor isnot potentially
hazardous.
Task 3.0: Prepare Formal Recommendations
Subtask 3.1: Prepare Reeommendations Relevant To The Monitoring Of Combustion
Products On Orbit. Based on the results of the reviews and assessments of Tasks 1.0
and 2.0,recommendations willbe made for the resolution of the following issues:
It What combustion or pyrolysis products should be monitored
continuously and rapidly on-orbit?
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What simple, compact analytical sensors can be used by the crew for
post-fire hazard monitoring?
What SMAC values are appropriate for combustion products predicted
for long-duration manned spaceflight.
4. What should be monitored for firedetection?
Subtask 3.2: Prepare Recommendations Relevant To The Screening And Selection Of
Materials For Combustion Toxicity. This subtask constitutes the preparation of a
NASA policy position regarding the need to perform screening tests for the evaluation
of the potential hazards associated with combustion product toxicity. The importance
of establishingsuch a policy should not be underestimated.
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6.4 Other Toxicity, Human Response, And Atmosphere Control Projects
Several other projects in this thematic area are worthy of note, although they were
not ranked among the highest-priorityprojects. For example, Priority Discipline No.
AR-10, "Evaluation of the Merits of Providing Breathable, 'Fire-Safe'Atmospheres in
Advanced Spacecraft," investigates the advantages of providing a safer, reduced-
oxygen atmosphere for spacecraft crews (see References 73 and 74). According to Dr.
D.R. Knight (Reference 73), atmospheric-control studies sponsored by the Navy
showed that spacecraft crews can live and work in enclosed environments with 11
percent oxygen if the total pressure is adjusted to maintain the partial pressure of
oxygen above 16 kPa (0.16 arm.). The reduced oxygen concentration would prevent or
retard most types of fires. Reduced-oxygen atmospheres are unlikely to be adopted
for Space Station Freedom for two fundamental reasons: I) An off-nominal
atmosphere that is unlike the normal sea-level earth atmosphere would interfere with
a number of life-sciences experiments and some physical experiments; and 2) Human
tolerance to long-term exposure to such atmospheres in low gravity is not well
defined. It may be envisioned, however, that the use of off-nominal "fire-safe"
atmospheres willbe used for other long-duration spaceflight missions in the future.
Project BR-4, "Research Relevant to the Effects on Human Physiology Due to Long-
Term Exposure to Non-Standard Atmospheres," covers the basic research pertinent to
the fire-safeatmospheres just discussed. Dr. Knight (Reference 73) cautioned that the
expanded research required must include assessments of the long-term physiological
limitations of decompression sickness, acute hypoxia, and chronic hypoxia. Dr. John
Orr of the Southwest Research Institute, a Wyle respondee, recommended the
expansion of research into the effects of combustion products on cognitive functions
such as perception, memory, and decision making of spacecraft crews.
Finally, BR-5, "Research on Low-Gravity Investigations Relevant to the Pyrolysis and
Combustion Products of Selected Materials," was compiled from several
recommendations of the respondees. The production of toxicants and irritants in
various low-gravity fire scenarios is poorly understood. There is a strong possibility
that a fireevent in low gravity may result in smoke gases that are more toxic than if
the same fire scenario were to take place at normal gravity. This supposition is
supported by the observation that the burning process of various materials in a nearly
quiescent, low-gravity environment tends to result in a slower flame spread rate and
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the flame tends to be cooler and sootier than in a normal-gravity environment
(References 75 and 76). If these observations are correct, then a low-level combustion
process (i.e.,smoldering, pre-pyrolysis, etc.) or even an actual flaming condition may
proceed undetected for a substantial period of time in a spacecraft with a resultant
buildup of highly toxic gases.
6-13
This page was intentionally left blank.
6-14
7.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS: GROUND-BASED TESTING AND STANDARD
TEST METHODS FOR FLAMMABILITY
7.1 Background
The ground-based testing and evaluation of spacecraft materials and configurations for
flammability are among the most important efforts in NASA's safety program. No
material or component is permitted to be used on a manned spacecraft in any
configuration untilithas been judged to meet stringent safety requirements. The test
procedures and guidelines for flammability are among the most demanding, with the
result that materials selection and component design are fundamentally conservative.
The development of advanced spacecraft, such as Space Station Freedom, and the
increased use of the STS Space Shuttle Orbiter and Spacelab for hazardous
experimentation has placed new demands on all safety requirements. Regarding fire
safety, materials screening for flammability is receiving renewed attention within
NASA, especially at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and NASA
Johnson Space Center (JSC) (including JSC's White Sands Test Facility). NASA's
flammability requirements outlined in NHB 8060.IB, "Flammability, Odor, and
Offgassing Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in Environments That
Support Combustion" (Reference 30) are currently being revised and materials testing
for flammability has continued to expand. NASA's guidelines for the assessment of
flammability hazards associated with STS payload hardware (NSTS 22648, Reference
38) have been recently revised (October 1988) and provide conservative requirements
for component end-use configurations.
In view of the attention given to safety and the generally successful record of U.S.
space missions, criticism of both NHB 8060.IB and NSTS 22648 and other NASA
requirements and guidelines for spacecraft fire safety may seem unjustified.
However, there are special problems that are not adequately addressed by the current
test methods and guidelines. Also, the intentional conservatism of current
requirements may be too restrictive for full access to advanced spacecraft. In
addition, there have been strong recommendations for adopting new test methods that
hold promise for placing flammability testing on a firmer scientific and engineering
basis (e.g.,see Reference 77). Current flammability tests are basically"pass/fail"and
do not permit, therefore, direct comparison and correlation with existing low-gravity
flammability data and new data that are beginning to emerge. Further, a number of
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variables exist that could permit one material batch to pass, while another batch (or
batches) may fail.
Examples of some special problems relating to material flammability testing have
been cited in the Wyle survey responses, for example:
1)
2)
3)
4)
The phenomenon of arc-tracking may contribute to starting a wire
insulationfire.
Tests used to qualify materials for use in high pressure oxygen systems
are inadequate.
The effect on the flammability of non-metallic materials due to long-
term aging isnot adequately addressed.
Some inconsistencies have been noted in the results of comparisons
between NASA and ESA flammability tests for Group I materials.
7.2 Proposed Ground-Based Testing And Standard Test Methods For Flammability
Projects
The final selection of the highest-priority projects has provided two projects to be
included in the thematic area of ground-based testing and standard test methods for
flammability, listed below in the order of descending priority and identified by the
disciplinenumber shown in Figure 2-2.
Priority
Discipline No.
GT-1
GT-2
Project Title
Test Procedures And Pass/Fail Criteria For Special
Problems Relevant To Electrical Wire/Cable Insulation
Flammability
Critical Review Of Relevant Test Methods For The
Screening Of Non-Metallic Materials For Flammability
Figure 7-1 illustratesa proposed schedule for the highest priorityground-based testing
and standard test methods for flammability projects. The schedule includes additional
lower-priority in ground testing for flammability in hyperbaric atmospheres (GT-3) and
advanced research on aging and degradation (AR-8).
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7.3 Test Procedures And Pass/Fail Criteria For Electrical Wire/Cable Insatation
Flammability
7.3.1 Background: NASA's specifications for electrical wire and cable material
selection, design, and installation are stringent, especially in the case of manned
spacecraft applications. Many of these NASA specifications incorporate, by
reference, other demanding standards and procedures (e.g.,MIL-STD and IEEE). With
regard to flammability requirements, electrical wire insulation and electrical
connector pottings and conformal coatings must adhere to Tests I, 4 and 5 of NHB
8060.IB (Reference 30).
The survey of fire-safety workers, conducted as a part of this effort, identified two
special problems related to the flammability of electrical wire and cable insulation.
The firstof these concerns was the specific phenomenon known as "Arc Tracking," the
formation of carbon on the insulationsurface, caused by electricalarc overheat, which
reduces the electrical insulating value of the wire covering and will contribute to
starting a fire. Unpublished tests at the NASA Kennedy Space Center have shown that
sustained arc tracking can be initiated at a voltage of 28V (with sustaining currents
less than 4 A). The concerns relative to wire insulation arc tracking, especially as the
phenomena might adversely affect STS Shuttle wire insulation,are being actively
reviewed by NASA and various contractors. The standard NASA tests for wire
insulation flammability, NHB 8060.1 Tests 1 and 4, do not test specifically for arc
tracking resistance. It was pointed out that the ASTM D-9 Committee is currently
developing a standard test procedure the purpose of which is to quantify the tendency
of wire insulation materials to arc track at low voltages.
The second major concern relative to electrical wire and cable insulation is the
general issue of the long-term effect that environmental aging may have on
flammability. Although NASA has long recognized the need to address time-related
changes along with other material property requirements (i.e.,corrosion, stress
corrosion, fracture control, vacuum stability,etc.), the advent of advanced, long-
duration mission spacecraft such as SS Freedom demands that renewed emphasis be
placed on material aging. The planned design lifeof 30 years for a spacecraft such as
Freedom is much more demanding in terms of material aging than, for example, the
original 10-year design life of the STS Shuttle Orbiter vehicle. A recent report
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(Reference 78) has been prepared by the Southwest Research Institute for the NASA
JSC that addresses the long-life assurance of materials for future, long-duration
mission spacecraft.
7.3.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of work
breakdown structure (WBS) tasks directed to address some of the special problems
related to the flammability of electrical wire and cable insulation. The concern
relative to the effect of lifetime aging on flammability is included. The organization
of the project WBS isillustratedin Figure 7-2.
Task 1.0: Review The Special Problem Of Are Traeking As Related To Spacecraft
Eleetrical Wiring
Portions of this effort are already in progress within NASA. Assessments are being
made relative to the arc tracking concerns as applied to STS Shuttle Orbiter electrical
systems -- especially the Kapton wire insulation. This effort should be expanded to
develop a test procedure that would properly address the arc-tracking problem for all
advanced spacecraft electrical wire and cable insulationand provide an appropriately
conservative pass/failcriterion.
Task2.0: Establish Material Aging Protocols For Eleetrieal wire And Cable
Insulation
Subtask 2.1: Review Current Knowledge and NASA Requirements Relative To
Accelerated-Life Aging. The purpose of this subtask is to perform a criticalreview
of NASA's current specifications and requirements as they apply to long-lifeassurance
of materials. The emphasis shall be on non-metallic materials, especially those whose
flammability properties may be affected by long-term aging. This effort shallrequire
an extensive review of the literature and may require a significanttest program.
Subtask 2.2: Develop Test Procedures For Material Aging Of Electrical Wire And
Cable Insulation. This subtask follows from the criticalreview and testing called for
in Subtask 2.1. Where possible,the test procedures (aging protocols) to be developed
should be based on well-established industry methods. Examples of industry standards
that require environmental aging are IEEE Std. 323-1988 (IEEE Standard for Qualifying
Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, dated September 30, 1983)
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PASS/FAIL CRITERIA FOR ELECTRICAL WIRE/CABLE
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and UL-746B (UL Standard for Polymeric Materials - Long Term Property Evaluations,
dated December 14, 1978). These industry standards typically address the electrical
insulation properties of wire, cable, and other component coverings and coatings.
However, the present effort places additional emphasis on the flammability of the
wire insulationafter aging.
Task 3.0 Prepare Draft Test Procedures And Pass/Fail Criteria For The Are
Tracking Phenomenon And For Material Aging
The test procedures, pass/fail criteria,and material aging specifications (protocols)
prepared during Tasks 1.0 and 2.0 shall be formally documented in draft form for
release. Review should be performed by all NASA design, materials, and safety
personnel concerned with the failure or degradation of electrical wire insulation.
Since this type of internal review does not constitute fullindustry concensus, it is
important that well-recognized industry test standards and test procedures be
incorporated where possible.
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7.4 Critical Review Of Relevant Test Methods For The Screening Of Non-Metallic
Materials For Flammability
7.4.1 Background: Test personnel from the NASA/JSC White Sands Test Facility
(WSTF) have recommended this review for at least two reasons. First,there are two
current test methods for the selection of non-metallic materials for use in the
pressurized regions of spacecraft: I) the European Space Agency (ESA) oxygen index
test (Reference 79) and 2) the NASA upward propagation test (Test I of Reference 30).
The ESA test (Figure 7-3) determines a limiting oxygen concentration for non-
propagation using a vertical sample mounted in a flow chamber and ignited at the top
f
f GLASS COLUMN
f SAMPLE
HOLDER
OXYGEN/NZTROGEN
MIXTURE
I
!
FIGURE 7-3. ESA OXYGEN INDEX APPARATUS
surface. The NASA test (Figure 7-4) determines non-propagation also using a
vertically mounted sample, but in a quiescent atmosphere chamber with ignitionat the
bottom surface. In both tests,non-propagation is the self-extinguishment of the flame
before it spreads beyond a specified reference length. Both tests provide a pass/fail
criterion for materials that can have unrestricted use in spacecraft pressurized
atmospheres (i.e.,Group I materials). While the bulk of the flammability testing for
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Group I criteria performed for ESA by the European Space Research and Technology
Center (ESTEC) is conducted in accordance with the NASA upward burning test, it is
recognized that there exist two different standard tests that may yield different
acceptance criteria. Recently, controlled experiments comparing the two methods
(Reference 80) were performed on a variety of materials, including rigid plastics,
foams, elastomers, films, fabrics, and coatings. Nearly 20 percent of the materials
either passed the ESA test for Group I acceptance but failed the NASA test in the
same Space Shuttle simulated atmosphere or vice versa.
A second reason given (Reference 81) for supporting this criticalreview of methods is
that the NASA test (Reference 30) remains essentiallyunchanged since itsoriginal use
for the screening of materials in atmospheres containing up to 100 percent oxygen.
The NASA test is essentially a pass/fail screening that produces little or no
correlatable information. Similarly, although the ESA oxygen index test isbased on a
more widely accepted ASTM test (referred to as the "Critical Oxygen Index," ASTM
D2863), the ESA test does not produce much information for the spacecraft designers.
An often stated goal of NASA's microgravity combustion research program is to obtain
an enhanced understanding of the flammability of materials in various microgravity
environments so that a better assessment of their fire safety attributes in spacecraft
use may be made from necessarily limited ground-based testing. The need to perform
a number of material flammability tests in low gravity was emphasized by several of
the fire-safetyexperts responding to Wyle's spacecraft firesafety survey. The ability,
however, to correlate such flammability data obtained in microgravity with ground-
based test results will require more fundamental information than that which can be
supplied by the current NASA tests.
Examples of test parameters and conditions to be considered for flammability
correlations were outlined by Dr. V. Babrauskas (Reference 77) as follows:
I) Planar, thermally thick specimens.
2) The testing of composites as composites, instead of testing individual
layers.
3) Simulated fire exposure to consist of a uniform, adjustable radiant
flux.
4) Design of tests to give one-dimensional heat transfer.
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5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
Design of apparatus such that specimens do not melt out of holder or
retreat from their ignitionsources.
The measurement of heat, species, soot and smoke on a per-gram
basis.
Use of oxygen consumption for measuring heat release rates.
The selection of both irradiance conditions and test times to predict
full-scaledata.
The focus on predicting volume-integrated full-scale variables (e.g.,
heat release rate) instead of point variables (e.g., temperature at a
given station).
One of the recent pieces of test apparatus developed for the bench-scale
determination of combustion heat release rate, mass loss rate, smoke production, and
toxic product formulation is the Cone Calorimeter (Reference 82) illustratedinFigure
7-5, which is under review at present as an ASTM test method (Committee E-5,
Proposal P-190).
7.4.2 Proposed Efforts: The proposed project is described on the basis of WBS tasks
directed to culminate in a new or revised methodology for testing nonmetallic
materials for flammability, especially for NASA Group I criteria. The effort will be
aided if established and/or generally accepted test methods are adopted where
possible. The organization of the project WBS isillustratedin Figure 7-6.
Task 1.0: Perform A Critical Review Of Relevant Test Methods For Evaluating The
Flammability Of Nonmetallie Materials
Subtask I.I: Compare And Evaluate Available Test Results Performed For The NASA
Space Shuttle And Spaeelab. The purpose of this subtask is to expand upon the test
results described in Reference 80 in which the NASA and ESA tests for meeting Group
I criteria materials requirements were compared. A thorough review of the
background (genesis)of both the NASA test (Test 1 of Reference 30) and the ESA test
(oxygen index test of Reference 79) will be performed, and additional data from both
tests should be obtained and compared, if possible. The advantages, disadvantages,
and limitationsof the tests willbe identified.
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Subtask 1.2: Review Other Potentially Applicable Test Methods. Specific test
methods that may be potentially applicable to the determination of selected
components of the physics of flammability will be reviewed in this subtask. A
proposed starting point for this effort would be based on the recommendations
prepared by Dr. V. Babrauskas (Reference 77).
During this subtask, it is also recommended that a review be made of the tests and
requirements used by the commercial airline industry to rank and/or screen
nonmetallic materials for use in the interiors of transport category airplane cabins.
For example, the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) flammability tests set out in the
recently amended version of FAR 25.853 (Reference 83) include requirements and
recommended methods for determining material heat release rates and smoke
emission, using the Ohio State University rate-of-heat-release test apparatus (ASTM
E906). Europe's Airbus Industrie has adopted its own fireworthiness regulations, i.e.,
the Airbus Test Specification ATS 1000.001. This specification defines material
requirements regarding allowable limits for toxicity -- requirements not currently
adopted by the FAA. A brief discussion of the FAA and Airbus Industrie specifications
ispresented in Reference 84.
Subtask 1.3: Establish Desired Test Parameters For Flammability Testing. This
subtask will be devoted to the preparation of a realistic list of the parameters
associated with flammability physics that should be measured and/or adhered to during
testing. Although the anticipated fire scenarios for NASA spacecraft may be
considerably different than those for aircraft and ground-based facilitiesand vehicles,
the fundamental requirements for obtaining meaningful and repeatable measurements
of ignition,flame spread, and burning and product generation rates isuniversal for all
of the fire conditions. A preliminary list of the desirable test parameters was
presented above in the background discussion.
Task 2.0 Establish Matrix Of Desired Flammability Test Parameters, Materials, And
Candidate Test Methods
After the knowledge base preparation and reviews performed in Task 1.0 have been
completed, this task will be devoted to the preparation of a test matrix for use in
evaluating the applicabilityof selected tests and test parameters for screening and/or
ranking nonmetallic materials for flammability.
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Subtask 2.1: Seleet Candidate Test Methods For Use In determining Speeifie
Flammability Parameters. A subset of flammability test methods will be selected
based on the review performed during Subtask 1.2. The selected procedures may
include more than one of the reviewed methods, with modifications and combinations
as appropriate to meet the demanding specifications for spacecraft use. The selection
willalso cover test conditions and ranges of experimental parameters.
Subtnsk 2.2: Seleet A Limited Number Of Nonmetallic Materials And Material
Configurations For Testing. The materials selected for test method development
should have the following characteristics:
I) Relevancy to manned spacecraft use in pressurized volumes.
2) Variety of specific materials and material configurations (foams,
composites, laminations, films,etc.)
3) Unique qualities for research, such as marginal flammability or
inconsistent prior test results(e.g.,Reference 80).
Subtask 2.3: Develop Data Interpretation Models. Existing and/or new material
flammability models willbe selected or developed to interpret the planned test results
in terms of ignition, flame spread, extinction, burning rates, etc. Such data
interpretation models shall include the selection of dimensionless parameters for
correlation of test data, numerical simulations of the flammability process, and the
selection or development of fundamental analytical models.
Task 3.0: Perform Bench-Scale Flammability Tests Based On Prepared Test Matrix
This task willbe devoted to the set-up and conduct of the test matrix prepared in Task
2.0. Test procedures will be prepared for each portion of the flammability test
methodology and an appropriate number of test specimens shall be submitted for
testing.
Task 4.0: Review Test Results And Correlate With Data Interpretation Models
The results of the flammability tests will be reviewed and correlated with the
appropriate models. Where possible, material rankings from the tests will be
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compared with the results of the NASA and ESA pass/failresults for Group I criteria
materials. If necessary, the test matrix will be altered and additional tests will be
performed.
Finally, recommendations will be made relevant to the adoption of new or revised
flammability test methods.
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7.5 Other Ground-Based Testing And Standards Development Projects
Several other suggestions and potential projects related to ground-based testing and
standards development are worth noting even though they have not been incorporated
into the highest-priorityprojects.
Priority Discipline No. GT-3 (see Figure 2-2), "Expansion Of Flammability Tests On
Materials For Use In Hyperbaric Atmospheres," extends work already underway at both
the NASA MSFC and NASA JSC White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). This effort is
clearly complementary to the highest-priorityproject on fire extinguishment in these
atmospheres, described in Section 4.3. Among the suggestions of the Wyle sources are
recommendations for detailed testing to determine the relative reactivity of air versus
selected oxygen-inert gas mixtures at increasing levels of pressure. This is in
recognition that the addition of some inert gases such as argon or nitrogen to high-
pressure oxygen tends to increase the energy required for ignition.
The project described in Section 7.2 already covers, in part, studies on wire insulation
aging effects. Attention is called to AR-8, "Evaluation Of The Effects Of Long-Term
Aging On The Degradation And Flammability Of Spacecraft Materials," which is a
project concerned with the more general aspects of aging effects, an important
concern in the long-term operations planned for the Space Station Freedom.
Several other suggestions involving metals ignitionin high-pressure oxygen and ignition
and detonation of spacecraft fuels were contributed by WSTF personnel. For the
former, minimum ignition energy tests and criteria would permit future spacecraft
system designers to control the energy levels of ignition sources in proximity to
potential fuel sites. For the latter, experiments to determine the detonation
parameters on all spacecraft fuels should be performed at the actual operating
conditions because detonation parameters depend on the initialstate of the fuel.
Priority should be given to determining the detonation parameters for proposed high
pressure, propulsion system fuels for the Space Station.
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8.0 SUMMARY OF OTHER FIRE-SAFETY TOPICS AND PROJECTS
Several other topics and projects that did not fit into the previous thematic areas or
priority groupings are worthy of some comments. Included are the suggestions on
post-fire cleanup, preparation of a spacecraft fire safety handbook, spacecraft crew
training,prevention or mitigation of spontaneous ignition,materials compatibility with
chemically reactive gases and liquids,and design of fire-safe appliances for crew use
on advanced spacecraft. The identification and investigation of these subjects was
largely through the efforts of J.H. Kimzey, based on his many years of dealing with
materials problems and spacecraft fire-safety issues at the NASA Johnson Space
Center (JSC).
8.1 Additional Comments On Post-Fire Cleanup
Rapid cleanup of a spacecraft's habitable atmosphere must be accomplished
immediately after a fire event has been identified and extinguished. This was
partiallyaddressed in the project on the development of an environmental cleanup unit
(Section 4.4). The time, power, and materials required to restore the habitable
atmosphere will depend upon the severity of the fire event and the equipment and
procedures available. Mr. Richard T. Congo of the NASA MSFC and Mr. J.H. Kimzey
emphasized the need for the development of procedures, cleaning techniques, and crew
training for the additional cleanup that is likely to be required after the habitable
atmosphere has been restored and the crew is allowed to re-enter the affected
spacecraft module (Topic 1.7,Table 2-1).
8.2 Preparation Of A Spacecraft Fire Safety Handbook
There is not currently available a single handbook devoted to spacecraft fire safety.
The need for such a handbook was suggested as Topic 6.2 by Mr. Robert Clodfelter of
the Wright Patterson Air Force Base. This handbook would contain much of the
material developed in thisreport, but would exhibit more detail in terms of accepted
practice for spacecraft fire safety (material selection, configuration design, fire
detection and suppression, etc.). A new firesafety handbook would no____tbe intended to
replace existing spacecraft fire safety related documents. In this handbook, various
chapters and topics would be prepared in detailby appropriate personnel at each of the
NASA fieldcenters, other government agencies, and outside organizations.
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8.3 Spacecraft Crew Training
The establishment of an intensive fire-safety training program for spacecraft crews is
an absolute requirement for long-duration flightsof advanced spacecraft such as Space
Station Freedom. Although astronaut training currently includes procedures relative
to the spacecraft firedetection and suppression (FDS) subsystem, it is recommended
that such traininG be expanded to enable crew to respond to the increased number of
fire scenarios that could occur on advanced spacecraft. It is recommended that fire
"drills"be continued during long-duration spaceflights. Other aspects of the expanded
crew training would include those activitiesinvolving post-firecleanup and restoration
of normal operational conditions. Such training is not currently a part of the crew
requirements for the STS Shuttle Orbiter or Spacelab, since any fire event in those
spacecraft that would require a release of extinguishant (i.e.,Halon 1301) is cause for
mission abortion and return to earth.
8.4 Prevention Or Mitigation Of Spontaneous Ignition
Threats of an explosion or fire due to the spontaneous ignition of a combustible
atmosphere in the low-gravity environment within a spacecraft may be possible, but
such threats are poorly understood at present. This subject has been assembled into
Project AR-5, "Evaluation Of The Mitigation Of Spontaneous Ignition Of Waste." Mr.
Kimzey has suggested a research project, initiated by a review of the literature on
spontaneous ignition and combustion, to learn more on how these phenomena occur in
normal gravity and how to apply this knowledge, as possible, to low gravity.
Space for the storage of on-board space vehicle supplies isalways at a premium. Thus,
supplies are packed together in a dense manner. Even in a ventilated storeroom or
cabinet, there will be a reduced air flow. The proposed study would investigate
whether a hazard exists when materials are stored for long periods in low gravity, for
example: dry foods, moist food items, frozen foods, condiments, extra clothing,
towels, tissue paper, alcohol wipes, cleaning materials, spare parts and maintenance
items, and medical supplies,etc.
It is clear that actual experimental research into the fire hazard, or lack thereof,
posed by spontaneous ignition in low gravity willnot be resolved easilyor in a manner
timely enough for Space Station Freedom design. Thus, it is recommmended that
methods of mitigation be adopted. It may be necessary to adopt some or all of the
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following measures: I) chemical or thermal inerting of stored waste, especially
organic waste; 2) cooling or freezing of stored waste; 3) active ventilation of storage
areas; and 4) careful segregation of stored supplies.
8.5 Long-Term, On-Orbit Storage Of Chemically Reactive Liquids And Gases
Topic 8.1 covers the establishment of a data base relevant to materials compatibility
for long-term storage of chemically reactive gases, liquids,and solids. This technical
issue isincluded in this assessment of fire-safetytopics due to the threat of explosion
and/or fire from improper or inadequate storage of various chemically reactive
materials, particularly the propellants nitrogen tetroxide, hydrazine, and derivatives,
halogens and oxygen on orbitingspacecraft.
For example, hydrazine, as a monopropellant, will break down in the presence of a
catalyst at some critical temperature producing the gases hydrogen, nitrogen, and
ammonia. Above the critical temperature, which is characteristic of each metal,
ceramic, and polymer, the exothermic reaction starts and continues at an accelerating
rate until an explosion occurs, unless immediate action to cool the system is provided.
As the Space Station willhave on-board tanks for storing hydrazine used in propulsion
systems, in recharging the unmanned satellitesor, later on, interplanetary vehicles, it
isnecessary to evaluate the various materials which are wet with hydrazine in order to
learn the criticalthreshold temperature for each material.
Mr. Kimzey also recommended that an investigation be undertaken to evaluate the
effect that a major solar flare might have on the integrity of on-orbit hydrazine
storage/handling systems.
8.6 Design And Development of Fire-Safe Applieanees For Crew Use
With the advent of long-duration spaceflight missions, the crew will need appliances
for their convenience and comfort -- appliances such as those used on earth that
include microwave ovens, clothes washers/dryers, televisions, etc. Although it is
obvious that these devices must be rendered safe for crew use, their use in
microgravity may pose some new problems.
Mr. Kimzey has recommended a test and development project on earth to evaluate the
appropriate design and use of on-orbit clothes dryers (Topic 10.5). A background
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review would be conducted based on ground investigations of appliance fires. The
study would identify fabrics and processes to be used in Freedom and would provide
guidelines for designing a fire-safe clothes dryer, considering all aspects of human
psychology; overloading equipment, impatience, neglect of maintenance, etc.
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9.0 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT
The importance of spacecraft fire safety demands appropriate management and
oversight of the projects underway as well as those identified in this study to be
initiatedor expanded. The absence of adequate attention to the important functions
of project management and oversight would most certainly result in a number of
potentially disastrous situations which could include: (I) inappropriate prioritization,
(2) unnecessary project duplication, (3) reduced level of interest in safety and safety
technology, and (4)inefficientuse of limited resources.
The technical management of any spacecraft fire-safety program within NASA will
most likely continue to flow from each major program office (i.e.,Space Station
Freedom, STS Shuttle, etc.) through the project offices and technical staffs at each
relevant NASA fieldcenter. At each of the major fieldcenters (especially MSFC and
JSC), there are technical organizations who have responsibilityfor various aspects of
spacecraft firesafety, including materials screening and selection, materials compati-
bility,firedetection and suppression, toxicology and contaminant monitoring, etc. To
a large extent, these are ongoing technical efforts that have been in place for many
years. When a new program is initiated,these technical groups are asked to respond
accordingly. In general, this organization of technical disciplines has worked very
well, as judged by NASA's spacecraft firesafety record from the early 1970s to date.
However, two serious deficiencies regarding NASA's overall spacecraft fire-safety
efforts have been identified. These two deficiencies have become quite apparent with
the advent of the Space Station Freedom (SS Freedom) program and are as follows:
1. There is currently no overall NASA program in spacecraft firesafety,
especially as regards advanced spacecraft. An earlier, intercenter
Spacecraft Fire Hazards Steering Committee met from 1968 through
1971.
2. Communication among the technical groups working in various
aspects of fire safety has been somewhat weak and could be
significantlyimproved.
With regard to the lack of an overall NASA program in fire-safety efforts relevant to
SS Freedom, the division of responsibilitiesbetween the NASA field centers has
resulted in the assignment of the Fire Detection and Suppression (FDS) subsystem to
the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). Traditionally, the technical studies and
tests relevant to fire detection and suppression had been a function of the Johnson
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Space Center (JSC) and JSC's White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). This shift in
responsibility has resulted in some lost motion and coordination difficulties. The
problem has been intensifiedby the retirement of several of NASA's most experienced
fire-safetyexperts at both JSC and MSF C.
Recently, the NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) has taken an active role in
providing means for overcoming the perceived deficiencies in the spacecraft fire-
safety program that were identified above. In addition to the two major spacecraft
fire-safety workshops held at LeRC (August 1986 and January 1989) and several
technical publications (e.g.,References 1, 85 and 86) on spacecraft fire safety, the
efforts described in this report leading to a research and technology development
program in fire safety for advanced spacecraft were monitored by the LeRC under
NASA Headquarters sponsorship. The LeRC is well recognized in basic and applied
research in microgravity combustion science, and the Center possesses unique
facilities in drop towers and research aircraft dedicated to these studies. The
microgravity combustion effort now supports applications to various aspects of
spacecraft fire safety (Reference 40).
The adoption of any or all of the proposed fire-safetyprojects described in thisreport
depends on the recognition of the importance of such a program by the advanced
spacecraft program offices and field centers. The implementation is clearly the
responsibilityof NASA Headquarters. Further discussion of the management efforts is
embedded in the following comments on program organization and communications.
With regard to the second of the perceived deficiencies, the role of excellent
communications and technical oversight in any program as important as spacecraft
fire safety cannot be overemphasized. Figure 9-1 illustratesa scenario that is
designed to take advantage of NASA's current organization to improve communica-
tions. Stated simply, itisrecommended that overall authority should be maintained by
NASA Headquarters -- say in the Office of Safety, Reliability,Maintainability and
Quality Assurance (SRM & QA). A "Spacecraft Fire-Safety Steering Committee"
should be formally established at the Headquarters level under SRM & QA, with
representatives from the other Level 1 offices, the advanced spacecraft program
offices, and the NASA field centers. In addition, it is recommended that an Ad Hoc
"Spacecraft Fire Safety Committee" be re-established at those NASA field centers
having some direct involvement with manned spaceflight systems, crew training,
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and/or design, fabrication and testing of manned spacecraft hardware. Members of
each of these committees should be selected from directly involved personnel from
that field center's project offices, engineering directorates and divisions,and the
center's safety office (SRM & QA). Each NASA field center's Ad Hoc "Spacecraft
Fire-Safety Committee" should meet periodically to discuss issues and concerns of
most relevance to itsprojects. The chairperson of each fieldcenter's committee must
be willing to see that minutes of the meetings are kept and must communicate
routinely with the chairpersons of the other NASA field center committees and with
the Headquarters level Steering Committee. Other NASA Headquarters officesshown
on Figure 9-1 are the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST), responsible
for applied research and development, the Office of Space Science and Applications
(OSSA), responsible for low-gravity combustion science, and the Office of Space
Station (OSS).
The illustratedorganization (Figure 9-1) shows that, although the responsibilityfor
SRM & QA flows from NASA Headquarters (Code Q) and the Level 2 program offices
for manned spacecraft, the fire-safetyrelated information willflow in both directions.
The Spacecraft Fire-Safety Committee chairperson at each NASA field center would
maintain oversight of all spacecraft fire-safety activities through contact with his or
her counterpart at the other field centers. Recommendations for other duties and
responsibilitiesof the Ad Hoc Spacecraft Fire-Safety Committees at each fieldcenter
include those activitiesoutlined in the following paragraphs.
Fire-safety workshops should be organized by the "Steering Committee," along with
members of the Ad Hoc "Spacecraft Fire Safety Committees" as deemed necessary --
probably no less frequently than every two years. In addition to the directly involved
NASA personnel and their contractors, these larger workshops should be attended by
experts from industry, academia, and other government agencies.
While overall authority should be maintained by NASA Headquarters (SRM & QA), each
NASA field center should exert a lead role in those areas of spacecraft fire safety
where they possess unique expertise and program responsibility. For example, the
following lead roles may be indicated:
NASA/MSFC Material selection and data basing, system design and
testing
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NASA/LeRC
NASA/Ames RC
Material screening and selection, combustion toxicology,
crew training
Current and advanced fire-safety concepts supported by
microgravity combustion research, ground-based micro-
gravity testing, liaison with microgravity combustion
research community
Development of new and improved "fire-safe" materials,
riskanalyses, and expert system applications.
In addition, the knowledge and research capabilitiesresident in the Langley Research
Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory may also
contribute to the spacecraft fire-safetyprogram.
The above recommendations are believed to have merit because they take advantage
of one of NASA's most important functions, i.e.,Safety, Reliability,Maintainability,
and Quality Assurance. The suggested activities are all based on responsibilities
already established in the organization.
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10.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The advent of long-duration, manned spacecraft and permanently orbiting structures,
such as Space Station Freedom, poses new challenges to the fire-safety community.
Although material screening and configuration control as done in the past by NASA is
likely to continue, greater emphasis on fire protection for these more advanced,
manned spacecraft is needed. It is evident that all aspects of fire mitigation, i.e.,
prevention, detection/suppression, and recovery must be considered and a balanced
approach be taken in a fire-safetyprogram development. This will not only increase
the fire safety of future spacecraft, but it will also make the spacecraft and its
facilitiesmore accessible to the user community.
The results of the present study have identified a large number of fire-safety
concerns, some major, that are relevant to future spacecraft. Based on a
prioritizationof these concerns, a comprehensive spacecraft fire safety program plan
is presented. The recommended fire safety program contains the highest priority
projects in the following thematic areas:
i.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Advanced Fire Detection Techniques and Hardware
Fire Extinguishment and Atmosphere Cleanup
Risk and Hazard Assessment
Toxicology, Human Response and Atmosphere Control
Ground-Based Testing and Standard Test Methods For Flammibility.
Detailed descriptions and Work Breakdown Structures of selected projects within each
one of these categories are presented. The overall program plan and the individual
projects stress the adoption and refinement of fire-safety techniques and hardware
already in use or under development by the fire-safety community as a whole. For
example, the research and development of expert systems applied to the fire
detection/suppression system hardware of spacecraft isimperative. Also, the program
plan may be considered pragmatic in that it does not insist that NASA alone
underwrite alladvanced firesafety techniques, materials and systems.
Throughout the course of this study, it became apparent that a fundamental lack of
understanding of how fires might be initiated,propagated, and extinguished in a low-
gravity spacecraft environment isa major obstacle to the spacecraft designers. This
lack of understanding of the differences between fireevents in normal gravity and low
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gravity has forced the use of ground-based technology which may or may not be
appropriate. It is for this reason that several projects have been included that
recommend a significant amount of testing of materials in low gravity for ignition,
flame spread, extinction, etc.
Finally, the importance of program management and oversight cannot be
underestimated. This study, having performed a cursory review of the current fire
safety organizations within NASA, recommends a decentralized, project-oriented
organizational structure with the ultimate responsibility residing with the NASA
Headquarters. It is further recommended that each NASA field center establish a
"Spacecraft Fire Safety Committee" composed of cognizant and responsible personnel
working with manned spacecraft design and development. At least one member of
each of these committees should be from that field center's Safety Office (SRM &
Q/A).
It is recommended that the program plan developed in this report be implemented as
soon as possible so that the fullest benefits possible are obtained during the
development phase of the Space Station Freedom.
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During the efforts reported herein for spacecraft firesafety analysis and planning, the
authors contacted numerous experts and workers in the fire safety and combustion
research community. Table A-1 is a tabulation of those individuals who responded
formally to requests for fire safety issues and concerns and/or information in various
forms. Several of the respondees assembled material from their organizational
colleagues and submitted multiple and, in some cases, extensive responses. For
example, multiple and extensive responses were obtained from Joseph L. Buckley
(FMRC), Richard W. Bukowski (NIST), Jack Stradling (JSC/WSTF), Dr. Arthur F. Grand
(SwRI), and several others. The authors are very appreciative of the time and effort
provided by allof the respondees.
The firstcolumn in Table A-1 tabulates individual"Source Codes" for each respondee.
Each project listed in Table 2-1 in Section 2.0 includes the Source Code(s) of the
respondees who recommended or supported that specific project.
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TABLE A-1. RESPONDEES TO SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY SURVEY
SOURCE CODE RESPONDEE AND ORGANIZATION
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0"
5.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
13.0
i1
14.0"
15.0
17.0
18.0"
19.0
20.0
21.0
22.0
23.0
28.0
29.0
31.0
32.0
33.0
34.0*
35.0
36.0
37.0
39.0
41.0
42.0
43.0
44.0
Df...Georh,e.' Apostolakis (University of California, Los An_Ieles )
Dr. Ro.bert A. Altenkirch (Mississippi State University_ Mississippi)
Harlan Burke (Boeinl_ Aerospace)Huntsville _Al,3bama)
Dr. Homer Carhart (Naval Research Laboratgry rWashington r D-C')
Robert G. Clodfelter (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base r Oh!o)
Matthew B. Cole (NASA Johnson Space Center) Houston r Texas)
Dr. Martin E. Coleman (NASA Johnson Space Center r Houston, Texas)
Joseph L. Buckley, et al. (Factory Mutual Research Corporation,
Norwood,Mass.)
RichardL.P.Custer(WorcesterPolytechnicInstituteTWorcester,Mass.)
Dr.RobertN. Haser_Jr.(ConsultantrF anktownrColorado)
Dr.HaroldL. Kap!an(Consultant)San Antonio)Texas)
Dr.TakashiKashiwagi(NationalInstituteforStandardsandTechnology,
Gaithersburg, Maryland)
C. Frank Key (NASA Marshall Space Flight Center) Alabama )
J. Howard Kimzey (Consultant THouston rTexas)
Dr. Anil K. Kulkarni (The Pennsylvania State University, University
Park r Penn.)
Paul W. Ledoux (McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company,
Houston r Texas)
Dr. Douglas R. Knight, M.D. (Naval Sul_marine Medical Research
Laboratory) Groton, Conn.)
Richard W. Bukowski, et al. (National Institute for Standards and
Technolo_¢ rGaithersburg) Maryland)
Jennifer D. Noelke (NASA) Johnson Space Center rHouston r Texas)
Dr. John B. Opfell, et al. (AlResearch Los Angeles Division, Allied-
Sisnal Aerospace Company rTorrance) Calif.)
Charles D. Ray (N..ASAr Marshall Space Flight Center) Alabama)
Dr. James.J. Reuther (Battelle Columbus Laboratories? Columbus, Ohio)
Dr. K. Saito _. niversity of Kentucky, Lexington.r Kentucky)
Dr. Hiroaki Sasaki (Fire Research Institute , To .kl:o, Japan).
Dr. William A. Siriffnano (Unive.rsity of California r Irvine).
Jacl_ Stradling, et al. (NASA Johnson Space Center, White Sands Test
Facility) Las Cruces r New Mexico)
Dr. Roger A. Strehlow (University of Illinois r Urbana)
Dr. Martin Summerfield (Princeton Combustion Research Laboratories,
Inc.) Monmouth Juncti°nr New JerselQ .
Dr. James S. T'ien (Case Western Reserve Universit,/r Cleveland rOhio)
Dr. Robert E. Tupscott, et al. (New Mexico Engineering Research
Institute rAlbuquerque, New Mexico)
Emory Thomas (Brunswick Corporation, Defense Division, Costa Mesa,
California)
Dr. Forman A. Williams (University of California, San Diego, LaJolla,
California)
Workshop proceedings r Spacecraft Fire Safety (NASA CP-2476)
Gus Sarkos (Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Technical Center,
Atlantic City Airport, New Jersey)
Dr. Arthur F. Grand, et al. (Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio,
Texas)
Richard T. Congo (NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama)
TELEPHONE
(213) 8,25-1300
(601) 325-2270
(205) 461-2487
(202) 767-2262
(513)255-4208.
(713) 483-4285
(713) 483-7187
(617) 762-4300
(508) 831-5562
(303) 688-8958
(512) 492-9985
(301) 975-6699
(205) 544-2487
(713) 333-2246
(814) 865-7073
(814) 865-1345
(713) 280-1602
(203) 449-2508
(301) 975-6881
(713) 483-3661
(213) 512-1488
(205)544-7227
(614)424-7916
(606)257-1685
(0422)44-8331
(714)856-6002
(505) 524-5732
(217) 333-3769
(609) 452-9200
(216) 368-4581
(505) 768-7578
(714) 546-8400
(619) 534-5492
(609) 484-5620
(512) 522-2012
(205) 544-2629
*Supplementary information was obtained from presentations by these respondees at the International Microgravity
Combustion Workshop, January 25-26, 1989, NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio.
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B.I DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIORITIZATION PROCESS
A project prioritizationprocess was developed to rank the 58 spacecraft fire safety-
related suggestions and topics to produce the select group of high-priority projects
described in thisreport. Care was exercised to minimize any institutionalor subjective
bias in the process, although such bias can never be fully eliminated. To assure the
reader that objectivity was indeed sought, the priority philosophy and ranking factors
are explained in thisAppendix. All of the contributed suggestions and topics listed in
Table 2-I (Section 2.0)were considered in the prioritizationprocess; moreover, project
rankings were updated in successive iterations. This permitted adjustment and
refinement of the prioritization rankings performed under this effort as new
information was obtained. Also, at any time in the future, the rankings may be
adjusted as new technology emerges or projects are completed and/or otherwise
resolved.
The basic fire-safety philosophy for the prioritization process is derived from
assumptions and guidelines applied to Space Station Freedom and other advanced
spacecraft. These assumptions and guidelines are as follows:
IQ
.
o
A minor fire event, or at least an ignition,is likelyto occur on a future
space mission (concensus opinion).
Baseline Safety Philosophy: No event (e.g.,fire) would cause damage to
the spacecraft or injury to the crew that would result in complete
suspension of operations (Reference B-l).
Spacecraft fire-safetymanagement isa riskoptimization based on a trade-
off of practical fire-safety approaches against small but tolerable risks
(Reference B-2).
A fullunderstanding of the above listedassumptions and guidelines demands a careful
review of References B-I and B-2 and supporting documentation. Reference B-2
identified some of the practical reasons for not being able to ensure complete
B-I. Peercy, R.L. Jr. and Raasch, R.F., "Threat-Strategy Technique: A System
Safety Tool for Advanced Design," Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, Volume
23, No. 2, 1986, pp. 200-206.
B-2. Friedman, R. and Sacksteder, K.R., "Fire Behavior and Risk Analysis," NASA
TM-100944, December 1988.
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elimination of the fire-causing elements in spacecraft (i.e., fuel, ignition,and oxygen)
and, further, outlined the generally accepted fire-safetystrategies. Figure B-I shows
pictoriallya representation of the increasing levelsof on-orbit firedamage (risk).The
lowest two levels suggest that a fireevent is precluded, or, if a fireevent does occur
the response is successful (i.e.,there is littleor no injury to the crew and the
spacecraft mission can continue).
Obviously, the upper two levels of on-orbit fire damage (risk)in Figure B-I are
deemed unacceptable and, conversely, the lowest level of risk cannot be ensured. It is,
therefore, a fundamental objective to enhance the fire safety of spacecraft by
concentration on the strategy of responsive techniques for mitigation of fire and its
precursors through appropriate recognition of the proposed research studies and
technology development topics. It is with this objective that the following
prioritizationprocess steps were developed for the present effort.
B.2 STEPS IN THE PRIORITIZATION PROCESS
Step 1. Collect and assimilate technical concerns, issues and recommendations
from survey of experts, in-house information, and other sources.
Step 2. Condense collected material into clearly defined recommendations for
action (specifically58 identified topics)and organize same into categories
of interest. Eleven such categories were identified and include the
following:
1.0) Atmosphere Control, Monitoring, and Post-Fire Cleanup
2.0) Low-Gravity Ignition,Flame Spread, and Flame Characteristics
3.0) Expert Systems Development (Hardware/Software)
4.0) Extinguishants and Fire Suppression Techniques
5.0) Fire Detectors and Fire Detection Systems
6.0) Fire Risk/Hazard Assessment
7.0) Human Effects and Toxicity
8.0) Materials and Material Configurations
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Step 3.
9.0) Modeling of Fire Scenarios
10.0) Other Fire-Safety Related Issues
II.0) Testing and Test Standards (Ground-Based)
Apply the prioritization rating factors (R) and criticality weighting factors
(C) listed in Table B-I to each of the identified fire safety research studies
and technology development topics. The priority factors are explained in
the following section.
Step 4. Review the rankings accomplished inStep 3. and flag those items which are
a) purely programmatic, b) already in progress, and/or c) require no
significantfunds to complete.
Step 5. Combine and eliminate topics and assemble into priority projects, iterate
Steps 3. and 4. as necessary, and derive the prioritized array (work
breakdown structure) of priority projects, presented in Figure 2-2 in the
body of thisreport.
B.3 COMMENTS ON THE FIRE-SAFETY PRIORITY PARAMETERS
The Fire-Safety Priority Parameters outlined in Table B-1 are intended to be
relatively free of institutionalor subjective bias and should be easy to understand and
use.
It is clear that not all of the suggested topics cover issues that can be resolved within
the next approximately five years, and many of the topics cannot be fully resolved or
developed to meet Space Station Freedom's Critical Design Review (May 1992). Thus,
the firstpriority parameter (No. I) addresses the urgency of the item relative to SS
Freedom's design/development schedule. Note that a low rating factor doesn't mean
that effort shouldn't be initiated immediately but simply provides a measure of
schedule urgency.
The intent of Priority Parameters Nos. 2 and 3 should require no explanation. Priority
Parameter No. 4 considers the status of technology as an impediment to resolution
and/or development of a fire-safetytopic. For example, the fullacceptance of solid-
state fire detection devices (micro-sensor technology) is unlikely in less than five
B-4
TABLE B-1
FIRE SAFETY PRIORITY PARAMETERS AND RATING FACTORS
w
FIRE SAFETY RATING FACTOR DEFINITION
PRIORYFY PARAMETER (Lowest Priority, R = 1 to 2 Up to Highest Priority, R = 9 to 10)
1.
,
.
,
°
°
Urgency to Meet Space
Station Freedom Schedule
Perceived Relevance to
Other Advanced Spacecraft,
Current and Future
Anticipated Value to Micro-
gravity Combustion
Science: Fire Safety
Emphasis
Perceived Status of
Enabling Technologies
(As An Impediment to
Issue Resolution)
Extent of Low-Gravity
Testing Required
Anticipated Cost of Effort
(May Include New Capital
Equipmen0
• Schedule to meet Space Station Preliminary Design Review: R = 9 to 10
• Schedule to meet Space Station Critical Design Review: R = 6 to 8
• Schedule important to Space Station, but cannot meet PDR/CDR: R = 3 to 5
• Urgency not high for Space Station: R = 1 to 2
• High relevance to all advanced spacecraft designs:
• Modest relevance to advanced spacecraft designs:
• Low relevance to advanced spacecraft designs:
• No relevance to advanced spacecraft designs:
• Highest scientific value:
• Modest scientific value:
• Lower scientific value:
• Little or no scientific value:
R=9tol0
R=6to8
R=3to5
R=lto2
R=8tol0
R=5to7
R=2_4
R=lto2
• No new technology required: R = 9 to 10
• Very little new technology required: R = 6 to 8
• Required technology available in two-three years: R = 3 to 5
• Required technology unlikely to be available in less than 5 years: R = 1 to 2
i,
• Little or no low-gravity testing required: R = 8 to 10
• Short duration, low gravity tests required (e.g., drop tower,
aircraft, suborbital rocket, etc.): R = 5 to 7
• Extended duration low-gravity testing required (e.g., STS Space
Shuttle, Spacelab, etc.): R = 1 to 4
• Low cost (no new capital equipmen0:
• Modest cost (including modest equipment):
• High cost (extensive manhours and/or major capital
equipment costs):
R=9_10
R=5to8
R=lto4
Criticality Weighting Factor, C: Highest Criticality, C = 7 to 10
Lowest Criticality, C = 1 to 3
NOTE: Apply weighting factors only to Fire Safety Priority Parameters 1 and 2.
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years. Although this technology may be highly desirable,NASA should not be required
to fullyunderwrite itsdevelopment since there are acceptable alternative detectors.
Fire-Safety Priority Parameter No. 5 (Extent of Low-Gravity Testing Required)
requires some explanation. The high value of the rating factor (R = 8 to 10) defined
for the case where "littleor no low-gravity testing is required" issimply a recognition
of the limited access to the test environment of low gravity. Priority Parameter No. 5
is also indirectly related to cost (No. 6). The greater the need for low-gravity testing
(e.g., via Spacelab), the greater the cost.
Finally, the Criticality Weighting Factor (C) is to be applied to Priority Parameters
Nos. 1 and 2, only. These factors are intended to allow judicious recognition of the
urgency and relevance of selected items. For example, the development of "expert"
fire detection/suppression systems (Topic No. 3.2 of Table 2-I) is clearly one of the
most important and relevant fire-safety efforts. The technology is available, little
low-gravity testing isrequired, and the development cost should be modest.
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Kimzey, John Howard
Consultant
Several philosophies have guided the design of systems in manned spacecraft during
the last 27 years. Some approaches have been well thought out, using an appropriate
balance of engineering and physiological guidelines. Others have at times been
somewhat arbitrary. The items discussed here include the atmosphere of the cabin,
the crew requirements (clothing, hygiene, rest and work schedules, etc.), material
selection, fire detection, fire extinguishment, caution and warning systems, and crew
attitude and housekeeping. Table C-1 shows how in-flight protection varied as
dictated by the various design requirements.
C.I ATMOSPHERE
Conservatism dictated a pure oxygen atmosphere for the cabin of Mercury, and this
atmospheric composition was continued in subsequent programs, Gemini and Apollo.
But conservatism is a valid description from only one perspective, not from all
viewpoints. Above the earth's atmosphere, the probability of a meteroid hit was
considered to be unacceptably high. So, if the assumption is that a hit would puncture
the cabin wall and violate the pressure integrity,the crew needed a pressurized suit to
survive. And, if suited, the crewman needed sufficient oxygen to sustain normal
breathing, but at a low enough totalpressure to enable mobility of arms and legs. This
resulted in the need for the atmosphere to be pure oxygen.
Subsequent experience showed that damaging hits from space debris were not the
problem that was anticipated, and so the shirt sleeve environment necessitated for
long duration flights(starting with Gemini 4) gradually became the norm for space
crewmen.
Skylab was the firstvehicle to baseline a two-gas system, although Apollo launched
with a two-gas atmosphere and went to pure oxygen on orbit. The Skylab environment
was 65 percent oxygen and 35 percent nitrogen at 5.2 psia (36 kPa) even though the
Apollo Command Module, used for crew transfers, stillhad pure oxygen as its
atmosphere.
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TABLE C-1
SPACECRAFT FIRE PROTECTION
SPACECRAFT
Mercury, MR-3,
4, MA-6T7, and 8
Mercury, MA-9
Gemini GT-3, 8
IN-FLIGHT
ATMOSPHERE*
i
Oxygen at 5 psia
(34 LPa)
Oxygen at 5 psia
(3 4 kPa)
Oxygen at 5 psia
CREW
CLOTHING
MATERIAL
SELECTION
(Flammability FIRE
,DETECTION**
suited _ Human Senses
Partially unsuited Good
Good (except forPressure suited
Ht_m Senses
Human Senses
Gemini GT-4, 5,
6,7,9, 10, 11,
and 12
i
Apollo 7, 8, 9, 10
and13
Apollo11,12,
14,15,16,and 17
Lunar Module
ApoUo-Soyuz
Skylab
Orbiter 1-4
(34 kPa) | i | , in ii m
Oxygen at 5 psia Pressure suited
(34 kPa) for launch and
• i
Oxygen at 5 psia
(34 kPa)
Oxygen at 5 psia
(34kPa)
Oxygen it 5 psia
(34 kPa)
i
Oxygen at 5 psia
(34 kPa)
i
65 oxygen, 35
nitrogen at 5.2 psia
(36 kPa)
Sea level air (21%
02 at 14.7 psia)
Typically 22-25%
i
Sea level air
entry
Pressuresuited
forlaunchand
entry
Pressuresuited
forlaunchand
entry
Pressuresuited
forlunarsurface
travel
Orbiter 5-25
Orbiter STS-26 Sea level air Pressure suited
for hunch
for launch and
entry
Pressure suited
for launch, EVA,
anden_
Pressure suited
for launch and
entry
Shirt sleeve
_C,_oodngecloth)
(except for
sponge cloth)
Human Senses
Very good Human senses
i •
Very good Human Senses
Very good Human Senses
Verygond
vev/gond
Very good
Very good
HumanSenses
Thirty ulua-
violet
Nineionization
type smoke
detectors
Nine
.|Nine
FIRE
EXTINGUISH-
MENT
Dump '
Almosphere
Dump
Atmosphere
Dump
Aanosphere
Dump
Aunosphere
(after suiting) ,,
Foam
Foam and water
gun
Foam '
Foam and water
hose
'I_on 130i
3-fixed,
Avionics
2-portable
Halon 1301
Halon1301
NOTES: *The atmosphere inside the spacecraft during some ground operations is increased to more than
atmospheric (as much as 21 psia or 145 kPa) pressure with pure oxygen. Mercury, Gemini,
and Apollo 1 applies.
**Human senses implies smell, sight, sound, and touch in whatever combination. For spacecraft
with electronic fire detection, these still apply, particularly when the crew disables the system
for preventing false alarms.
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The Orbiter made the final change by selecting 21 percent (nominal) oxygen at 14.7
psia (i01 kPa) with nitrogen as the inert gas. For the Space Station Freedom, the
concensus of the scientificcommunity insistson an atmosphere similar to sea level air
in order that normal-gravity ground data can be compared directly with low-gravity
in-flightobservations.
C.2 CREW REQUIREMENTS
Clothing was selected primarily for comfort. Pressure suitsselected for Mercury were
modified somewhat for Gemini as one of the mission requirements involved an EVA
(extra-vehicular activity)with severe radiation levels not found on earth. Apollo suits
had the additional requirement, in the case of those who would explore the moon, of
longer periods of self-sufficiencyplus the added protection from abrasion by the use of
extra gloves and footwear. But, it wasn't until the fifth Orbiter flight that sufficient
confidence was established to have the crew perform launch and landing operations
without a fullpressure suit and ejection seats. That confidence was abruptly shaken
by the Challenger accident, however, with the result that the STS-26 Discovery crew
had to have very elaborate (and heavy) suits with life support aids designed for an
open-ocean recovery: a liferaft and two litersof drinking water, etc.
Flight suits(coveralls with long sleeves),underwear, socks, caps, and various footwear
have been used. Apollo in-flightclothing was PBI and Durette. The Shuttle started
out with flame-retardant cotton and switched to Nomex in STS-25 because of linting.
Shorts and T-shirts are worn when possible. Materials include cotton (underwear and
socks), Nomex, beta-cloth (fiberglass),and a variety of materials for EVA suits:
neoprene-coated nylon, teflon fabric, aluminized mylar, dacron, silicone rubber,
polycarbonate, polysulfone, etc. Some of these were selected for their non-flammable
characteristics in a selected atmosphere; others were selected with a waiver as no
acceptable substitute was available.
Sleep periods were scheduled as close as possible to match those the crew had grown
accustomed to, and all slept at the same time. In such confined quarters, it was felt
the activity of some would disturb the sleep of others. Hygiene facilitieswere
somewhat primitive. Only on Skylab was a shower provided. The Shuttle has a private
toilet and provision for a wet cloth bath. Shaving was waived by some men while
others apparently shaved at the last minute before a public appearance. Highly
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flammable paper (tissue, notebooks, etc.) and highly flammable cotton towels and face
cloths were on-board and in use.
Crew preference items were also allowed, suchas the "Hello Morn" and "Ajax Delivery
Service" signs of earlier flights and the five Hawaiian shirts of STS-26, with no
attempt to meet material selection criteria.
C.3 MATERIAL SELECTION
Engineering properties formed the basis for selecting a given material, with toxicity
and flammability placing a close secondin the priority system. In addition, for metals,
their fracture corrosion and stress corrosion properties were a guide as well.
Testing a material for acceptability was done in accordance with a NASA Head-
quarters document, NHB 8060.1 from November 1971to February 1974, NHB 8060.1A
from February 1974 to September 1981, and a B-revision after that. A C-revision,
now under review, will undoubtedly apply for the SpaceStation. For materials that do
not passor qualify according to the approved testing, a waiver is granted. Histori-
cally, the majority of these have been granted for flammable materials to be located
inside the crew cabin. The Orbiter has had two toxicity waivers and about thirty
Rockwell and sixty GFE (government-furnished equipment) flammability waivers. For
example, the face plate of the EVA suit is made of polycarbonate, an impact resistant
transparent polymer which is highly flammable in oxygen. Also, among the EVA
helmet construction materials is polysulfone, which is also flammable in air. Simi-
larly, the use of cotton, as previously stated, was waived as synthetic substitutes do
not have the water absorbencyor comfort characteristics, and most are flammable as
well. The major flammability waivers are for suits, towels, data files, foam cushions
in lockers, velcro, and PVC (polyvinyl chloride) used in medical wiring harnessesand
tubing.
In addition to selecting the proper material for specific environments, there hasbeena
variety of constraints on the materials. Thus far, the philosophy is that if a
potentially catastrophic occurrence initiates, the system is designed to contain the
problem. If, for example, a motor overheated and a fire started, it would self-
extinguish before heat or toxic effects would disable the crew. This is exactly what
happenedwhen a wire shorted and charred in STS-6,but no propagation of a fire took
place.
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An instance of how this designconstraint is applied is in the placing of velcro (hook) on
the cabin walls. In order to prevent a fire path of the nylon, which is flammable in air,
velcro is limited to four square inches (25 cm2) at a time with at least a two-inch
(5-cm) gap between it and other flammables. Food wrappers, paper, towels, etc. are
also managedin such a way as to minimize fire propagation. In the Gemini, however,
this wasnot a strict designconstraint. Most interior surfaces were "carpeted" with a
water absorbent maze of cellulose acetate called "spongecloth" to reduce the effects
of annoying spills (water, fruit juice, urine, etc.). This material burned extremely
rapidly in the spacecraft's oxygen environment. In the caseof Apollo, the design was
far more fire-safe, yet the large block of polyurethane foam that was usedfor ground
testing of the CommandModule to cushion the hatch of Apollo 204 greatly contributed
to that January 1967 catastrophe. This happenedas a result of emphasizing in-flight
safety in a far more rigid manner than pre-flight activities. An excellent critique of
that accident and its consequencesis documented in "Apollo Expeditions to the Moon,"
a publication designated NASA SP-350. George M. Low, the Program Director, listed
"Three Mistakes" on page 73 of that publication, concluding that they "added up to a
spark, fuel for a fire, and an environment to make the fire explosive in its nature. And
three fine mendied."
C.4 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
The use of circuit breakers as a means to prevent accidental ignition has its own
potentially conflicting design considerations. From a reliability standpoint, there is a
built-in allowable overload capability which is designedto prevent circuit interruption
from a momentary power surge. But, from a fire safety standpoint, any overload is
highly uadesirable. Thus, a tension exists between safety and continued performance.
Another design conflict that has an effect on accidental fire is the practice of
combining several circuits with a single circuit breaker. The advantages from a
weight and reliability standpoint are obvious. But, a short in a minor circuit that
draws less than five amperes may cause localized overheating to the point where the
conductor melts before a fifteen or twenty ampere circuit breaker respondsand opens
the circuit.
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C.5 FIRE DETECTION
The human sensesprovide an excellent meansof identifying an accidental fire nearby
in a confined space such as the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo spacecraft, provided the
human is healthy and alert. Thus, when the mission plan involved sleep, as in the last
Mercury flight, Gemini 4, and subsequent flights, this means of fire detection is
inadequate. A survey of possible types of fire detectors wasprepared by the Manned
Spacecraft Center, J.H. Kimzey, on 12 January 1971 and forwarded to the Apollo
Office. Skylab provided the first in-flight fire detector, using thirty ultra-violet, line-
of-sight, devices placed throughout the vehicle. The Orbiter usesnine ionization-type
smokedetectors, which respondto particulates of flame precursors.
C.6 FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT
For crewmen already in a pressuresuit in a spacecraft and breathing pure oxygen, the
atmospherecan be vented to spacein the event of an accidental fire. But man cannot
live very long in such confinement. Eating, using the toilet,and other mundane chores
such as exercise or performing experiments cannot be done efficientlythat way.
Apollo had a fire extinguisher, consisting of a pressurized can that delivered upwards
of four cubic feet (0.I M 3) of foam, which displaced the oxygen surrounding a blazing
electrical component when its nozzle is inserted into the selected opening in the
instrument panel. The Lunar Module had a water "gun" for reconstituting dehydrated
food, which was designated a fireextinguisher.
Obvious limitations of the Apollo foam extinguisher destined it to oblivion. For
Skylab, one of the ten water tanks (lightlypressurized) was fitted with a long garden-
type hose so water could be directed in ample quantity to extinguish a fire,or keep it
from spreading.
Weight considerations resulted in the selection of Halon 1301 for the Orbiter. Water is
provided in very limited amounts, and the decreased concentration of oxygen in the
atmosphere make this gas an excellent choice, particularly in the Avionics Bay.
Portable extinguishers holding a 2-1/2 pound (1.1 kg) charge are provided in the crew
cabin. Tests recently completed with human subjects in normal gravity show no
measurable effect from breathing this gas (bromotrifluoromethane) in one percent
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concentrations for twenty-four hours. That concentration represents the maximum
which would result if all on-board extinguishers were emptied in the absenceof a fire.
If used in a fire, the breakdown of that material when added to the smoke of the
consumedmaterial would producea variety of toxic and extremely corrosive gases.
C.6 CAUTION AND WARNINGSYSTEMS
Automatic on-board monitoring of the atmosphere and means to alert the crew for
off-nominal conditions has long beena major design consideration. Various items have
been included throughout the spaceprogram. In addition to a drop of cabin pressure, a
drop in oxygen partial pressure, a rise in carbon dioxide, and the presence of various
contaminants in the atmosphere are examples. During the Apollo 11 Lunar Module
descent to the moon, at six thousand feet (1800 M) above the lunar surface, a yellow
light came on "and we encountered one of the few potentiallyserious problems in the
entire flight"reports Michael Collins who was flying the Apollo at the time and who
heard Aldrin say, "program Alarm. It's a 1202." Collins decoded that to mean
"executive overflow," meaning simply that the computer has been called upon to do
too many things at once and is forced to postpone some of them (NASA SP-350, page
210).
C.7 CREW ATTITUDE
The crew's role in fire protection cannot be over-emphasized. Each individual has his
or her own background with an accidental fire,as well as experience level in fighting
fires. We all have thousands of hours (specifically 8766 hours per year) living,
sleeping, and working in surroundings that are typically quite flammable, yet only
moderately hazardous considering the options. For one thing, we normally can leave
the area - whether a residence, an office, a hotel room, an industrial shop, or an
automobile - and leave the situation for the experts to deal with. For ships and
aircraft,escape isnot always an option, and the situation becomes more complex, but
very few of us have crises like this in our personal experiences. So, we have a
relativelycasual attitude about accidental fires.
In space, there are several things lacking that we have previously taken for granted.
With no firedepartment to summon and with no lifeboats or parachutes for crew exit,
the isolationresults in total dependence on just those on board who are available to
help. At least in the Orbiter, as well as other low altitude orbiting vehicles, a landing
ispossible in about two hours or less.
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For the Space Station Freedom, the likelihood of a shuttle vehicle being available on
standby for months at a time is highly unlikely or, to put it another way, very
expensive. Thus, the crew awareness of the criticalityof their situation must be faced
early in their training,in the selection of items brought on board, and in the scheduling
of activitieson board the Station.
C.8 SPACE STATION HOUSEKEEPING
Special concern in the mind of fire protection engineers is the area of housekeeping.
Included here is the orderly placement of things, the general cleanliness of livingand
working areas, and the identificationand disposal of trash. Much material is packed
into every spacecraft: work items, sustenance items, recreation items, backup system
items, etc. For many spaceflights, no doubt, there is an in-flightorientation needed.
"Where islocker D-19?" and "Isn'tthere supposed to be a thing-a-ma-jig to turn this?"
And with as many as seven or eight people sharing such confined spaces, there ismuch
room for creativity,such as in finding a better place to store the mustard. Then,
there is the eternal problem of unpacking an optic, using it,and restoring it for return
to earth. Everybody over five years old has experienced the frustration of simply
putting the several items back in the carton recently opened and which appeared to be
so logicallyfitted together. Add to that the zero gravity environment and we have the
wonderment expressed by Skylab crewmen when things carefully placed where they
could be found later had simply disappeared.
Short spaceflights tended to impress the crew with the fact that there would soon be a
day of reckoning when everything had to be stowed for the re-entry. For longer stays,
as expected in the Space Station, it will become tempting to include "Manana" in the
priority system.
Cleaniness is another area that has to be addressed directly. The design of interior
surfaces must preclude those out-of-sight dark areas where an item can and will nest
for months. In addition, crew training must include appropriate reasons why fluids,
food residues, chemicals from experiment packages, soiled tissues, etc. can cause
corrosion, damage electrical insulation,interfere with thermal control, and otherwise
contribute to starting an accidental fire.
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The identification and stowage of trash is probably the most significant area in which
we have learned little in the twenty-seven years of spacecraft use. Spontaneous
ignition is mysterious enoughin earthly spaces. In zero gravity, we may learn the hard
way what it means to simply toss our discards into the trash-master and leave the
packagesin the designatedplace for pickup in as much as three months when the next
crew transfer takes place. Perhaps for a dead test rodent or other biological
specimen, the inevitable odor will dictate special handling. But other more subtle
items may escape optimum treatment. Food scraps, alcohol wipes, film wrappers,
adhesive tape, torn fabrics, paper, old batteries, monkey feces, and unknown gunk
from someexperiment may prove to be relatively incompatible.
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